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levels of description
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1
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Christian List; Marcus Pivato This article offers a new argument for the claim that there can be nondegenerate objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, the article shows how objective chance at a higher...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... descriptions are not very useful because what counts as abnormal at
463
BOOK REVIEWS
the genetic level may not do so at the level of the organism, and vice versa. She
correctly challenges the underlying belief in the “giveness” of the categories...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... descriptions are not very useful because what counts as abnormal at
463
BOOK REVIEWS
the genetic level may not do so at the level of the organism, and vice versa. She
correctly challenges the underlying belief in the “giveness” of the categories...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
... descriptions are not very useful because what counts as abnormal at
463
BOOK REVIEWS
the genetic level may not do so at the level of the organism, and vice versa. She
correctly challenges the underlying belief in the “giveness” of the categories...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 461–467.
Published: 01 July 2011
... descriptions are not very useful because what counts as abnormal at
463
BOOK REVIEWS
the genetic level may not do so at the level of the organism, and vice versa. She
correctly challenges the underlying belief in the “giveness” of the categories...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
... common count nouns. When they appear to do so, they are, at the level of logical form, directly preceded by the null definite with which they form a definite description. So there will be no ungrammatical sentences containing bare singular name count nouns in argument position that wear...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 626–630.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 607–610.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 610–614.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 615–617.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 618–620.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 623–626.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 630–633.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 634–637.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 637–639.
Published: 01 October 2008
... causal description (94). Okasha argues for
contextual analysis based on its theoretical generality (99), and despite that it
allows for MLS1 to occur in cases where there is no variation in collective-level
fitness (95–96). This issue of correct causal description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 579–582.
Published: 01 October 2002
... and Wittgenstein to Hartry Field. Second, its aims are broad. The author describes the book both as a rational reconstruction of Poincaré s position and as a treatise on mod- ern epistemology (4). The former description is somewhat misleading in that, together with Zahar s stated aim of both clarifying...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2007
... to be a physical state
of that person, fully governed by the laws of physics. Thus, Davidson’s view,
described at this level of abstraction, is compatible with materialist monism
and a variety of other restrictive ontological views.
So how is Davidson challenging the “methodological theme” in scien...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 650–653.
Published: 01 October 2007
... to be a physical state
of that person, fully governed by the laws of physics. Thus, Davidson’s view,
described at this level of abstraction, is compatible with materialist monism
and a variety of other restrictive ontological views.
So how is Davidson challenging the “methodological theme” in scien...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 654–656.
Published: 01 October 2007
... to be a physical state
of that person, fully governed by the laws of physics. Thus, Davidson’s view,
described at this level of abstraction, is compatible with materialist monism
and a variety of other restrictive ontological views.
So how is Davidson challenging the “methodological theme” in scien...
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