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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 129–132.
Published: 01 January 2001
... owed to “everyone alike” in the “repub lic under God” not to be intentionally killed, harmed, cuckolded, deprived of property, or defamed-an implicit list of rights (136) that is derived ultimate- ly from the love of neighbor as oneself that Finnis argues is Aquinas’s basic principle of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 657–661.
Published: 01 October 2013
.... On any plausible theory of prudential reasons and any plausible theory of moral standards, morality can require an agent to act against his or her own interests, as when he or she could benefit by making a lying promise without suffering any adverse consequences. RAMS becomes plausible only if...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 135–137.
Published: 01 January 2001
... not an idealist, on Collins’sview, because he (Kant) neither denies the existence of a non-mental reality (dogmatic idealism) nor claims that we cannot be sure that there is any non-mental reality (problem- atic idealism) (22; cf. 23). Because Kant explicitly (and, it is implied, correct- ly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 289–290.
Published: 01 April 2001
... interprets those remarks as arguments against the logicist reduction of mathematics to logic. The above summary can only give a partial idea of the richness of infor- mation and analysis contained in the book. Although Marion had, admitted- ly, to leave out several topics (such as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 621–624.
Published: 01 October 2000
... heavi- ly on our inability to discern any good that serves God’s purposes in re- maining silent for now or permitting us to ruin ourselves in such a way that his evident presence and love is but seen through a glass darkly, which merely raises slightly elsewhere the worry it was supposed to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 77–79.
Published: 01 January 2001
... outSmarted by him (see Dan Dennett’s Philosophical Lexicon for the term) more thorough- ly than ever before, or since. I said to him ‘You hold that all composition in the world, or across worlds, is mereological only.” “Yes.” ‘You hold also that mere- ological wholes supervene upon the totality...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 111–113.
Published: 01 January 2001
... ground rather quick- ly, but what he says is powerful and suggestive. The chapter closes with a schol- arly discussion of Hume, too easily taken by others to be the classic instrumen- talist, and Shaver develops further the now standard point that hypothetical as well as categorical imperatives...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 281–283.
Published: 01 April 2001
... less confident. The further something is from an aspect of experience, the less assurance we can have about its worth. This is where his metaethics gives objective values a secondary place, but we can wonder whether it does so fair- ly. Why take a requirement that fits experiential values...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 286–289.
Published: 01 April 2001
.... More positively, he interprets those remarks as arguments against the logicist reduction of mathematics to logic. The above summary can only give a partial idea of the richness of infor- mation and analysis contained in the book. Although Marion had, admitted- ly, to leave out...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 132–134.
Published: 01 January 2001
... unintegrated parts.” Accordingly, he proposes to “fas- ten on Hume’s efforts to found a theory of morality on a theory of mind” and to do so with an “approach to the textual evidence [that] is holistic, selfconscious ly seeking connections between what can seem to be isolated doctrines” (2).The set of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
... Nicole was lying. (14b) Ken felt the proposition that Nicole was lying. (14c) Ken felt the fact that Nicole was lying. 353 JEFFREY C. KING Since (14a) may be true while (14b) is not, we have a case of substitu- tion failure.12 But...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 279–286.
Published: 01 April 2015
... leave many to think that the marriage between the two here requires, at the very least, further defense. Even if Irwin can maintain the marriage, we may still wonder what accepting Kant's position involves. Irwin seems to express some misgivings about Kant's view on lying (51, 823). We may wonder...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 291–295.
Published: 01 April 2001
...: University of Alabama Press, 1998. Pp. vii, 315. These books are part of Douglas Walton’s project to develop a new theoretical framework for informal logic. The first book, on his new dialectic, is extreme- ly ambitious; the goal is nothing less than to construct a systematic and com- prehensive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 525–560.
Published: 01 October 2003
... appropriate example of Kant’s claims on just about anybody’s reading). Because we do not want to skimp on exemplary contradication-in-the-will arguments before proceeding to develop our own, I will substitute an alternative, the recent New Kantian argument against violence. Lying. Suppose your maxim is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 441–463.
Published: 01 July 2007
... usage in English: in fact, the ubiquitous use of the suffi x ‘-ly’ for adverbs derives from the Middle English suffi xes ‘-lik’ and ‘-like’, as in modern English ‘greedily’ from Middle English ‘gredilike’. Mod- ern English also has a small number of survivors such as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 331–336.
Published: 01 April 2011
.... Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. vi þ330 pp. Carlisle, Clare. 2010. Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Reader’s Guide. Continuum Reader’s Guides. London: Continuum. xi þ212 pp. Carson, Thomas L. 2010. Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press. xix þ280 pp. Cavell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 117–121.
Published: 01 January 2018
... is a way of sensing, of sensing F-ly. Perception, by contrast, is presentational. Van Cleve identifies three elements in Reidean perception: conception, belief, and immediacy. But “the real core of perception,” according to Van Cleve, “is conception . . . a nonconceptual and therefore non-doxastic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 298–302.
Published: 01 April 2016
... interwar period and not at all with my question in its historically unqualified form. This brush-off will not do, Charles. Exhuming archival material in mathematics is often tempting and sometimes enlightening. Yet, the historical turn is open to a double genetic fallacy lying doggo nearby: the assumptions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 583–586.
Published: 01 October 2000
... is true that it is true, and so on. But this ladder is “lying on the ground, horizontal” (78): we are only asserting the original 586 ...