...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...

...” not to be intentionally killed, harmed, cuckolded, deprived of property, or defamed-an implicit list of rights (136) that is derived ultimate- ly from the love of neighbor as oneself that Finnis argues is Aquinas’s basic principle of practical reasonableness. Finnis gives special attention Aquinas’s moral...

... engages, for instance, some of the problems related to lying and self-defense, arguing, first (as she has before), for the exception to the rule when it comes to lying (when doing so does not undermine the end sustained by the general prohibition on lying) and, second (for the first time...

... is not an idealist, on Collins’sview, because he (Kant) neither denies the existence of a non-mental reality (dogmatic idealism) nor claims that we cannot be sure that there is any non-mental reality (problem- atic idealism) (22; cf. 23). Because Kant explicitly (and, it is implied, correct- ly...

... plausible theory of prudential reasons and any plausible theory of moral standards, morality can require an agent to act against his or her own interests, as when he or she could benefit by making a lying promise without suffering any adverse consequences. RAMS becomes plausible only if ‘reasons...

... heavi- ly on our inability to discern any good that serves God’s purposes in re- maining silent for now or permitting us to ruin ourselves in such a way that his evident presence and love is but seen through a glass darkly, which merely raises slightly elsewhere the worry it was supposed...

... to skimp on exemplary contradication-in-the-will arguments before proceeding to develop our own, I will substitute an alternative, the recent New Kantian argument against violence. Lying. Suppose your maxim is: to lie about whether you can and will pay back your creditor, whenever you need a loan...

... was lying. (14b) Ken felt the proposition that Nicole was lying. (14c) Ken felt the fact that Nicole was lying. 353 JEFFREY C. KING Since (14a) may be true while (14b) is not, we have a case of substitu- tion failure.12 But clearly (14a...

.... vii, 315. These books are part of Douglas Walton s project to develop a new theoretical framework for informal logic. The first book, on his new dialectic, is extreme- ly ambitious; the goal is nothing less than to construct a systematic and com- prehensive theory of rationality that can provide...

... and that therefore he “does not really defend utilitarianism” (425). Even if Irwin can maintain the marriage, we may still wonder what accepting Kant's position involves. Irwin seems to express some misgivings about Kant's view on lying (51, 823). We may wonder whether it is possible to embrace Kant's version...

... interprets those remarks as arguments against the logicist reduction of mathematics to logic. The above summary can only give a partial idea of the richness of infor- mation and analysis contained in the book. Although Marion had, admitted- ly, to leave out several topics...

... that colors are physical properties. However, the many objections in the literature to be discussed later are directed at intentionalism, not these other doctrines. Block, for example, actual- ly agrees with the rest of the package: he is a physicalist about both the mind and the colors...

... a survival of earlier Scotch usage, but of a much more extended usage in English: in fact, the ubiquitous use of the suffi x ‘-ly’ for adverbs derives from the Middle English suffi xes ‘-lik’ and ‘-like’, as in modern English ‘greedily’ from Middle English ‘gredilike’. Mod...

... Lexicon for the term) more thorough- ly than ever before, or since. I said to him ‘You hold that all composition in the world, or across worlds, is mereological only.” “Yes.” ‘You hold also that mere- ological wholes supervene upon the totality of their parts.” “Yes.” ‘You hold fur- ther...

... quick- ly, but what he says is powerful and suggestive. The chapter closes with a schol- arly discussion of Hume, too easily taken by others to be the classic instrumen- talist, and Shaver develops further the now standard point that hypothetical as well as categorical imperatives require...

..., but on reflection comes to accept ‘Sue did not lie’, through reflection on the concept of lying. Then, initially, A and B need not be having a narrowly verbal dispute: both may use ‘lie’ to express the same concept. But they are having a broadly verbal dispute all the same: intuitively, they agree...

.... This is where his metaethics gives objective values a secondary place, but we can wonder whether it does so fair- ly. Why take a requirement that fits experiential values because of their spe- cial character and apply it to values generally? Many hold that the state of someone on Robert Nozick s experience...

... unintegrated parts.” Accordingly, he proposes to “fas- ten on Hume’s efforts to found a theory of morality on a theory of mind” and to do so with an “approach to the textual evidence [that] is holistic, selfconscious ly seeking connections between what can seem to be isolated doctrines” (2).The set...

... exactly does that amount to? Sometimes it seems to refer to an indeterminacy intrinsic to the agent, but elsewhere it seems to require only that the agent be the cause of its acts. Above all, I would like to understand better the problem Hoffmann sees as lying at the heart of the entire later medieval...

... positively, he interprets those remarks as arguments against the logicist reduction of mathematics to logic. The above summary can only give a partial idea of the richness of infor- mation and analysis contained in the book. Although Marion had, admitted- ly, to leave out several topics...