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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 378–385.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Angela Mendelovici; David Bourget Neander Karen , A Mark of the Mental . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2017 . xv + 327 . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental is a noteworthy and novel contribution to the long-running project of naturalizing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
...Andrew Y. Lee Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 79–103.
Published: 01 January 2006
...John Gibbons Cornell University 2006 Mental Causation without Downward Causation John Gibbons University of Nebraska, Lincoln The problem of causal exclusion is that an intuitive response to an intuitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... counterfactuals can yield an appropriate notion of causal redundancy and argues for a negative answer. Second, it examines how this issue bears on the mental causation debate. In particular, it considers the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not arise on a dependency conception of causation...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Jeffrey E. Brower; Susan Brower-Toland This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 614–619.
Published: 01 October 2021
...Lei Zhong In contrast with Kroedel’s formulations, my version of the exclusion argument bypasses the issue of how to characterize the notion of overdetermination. What definition of overdetermination we should accept—or whether mental causation is a case of overdetermination—is not very...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 417–420.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Mary Salvaggio Finally, the book turns to the purpose of memory. Why did episodic memory evolve? There is evidence that nonhuman animals have episodic-like memory, but it is an open question whether any have a conscious “mental time travel” type of memory. Michaelian argues that existing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 270–275.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Agnieszka Jaworska Peter Byrne, Philosophical and Ethical Problems in Mental Handicap. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. Pp. xiii, 175. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS lineal traditions, between secularism and religiosity, between rationalism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object system...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... it have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... of to careers, would serve equally well. It is further argued that the circularity objection to psychological accounts can be answered without appeal to the notion of quasi-memory. Because of the internal relations between the causal profiles of mental states and the persistence conditions of their possessors...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 473–480.
Published: 01 July 2020
... and to give Brentano’s significant and lasting contribution to philosophy the careful attention it deserves. Textor doesn't explicitly address this issue here, but he has previously argued for a “fusion” view, according to which the mental acts of being aware of x and the awareness of awareness of x...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... . Minds and Machines. In Dimensions of Mind , edited by S. Hook. New York: New York University Press. ____. 1964 . Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life? Journal of Philosophy 59 : 658 -71. ____. 1967a . The Mental Life of Some Machines. In Intentionality, Minds, and Perception...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2001
... and the epistemological claim that it is not possible to under- stand the nature of cognitive processes by focusing exclusively on what is occurring inside the skin of cognizing organisms (31). Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining how environmentalism differs from other forms of externalism about the mental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 291–294.
Published: 01 April 2002
...: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp.viii, 274. The following assumptions are necessary to get the contemporary problem of mental causation off the ground: (1) Non-Identity of the Mental and the Physical (2) Causal Closure of the Physical (3) Causal Exclusion (4) Causal Relevance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... it seems that mental events very often cause physical events, they probably do (100–101). This argument is, as far as I know, wholly original and in my estimation brilliant—one of the most important contributions of the book. Given property dualism, Swinburne assumes epiphenomenalism entails...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... for the possession of it. Introspection tells us about our own phenomenally individuated mental states, such as our current experiences and our stored beliefs. Intuitively, justification from introspection can also be partial and misleading, and if one momentarily consciously judges that p but has stored away...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 623–626.
Published: 01 October 2001
... of perception the mental compo- nents would be perceptual experiences. To distinguish his view of perception from the truism that perception is essentially world-involving, Rowlands needs to show that there are components of perception that are both mental and essentially world-involving. I think...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 31–75.
Published: 01 January 2001
... ALISON SIMMONS presents to illustrate his renunciation of Cartesianism is dominated by issues in the philosophy of mind. The most dramatic, but under-appre- ciated, disagreement concerns the very nature of mental activity, and so of the mind itself. The Cartesians take consciousness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 304–306.
Published: 01 April 2008
... criti- cally at the orthodox approach to the identification of mental disorder. Early on he rejects constructivist views that make mental disorders purely a function of social norms, arguing that within the “abnormal” we commonly distinguish between the deviant and the pathological...