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libet

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... of Conscious Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. ix þ178 pp. Al Mele’s Effective Intentions is a much-needed antidote to some of the anti- realist views of free will that have been put forward recently by various scientists, most notably, Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. Now, unlike Wegner...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... University Press, 2009. ix þ178 pp. Al Mele’s Effective Intentions is a much-needed antidote to some of the anti- realist views of free will that have been put forward recently by various scientists, most notably, Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. Now, unlike Wegner, Libet actually wants to admit...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
... Libet and Daniel Wegner. Now, unlike Wegner, Libet actually wants to admit that humans have a limited sort of free will—a bit rough- ly, he thinks we have the freedom to consciously veto actions that are about to occur—but I think this is a pretty uninteresting kind of free will, and I’ll gloss over...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 461–467.
Published: 01 July 2011
... Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. ix þ178 pp. Al Mele’s Effective Intentions is a much-needed antidote to some of the anti- realist views of free will that have been put forward recently by various scientists, most notably, Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. Now, unlike Wegner, Libet...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
... with the world. Chapter 7 discusses the problem of action and free will. The central topic here is how Benjamin Libet's famous experiments can be dealt with in an enactive paradigm. Gallagher claims that there has been a lot of confused interpretation of Libet's results, and once we opt for some basic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 279–283.
Published: 01 April 2004
... cognitive motivations for their beliefs, such as the way things seem, introspectively, when we make choices. Every curious reader will want to read Benjamin Libet’s (reprinted) article, which describes Libet’s fascinating experiments showing that brain events leading to a decision occur 400...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 532–536.
Published: 01 October 2022
... it is mistaken; there are not good reasons to think it mistaken (277). This is a familiar line of argument. The epistemic principle concerning defeasible trust in one’s experiences is widely accepted. Wilson confines her defense of the ‘no empirical defeaters’ premise to a rebuttal of the Libet brain-activity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 303–311.
Published: 01 April 2000
... in Ethics and Social Philosophy. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. By David Lewis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. ix, 255. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. By Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, eds. Exeter, England: Imprint...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 244–247.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to address this problem on behalf of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 250–253.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 253–255.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 256–258.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 259–261.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 261–266.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 269–273.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 273–276.
Published: 01 April 2009
... of libertarians later in the book. Chapter 2 contains a critical discussion of the work of neurobiologist Benjamin Libet, who has interpreted certain experimental results as demon- strating that an agent’s decisions occur before the agent is aware of making them. Mele’s criticisms are persuasive (even...