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The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Neil Sinhababu This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to the specification of this relation. Several difficulties with such analyses have led many philosophers to reject the possibility of an adequate resemblance account of depiction. This essay outlines these difficulties and argues that current resemblance accounts succumb to them. It then develops an...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 481–524.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Seana Valentine Shiffrin The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 31–76.
Published: 01 January 2010
... consider particles fundamental, with metaphysical explanation snaking upward from the many. There seem to be physical and modal considerations that favor the monistic view. Physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 315–336.
Published: 01 July 2010
... powerful “Dilemma Defense.” In the last decade or so, many philosophers have been persuaded by the Dilemma Defense that the Frankfurt cases do not show what Frankfurt (and others) thought they show. This essay presents a template for a general strategy of response to the Dilemma Defense. It thus seeks to...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... the power of any idea derives from the power of its causes and because many ideas have external causes, there are no grounds for taking the intensity of conscious experience to track a mind's power closely. Rather, as the second group of remarks suggests, power in a human mind tracks the degree to...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations that...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... hypothesis and by arguing that there is no easy way to defeat it—prima facie counterexamples are many, but none of them withstand serious scrutiny. Then the article presents a real counterexample—a hitherto largely neglected reading of quantified attitude-reports where the attitude verb splits the quantifier...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
... implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Research on this article has been supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (RJ). Some supplementary funding was provided by the Wenner-Gren Foundations. I have...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 423–446.
Published: 01 July 2011
...David Enoch In Slaves of the Passions Mark Schroeder puts forward Hypotheticalism, his version of a Humean theory of normative reasons that is capable, so he argues, of avoiding many of the difficulties Humeanism is traditionally vulnerable to. This critical notice first outlines the main argument...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
...David J. Chalmers The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 215–287.
Published: 01 April 2013
... many other kinds of depiction. The essay concludes that depiction in general is not grounded in resemblance but geometrical transformation. © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 This essay benefited from the generous conversation and comments of many friends, colleagues, students, and teachers: Tendayi...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 1–40.
Published: 01 January 2018
... in general” is a substance, and since all substances are “by their nature incorruptible,” this sort of body is incorruptible as well. In this article I defend a pluralist reading of this passage, according to which there are indefinitely many bodies-taken-in-general, each of which counts as an...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
... the referent of the complement clause that p . On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—for example, the proposition that p —as they are in the case of believes . In many...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
.... Benevolence seems to say that the only reason for departing from being bound to treat others like oneself is that more good would be produced. But the commonsense moralist will not agree that this is the only reason. In reply to the threat of an egoist's disagreement, this essay argues that many of the axioms...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... it, and not the other way around. Once we see this result, many suppose, we'll see that divine foreknowledge ultimately poses no threat to human freedom. This essay argues that matters are not so simple, for such reasoning threatens also to reconcile divine prepunishment with human freedom. The...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Tim Henning Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
... space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
...Anat Schechtman Descartes notoriously characterizes substance in two ways: first, as an ultimate subject of properties (that is, a subject in which properties inhere without itself inhering in anything); second, as an independent entity. The characterizations have appeared to many to diverge on the...