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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 329–333.
Published: 01 April 2023
...J. P. Studd Florio Salvatore Linnebo Øystein and The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . xiv + 314 pp. © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 Logicians and philosophers have had a good 120 years to get used...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 191–226.
Published: 01 April 2021
...Lara Buchak In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one's own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one's opinion on important matters...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 327–359.
Published: 01 July 2022
...Alex Byrne; Riccardo Manzotti When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 295–325.
Published: 01 July 2022
...Chunghyoung Lee Many people believe that human beings begin to exist with the emergence of the 1-cell zygote at fertilization. I present a novel argument against this belief, one based on recently discovered facts about human embryo development. I first argue that a human zygote is developmentally...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 41–71.
Published: 01 January 2018
...J. Robert G. Williams The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Michael Bukoski In The Sources of Normativity and elsewhere, Korsgaard defends a Kantian ethical theory by arguing that valuing anything commits one to valuing humanity as the source of all value. I reconstruct Korsgaard's influential argument to show how she can resist many of the objections...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
... in space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
...Anat Schechtman Descartes notoriously characterizes substance in two ways: first, as an ultimate subject of properties (that is, a subject in which properties inhere without itself inhering in anything); second, as an independent entity. The characterizations have appeared to many to diverge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 397–430.
Published: 01 July 2016
... and Jonathan Bennett in effect interprets the result to mean that PSR entails that there are no contingent truths. But reflection on parallels in philosophy of mathematics shows it can equally be interpreted either as a proof that there are “too many” contingent truths to combine in a single conjunction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
... is the referent of the complement clause that p . On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—for example, the proposition that p —as they are in the case of believes . In many cases...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
..., the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... the hypothesis and by arguing that there is no easy way to defeat it—prima facie counterexamples are many, but none of them withstand serious scrutiny. Then the article presents a real counterexample—a hitherto largely neglected reading of quantified attitude-reports where the attitude verb splits the quantifier...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
... or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Research on this article has been supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (RJ). Some supplementary funding was provided by the Wenner-Gren Foundations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 423–446.
Published: 01 July 2011
...David Enoch In Slaves of the Passions Mark Schroeder puts forward Hypotheticalism, his version of a Humean theory of normative reasons that is capable, so he argues, of avoiding many of the difficulties Humeanism is traditionally vulnerable to. This critical notice first outlines the main argument...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
...David J. Chalmers The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 215–287.
Published: 01 April 2013
... for many other kinds of depiction. The essay concludes that depiction in general is not grounded in resemblance but geometrical transformation. © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 This essay benefited from the generous conversation and comments of many friends, colleagues, students, and teachers...