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lotteries

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Tim Henning Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408.
Published: 01 July 2000
... To Be a Fallibilist.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2 , ed. James Tomberlin, 91 -123. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Press. DeRose, Keith. 1996 . “Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 : 568 -80. Dretske, Fred. 1981 . Knowledge and the Flow of Information...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 395–404.
Published: 01 July 2003
... University Press. DeRose, Keith. 1996 . Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 : 568 -80. Douven, Igor. 2002 . A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 : 391 -410. Dretske, Fred. 1970...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... of rational belief can be built around these principles that is not ad hoc and that has various philosophical features that are plausible independently. In particular, this essay shows that the theory allows for a solution to the Lottery Paradox, and it has nice applications to formal epistemology. The price...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 335–338.
Published: 01 April 2021
.... The first consists in paradoxes where an infinity of physical things cooperate to produce a paradoxical situation. The paradigm is the Grim Reaper paradox. The second type involves paradoxes of rationality that can occur in infinitistic situations. The paradigm is a fair countable lottery. The opening...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
..., his wife has divorced him to run off with a younger man, he has lost his job including his health insurance, and he has recently been diagnosed with kidney disease, which will require expensive treatment. Larry deser- ves to win the lottery, if anyone does. So if there is to be any justice...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... University 2018 quantifiers epistemic modals dynamic semantics counterpart theory conceptual covers Imagine that there is a lottery with only two tickets, a blue ticket and a red ticket. The tickets are also numbered 1 through 2, but we don't know which color goes with which number...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
...Matthew Weiner Cornell University 2005 DeRose, Keith. 1995 . Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 : 1 -52. ____. 1996 . Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 : 568 -80. ____. 1998 . Simple `Might's, Indicative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
... and Richard Jeffrey, 33 -167. Berkeley: University of California Press. DeRose, Keith. 1991 . “Epistemic Possibilities.” Philosophical Review 100 : 581 -605. ____. 1996 . “Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 : 568 -80. ____. 2002 . “Assertion...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... .” Philosophical Review 111 ( 1 ): 67 – 94 . ———. 2009 . “ Critical Study of John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests .” Nous 43 ( 1 ): 178 – 92 . ———. 2007 . “ On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology .” Philosophy and Phenomenological...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... ′ . 76. We here consider the simplest case, in which each lottery assigns nonzero probability to only finitely many outcomes. Of course, our analysis can be extended to measurable sets O . 77. Another example of such a theory is Lara Buchak's (2013) risk-weighted expected utility theory...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
... a number of further puzzles—including Gettier Cases, the lottery puzzle and inductive knowledge (chapter 5), and Moorean thought and transmission failure (chapter 6). As well, Blome-Tillmann indicates how PEC might accommodate the influential recent thesis that evidence = knowledge —or, as suits...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 253–271.
Published: 01 April 2005
... to C. Strong independence. Strong independence is the constraint that enables the extension of rational choice theory to conditions of risk. It says that an individual prefers lottery L1 to L2 if and only if, for any lot- tery L3 and any probability p, she prefers the mixed lottery (pL1, (1...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... if the book had only this virtue, I would recommend it. Given, in addition, the richness of ideas and arguments contained within it, the collection is a must-read. References Hawthorne John 2004 . Knowledge and Lotteries . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Hill Christopher S...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
.... And we can also devise cases where I should move my belief considerably toward my friend’s, even though I start with a perfectly rational 99.9999 percent confi dence that P is false. Consider a million-ticket lottery in which each ticket is printed with three six-digit numbers that, when added...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 127–129.
Published: 01 January 2002
... on the basis of “certain criteria of medical acceptability” (127). If there are still more patients who need the treatment than there are resources to treat them, we should eschew attempts to rank them according to social worth, and choose instead on some random basis such as a lottery. Wallace disagrees...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... probable typically will rationalize certain actions. For instance, if I think that each ticket in a large lottery is equally likely to win, I’ll be happy to take certain bets concerning the outcome—for any particular ticket, I’ll be willing to bet against that tick- et’s winning at quite steep odds...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 504–507.
Published: 01 July 2023
... to match KNA’s familiar explanatory successes (involving lottery propositions, Moorean statements, etc.). Unlike KNA, alternatives that require only epistemically justified or rational belief or credence can allow that a subject is epistemically proper to assert what they believe when their belief...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 371–375.
Published: 01 July 2019
... belief in a proposition A as A being believed to a ‘high enough’ degree—has long been known to run into paradoxes, specifically the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes. At least that is so given some pre-theoretically equally plausible ideas about categorical belief, most notably that it is closed under...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... from the axioms. Von Neumann and Morgenstern lay down axioms governing preference between consequences, where the consequences include participation in lotteries. Jeffrey lays down axioms regarding preferences between states of affairs, and then identifies actions with those states of affairs one...