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might

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Sonia Roca-Royes Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Cornell University 2009 Chalmers, David. 2002 . “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” In Conceivability and Possibility , ed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Matthew Mandelkern What does ‘might’ mean? One hypothesis is that ‘It might be raining’ is essentially an avowal of ignorance like ‘For all I know, it's raining’. But it turns out these two constructions embed in different ways—in particular, as parts of larger constructions like Wittgenstein's ‘It...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 241–272.
Published: 01 April 2017
... two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 April 2010
... is easy to appreciate Leibniz's reasons for embracing this view, it has proven difficult to see how his doctrine of incompossibility might be reconciled with the broader commitments of his larger philosophical system. This essay develops, in four sections, a novel solution to the “puzzle of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues that this conflict does arise and that it creates problems...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
..., we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 449–495.
Published: 01 October 2010
... the rational psychologist might arrive at such a view. It is further argued that the source of the fallacy in the first paralogism is a confusion about the very nature of conceivability and that, in identifying this confusion, Kant makes a philosophical contribution of lasting value. © 2010 by...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Malte Willer A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Kai von Fintel; Anthony S. Gillies Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mathematical structure of a probability function does. The second mistake is that the hyperreals make too many distinctions. They have a much more complex structure than credences in ordinary propositions can have, so they make distinctions that don't exist among credences. While they might be useful for...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Theron Pummer It seems plausible that (i) how much punishment a person deserves cannot be affected by the mere existence or nonexistence of another person. We might have also thought that (ii) how much punishment is deserved cannot increase merely in virtue of personal division. I argue that (i...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
... might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This essay argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one's knowledge of what the relevant kind of thing looks like. To make the case requires examining the nature of knowing what Fs look...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
... incompatibility of deflationism and RI. Section 3 argues that direct RI—RI that is not simply a derivative of some other, nonreferential instance of indeterminacy—is strictly incompatible with deflationism. Section 4 considers a couple of different ways the deflationist might try to achieve indirect RI—via...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... about the knowledge that Mary acquires. What the gods might lack despite their propositional omniscience is not any distinctive kind of information, but certain abilities of introspection. The motivating idea is that knowledge one acquires by exercising introspective abilities cannot fail to be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 641–647.
Published: 01 October 2013
... and introduced by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. Most of the papers published here give detailed accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of plain epistemically modalized sentences such as (1) Mary might be in Chicago. and so I will focus on this aspect of the volume, summarizing the remaining...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
... range across the relevant neural populations. This gives us an “unpacked” version of the view that provides an unusually vivid sense of how consciousness might actually be implemented in our neuronal wetware. The resulting discussion, drawing on a vast range of empirical data and astute philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2017
... required for moral responsibility, and the focus has been on humans. There has been little discussion of the freedom of such things as sharks and bats. One might defend this restriction on the ground that nonhuman animals do not have the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. If that is the...