...Andrew Y. Lee Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely...

...-69; and Margaret Wilson, “Descartes on the Representationality of Sensation,” 1-14.141-42/59-60; Arnauld, WI244-45, 248. 49 ALISON SIMMONS etc and that they are confused insofar as they falsely represent those mental qualities...

... Defi nition 2a reads as follows: “In Scotch, the suffi x is added freely to almost any descriptive adj., esp. those relating to mental qualities, 12. The material in this paragraph owes much to Fara 2001. 454 The Structure...

...-dependent qualities is not a uniquely relativistic doctrine. Thus Paul Boghossian and David Velleman (1991) maintain that colors are qualities, not of material things, but of mental things. If colors are essentially qualities of mental things, then they are mind-dependent qualities, but they need...

... if there is something it is like to be that being. … Similarly, a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience...

... of ‘Q’ to think about a sensory quality-type Q and, necessarily: if a subject S uses a token of ‘Q’ at a time t, then S experiences Q at t. It should be clear that, absent further assumptions, Imagism about Phenomenal Thought and Mental Symbol Imagism are not just distinct...

... of Simple Ideas of Sensation .” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 : 301 – 21 . Curley E. M. 1972 . “ Locke, Boyle, and the Distinctions between Primary and Secondary Qualities .” Philosophical Review 81 : 438 – 64 . Feldman Richard , and Conee Earl 2001...

... Block, N. “Mental Paint and Mental Latex.” In E. Villanueva, ed. Philosophial Issues, vol. 7: Perception, ed. E. Villanueva (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1996), 19–49. Boghossian, P., and D. Velleman. 1989. “Color as a Secondary Quality.” Mind 98:81–103. Clark, A. Sensory Qualities. 1993...

... of 216 Aquinas on Mental Representation standing in the relation of formal sameness to them and, hence, can be only “about” things that are intrinsically the same as they are. But con- cepts, as we have seen, are accidental forms falling in the Aristotelian category of Quality...

... to the epiphenomenality of the mental.) Merricks offers the following support for his denial of microphysical super- venience. If human organism O’s existing and having conscious mental prop- erties supervened on the qualities and interrelations of the atoms composing O, then those same atoms, minus the atoms...

... and Witmer, concern the formulation of physicalism, concentrating (especially in Witmer’s case) on questions of supervenience and determination. The next two papers, by Shoe- maker and Rey, concern the connection between physicalism and mental cau- sation. Shoemaker concentrates on George Bealer’s well...

... the nonintentional conception of pain and pleasure is based on a linguistic ambiguity involving pain and pleasure words. According to Brentano, “pain” (say) is used to designate both a feeling of hurtfulness (intentional mental phenomenon) and a sensible quality (nonintentional physical phenomenon). Since we tend...

..., is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive qualitative character that resists reduction. (Kim does not discuss “representationalist” accounts of qualia, which would presumably permit...

..., is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive qualitative character that resists reduction. (Kim does not discuss “representationalist” accounts of qualia, which would presumably permit...

..., is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive qualitative character that resists reduction. (Kim does not discuss “representationalist” accounts of qualia, which would presumably permit...

..., is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive qualitative character that resists reduction. (Kim does not discuss “representationalist” accounts of qualia, which would presumably permit...

... domain—in fact if it is to have any causal efficacy at all—it must be physically reducible” (161). The trouble, Kim argues, is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive...

... domain—in fact if it is to have any causal efficacy at all—it must be physically reducible” (161). The trouble, Kim argues, is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive...

...). The trouble, Kim argues, is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive qualitative character that resists reduction. (Kim does not discuss “representationalist” accounts of qualia...

....: Ridgeview. ____. 1995a . “On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 : 225 -47. ____. 1995b . “How Many Concepts of Consciousness?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 : 272 -84. ____. 1996 . “Mental Paint and Mental Latex.” In Philosophical Issues...