Search Results for mathematic
1-20 of 340 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2004) 113 (2): 157–201.
Published: 01 April 2004
..., Calif.: Wadsworth. ____. 1972 . Kantian Intuitions. Inquiry 15 : 341 -45. ____. 1974a . Kant's `New Method of Thought' and His Theory of Mathematics. In his Knowledge and the Known . Dordrecht: D. Reidel. ____. 1974b . Kant on the Mathematical Method. In his Knowledge and the Known...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 485–531.
Published: 01 October 2014
...Marc Lange Unlike explanation in science, explanation in mathematics has received relatively scant attention from philosophers. Whereas there are canonical examples of scientific explanations (as well as canonical examples of nonexplanations, such as “the flagpole,” “the eclipse,” and “the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 422–426.
Published: 01 July 2018
... fact that Because without Cause brilliantly makes the case for the possibility of noncausal explanation in mathematics and science and opens our collective eyes to many kinds of scientific argument that have escaped philosophical attention. The book shows one of the generation's best philosophers of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 298–302.
Published: 01 April 2016
... definitions be ejected from mathematics, or at least from mathematics beyond elementary arithmetic. In my review, I asked if there are, or ever were, such justifications. Here, Parsons replies that, in his paper, he was concerned solely with efforts to expose the foundations under the predicativism of the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 115–118.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Mark Steiner MATHEMATICS AS A SCIENCE OF PATTERNS. By Michael Resnik. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1997. Pp. xiii, 285. Cornell University 2000 Frege, Gottlob. 1959 . The Foundations of Arithmetic. Trans. J. L. Austin. Oxford: Blackwell. Kitcher, Philip...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 79–82.
Published: 01 January 2001
...John P. Burgess PLATONISM AND ANTI-PLATONISM IN MATHEMATICS. By Mark Balaguer. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 217. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REWEWS without careful and difficult argument. The Humean principle has become an...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 286–289.
Published: 01 April 2001
...Paolo Mancosu WITTGENSTEIN, FINITISM, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS. Oxford Philosophical Monographs. By Mathieu Marion. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. xx, 260. Cornell University 2001 Nedo, Michael, ed. 1993 . Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wiener...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2003
...Adam Rieger Penelope Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. viii, 254. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3 (July 2003) Penelope Maddy...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mistake, which this essay calls the “numerical fallacy,” is to assume that a distinction that isn't represented by different numbers isn't represented at all in a mathematical representation. In this case, the essay claims that although the real numbers do not make all relevant distinctions, the full...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Daniel Sutherland Despite the importance of Kant's claims about mathematical cognition for his philosophy as a whole and for subsequent philosophy of mathematics, there is still no consensus on his philosophy of arithmetic, and in particular the role he assigns intuition in it. This inquiry sets...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... employ in logic, mathematics, and the sciences can be fully captured in English, there is also reason to think that the threat can be averted. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Earlier versions of the article were presented at a Rutgers Semantics Workshop, at Arché in St. Andrews, and at an...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 397–430.
Published: 01 July 2016
... Jonathan Bennett in effect interprets the result to mean that PSR entails that there are no contingent truths. But reflection on parallels in philosophy of mathematics shows it can equally be interpreted either as a proof that there are “too many” contingent truths to combine in a single conjunction or as...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 81–122.
Published: 01 January 2017
... suspect in requiring nonstandard assumptions about mathematical objects. Happily, the view of quantifier meanings that underwrites quantifier variance can be used to provide an account of indefinite extensibility that is both metasemantically and metaphysically satisfying. Section 1 introduces the puzzle...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 296–299.
Published: 01 April 2008
... of mathematics, and philosophy of language. The style is both entertaining and clear. The positions he argues for are so controversial as to sound almost insane. And yet the arguments he provides are illuminating and manage to make the positions seem almost like common sense. Both books are worth...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 289–290.
Published: 01 April 2001
... chapter, Marion mounts an impressive attack on one of the standard interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathemat- ics-most notably proposed by Dummett-which equates Wittgenstein’s position with strict finitism. In particular, Marion shows that Wittgenstein was hostile to the argument...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 342–354.
Published: 01 July 2014
... Foundations …is to explain how the application of pure mathematics to the empirical concepts of mathematical physics becomes possible” (88). Kant's goal is to explain, concept by concept, how the fundamental concepts of Newtonian physics—for example, duration , mass , velocity , and force— come to be...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 579–582.
Published: 01 October 2002
... misleading in that, together with Zahar’s stated aim of both “clarifying and of then reconciling Poincaré’s various theses about the foundations of mathematics and the natu- ral sciences” (1), it might give the reader hope that all of these theses might be shown to be part of one unified position. In...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 456–459.
Published: 01 July 2000
...Mark Eli Kalderon REALISTIC RATIONALISM. By Jerrold Katz. Cambridge: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 1998. Pp. xxxiv, 226. Cornell University 2000 Benacerraf, P. 1973 /1989. “Mathematical truth.” In Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings , ed. P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, 403...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 116–118.
Published: 01 January 2014
... subnomically stable sets form a hierarchy of nested sets. The set of all subnomic facts forms the largest (and trivially) subnomic set. The next subnomically stable set is one containing the laws, plus mathematical, conceptual, and logical truths—it excludes all the accidental truths. A set containing the...