Search Results for merrick

...John Martin Fischer; Patrick Todd In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review , “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect...

...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...

...Trenton Merricks The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” ( Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine...

...Michael B. Burke Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 203. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 4 (October 2002) Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons. Oxford...

...Simon Keller Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xviii + 202 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xii + 240 pp...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

..., 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xviii + 202 pp. Philosophers often find themselves trying to make their claims about what is true fit their claims about what exists. They argue about whether acor- rect...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... epistemic situation with respect to the experiential, and, as such, fails to resolve the logical problem, at least in the manner Stoljar claims it does. Kelly Trogdon University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophical Review, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2009 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-053 Trenton Merricks...

... © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 INDEX OF VOLUME 120 ARTICLES Chalmers, David J., Verbal Disputes 515 Fischer, John Martin, and Patrick Todd, The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks 97 Graham, Peter A., ‘Ought’ and Ability 337 Lam, Barry...

... . Merricks Trenton . 2009 . “ Truth and Freedom .” Philosophical Review 118 : 29 – 57 . Pike Nelson . 1965 . “ Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action .” Philosophical Review 74 : 27 – 46 . Reprinted in Fischer 1989, 57–73 . Pike Nelson 1993 . “ A Latter-Day Look...

... . “Modal Realism with Overlap.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 : 137 -52. ____. Forthcoming a. “Brutal Simples.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics , vol. 3 , ed. Dean W. Zimmerman. ____. Forthcoming b. “Extended Simples.” Philosophical Studies . Merricks, Trenton. 1994 . “Endurance...

.... Linsky, Bernard, and Ed Zalta. 1991 . “Is Lewis a Meinongian?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 : 438 –53. Merricks, Trenton. 2006 . Objects and Persons . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Parsons, Terence. 1980 . Nonexistent Objects . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Salmon, Nathan...

...,” Trenton Merricks targets the view that the present is the edge of the growing block of reality, which includes the past but not (yet) the future. A growing block theorist needs to explain how that “objective” notion of the present relates to the ordinary “subjective” one, as deployed in what we might...