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The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Sonia Roca-Royes Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge: Cambridge...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Matthew Mandelkern What does ‘might’ mean? One hypothesis is that ‘It might be raining’ is essentially an avowal of ignorance like ‘For all I know, it's raining’. But it turns out these two constructions embed in different ways—in particular, as parts of larger constructions like Wittgenstein's ‘It...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 241–272.
Published: 01 April 2017
... two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues that this conflict does arise and that it creates problems...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
..., we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 April 2010
... is easy to appreciate Leibniz's reasons for embracing this view, it has proven difficult to see how his doctrine of incompossibility might be reconciled with the broader commitments of his larger philosophical system. This essay develops, in four sections, a novel solution to the “puzzle of...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Malte Willer A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mathematical structure of a probability function does. The second mistake is that the hyperreals make too many distinctions. They have a much more complex structure than credences in ordinary propositions can have, so they make distinctions that don't exist among credences. While they might be useful for...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Kai von Fintel; Anthony S. Gillies Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Theron Pummer It seems plausible that (i) how much punishment a person deserves cannot be affected by the mere existence or nonexistence of another person. We might have also thought that (ii) how much punishment is deserved cannot increase merely in virtue of personal division. I argue that (i...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
... might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This essay argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one's knowledge of what the relevant kind of thing looks like. To make the case requires examining the nature of knowing what Fs look...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
... incompatibility of deflationism and RI. Section 3 argues that direct RI—RI that is not simply a derivative of some other, nonreferential instance of indeterminacy—is strictly incompatible with deflationism. Section 4 considers a couple of different ways the deflationist might try to achieve indirect RI—via...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... about the knowledge that Mary acquires. What the gods might lack despite their propositional omniscience is not any distinctive kind of information, but certain abilities of introspection. The motivating idea is that knowledge one acquires by exercising introspective abilities cannot fail to be...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
... experience requires that bodies are sensuously colored, and (iii) the attribution of sensuous colors to bodies provides the best explanation of color constancy. Although some passages might suggest that Cavendish endorses a reductive account of sensuous color, according to which sensuous color reduces to a...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 423–462.
Published: 01 October 2019
... experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. But note...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 433–463.
Published: 01 July 2020
... alternatives. Killing, it turns out, is much harder to justify than we might otherwise have thought. Some might worry that the Comparative Approach and the Revisionary View leave no space for ethical partiality. It is true that the cases considered so far have been cases in which a rescuer has no reason to...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
...? While much of this thought seems right, this paper argues that the relationship between the epistemic and the zetetic is not as harmonious as one might have thought and liked. In particular, this paper argues that some familiar contemporary epistemic norms are in tension with, and even in conflict with...