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mental

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 79–103.
Published: 01 January 2006
...John Gibbons Cornell University 2006 Mental Causation without Downward Causation John Gibbons University of Nebraska, Lincoln The problem of causal exclusion is that an intuitive response to an intuitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Jeffrey E. Brower; Susan Brower-Toland This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... counterfactuals can yield an appropriate notion of causal redundancy and argues for a negative answer. Second, it examines how this issue bears on the mental causation debate. In particular, it considers the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not arise on a dependency conception of causation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 417–420.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Mary Salvaggio Michaelian Kourken , Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2016 . xx + 291 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Mental Time Travel defends the extraordinary claim that episodic memory is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 270–275.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Agnieszka Jaworska Peter Byrne, Philosophical and Ethical Problems in Mental Handicap. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. Pp. xiii, 175. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS lineal traditions, between secularism and religiosity, between rationalism and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... to quareers instead of to careers, would serve equally well. It is further argued that the circularity objection to psychological accounts can be answered without appeal to the notion of quasi-memory. Because of the internal relations between the causal profiles of mental states and the persistence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... seems that mental events very often cause physical events, they probably do (100–101). This argument is, as far as I know, wholly original and in my estimation brilliant—one of the most important contributions of the book. Given property dualism, Swinburne assumes epiphenomenalism entails that the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2001
... about the mental. The crucial points are (a) that the arguments to be pre- sented for the ontological claim do not turn on considerations about the con- tent of mental states, (b) that environmentalism implies a strong form of externalism, and (c) that standard arguments for externalism, based on con...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 291–294.
Published: 01 April 2002
... Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp.viii, 274. The following assumptions are necessary to get the contemporary problem of mental causation off the ground: (1) Non-Identity of the Mental and the Physical (2) Causal Closure of the Physical (3) Causal Exclusion (4...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 304–306.
Published: 01 April 2008
... looking criti- cally at the orthodox approach to the identification of mental disorder. Early on he rejects constructivist views that make mental disorders purely a function of social norms, arguing that within the “abnormal” we commonly distinguish between the deviant and the pathological, and that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 422–424.
Published: 01 July 2003
... Witmer, concern the formulation of physicalism, concentrating (especially in Witmer’s case) on questions of supervenience and determination. The next two papers, by Shoe- maker and Rey, concern the connection between physicalism and mental cau- sation. Shoemaker concentrates on George Bealer’s well...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
.... 1960 . Minds and Machines. In Dimensions of Mind , edited by S. Hook. New York: New York University Press. ____. 1964 . Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life? Journal of Philosophy 59 : 658 -71. ____. 1967a . The Mental Life of Some Machines. In Intentionality, Minds, and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 623–626.
Published: 01 October 2001
... perception the mental compo- nents would be perceptual experiences. To distinguish his view of perception from the truism that perception is essentially world-involving, Rowlands needs to show that there are components of perception that are both mental and essentially world-involving. I think that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 135–137.
Published: 01 January 2001
... not an idealist, on Collins’sview, because he (Kant) neither denies the existence of a non-mental reality (dogmatic idealism) nor claims that we cannot be sure that there is any non-mental reality (problem- atic idealism) (22; cf. 23). Because Kant explicitly (and, it is implied, correct- ly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 586–588.
Published: 01 October 2002
... serious option. Ironically, it is his way of preserving humans and other conscious organisms that is startling and hard to take seriously. Supposing that we exist, and that we cause certain things by having “con- scious mental properties” (88–89), Merricks argues that our existing and hav- ing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
... that are actions. They become actions only when they are causally connected in the right functional way to other events within the agen- tial system. The two time-honored competitors to CTA are the so-called “Agent Theory of Action” and the “Mental Action Theory”. The first theory maintains that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
... science. The best measures to consider here are: commitment to the existence of representations, in some form or other, and individualism, in one form or other, that is, whether the organism or some subunit of it is taken as more or less sufficient for mentality. On this scale of radicalness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2016
... for all kinds of mental states the possibility of a mismatch between one's actual attitude and what one's attitude ought to be, which raises the question of how one can determine what one's attitude is by determining what it ought to be. There is also the “Substitution Problem” for Rationalism; TM...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 31–75.
Published: 01 January 2001
... ALISON SIMMONS presents to illustrate his renunciation of Cartesianism is dominated by issues in the philosophy of mind. The most dramatic, but under-appre- ciated, disagreement concerns the very nature of mental activity, and so of the mind itself. The Cartesians take consciousness to be...