Search Results for learning

...John Mikhail Nichols Shaun , Rational Rules: Towards a Theory of Moral Learning . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . xv + 248 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 Shaun Nichols’s new book, Rational Rules , is the most creative and interesting response to moral...

...Patricia Marechal Jimenez Marta , Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2020 . x + 214 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 How can we become virtuous by doing virtuous actions? This question, which has received unceasing...

...Paolo Fait Bronstein David , Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The “Posterior Analytics.” Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016 . xiii + 272 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 Although it is one of Aristotle's most technical and abstract works, the Posterior Analytics...

...Sara Aronowitz Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the exploration / exploitation trade-off . In computer science and psychology, this trade-off has...

..., this sort of learning occurs all the time. When you don’t know the time and look at your watch, you acquire a self-locating belief. Similarly, when you are lost and look at a map, you acquire a self-locating belief. The issue in this article is: when you acquire a self-locating belief, what effect does...

..., is codified in learning by Conditionalization. Suppose I put the probability of some hypothesis H at .5, but that I also think that some evidential proposition E is highly relevant to H. In particular, suppose that I think that the probability of H, on the supposition that E is true, is .9...

... this fact. (For instance, no three propositions are possible but pairwise incompatible.) But note that this consequence is already bad enough. For example, you might not be sure whether Andrew is at the talk, or whether if Andrew is at the talk he's happy. But when you learn the conditional—if Andrew...

... gradability extends well beyond ascriptions of know-how. It is not just that one can know in part how to do something. One can also learn in part how to do it, decide in part how to do it, or partly tell others how to do it. One can also in part know where to find good groceries, in part learn where to find...

... Psychology 36 : 883 -94. Jenkins, H. M., and R. Sainsbury. 1970 . “Discrimination Learning with the Distinctive Feature on Positive or Negative Trials.” In Attention: Contemporary Theory and Analysis , ed. D. Mostofsky, 239 -75. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Kamp, H. 1981 . “A Theory...

..., it is in many ways the first and most basic part of mathematics. It is the first mathematics a child learns, and it is most closely connected to ordinary nonmathematical discourse. Besides that, it is there where mathemat- ical symbols are first introduced. A good starting point for understand- ing...

... between rational and nonrational motivations and it is one of the most central features of the Stoics’ ethical views that they reject it. So what is this distinction? What role do these two elements or aspects of our psy- chology have in ethical learning, and what is the value and place of each...

... G. Titelbaum University of Wisconsin–Madison How much do I learn when I learn what time it is, or where I am, or who I am? Beliefs about one’s spatiotemporal location and beliefs about one’s identity are often...

... that Schulz’s theory rejects (ii). While this strategy achieves Schulz’s aims, it leaves open the question why “we can only know an arbitrary F to be G if all F s are G s…for [otherwise] we cannot know which [ F ] has been selected” (176). Notice that, if we could learn thin counterfactual information...

... of thoughts, whose contents are determined by the contents of their constituents and how these constituents are combined, (4) some-but only some-concepts must be learned, and (5) concepts are public and shareable. (1) is puzzling: if one’s cat concept is a particular, how can one have different...

... of whether the coin comes up heads or tails (let us call these two possibilities Heads and Tails, respectively). It may seem, therefore, that when Beauty awakens on Monday morning, she does not learn anything that should influence her opinions about the outcome of the coin toss. Thus, it may seem...

... for a rational agent to update her credences as she gains new information is to conditionalize—that is, the credence P 1 after the learning should be related to the initial credences P 0 by , where A is any proposition in , and B is the proposition learned. Many philosophers follow chapter 1...

... learns some claim E.We suppose that if E is true, then the agent will have learned this (and noth- ing else) by t 1, and if E is false, then the agent will have learned not-E by t 1. We also suppose that Cr 0(E) ¼ d (with 0 , d , 1), Cr 0(A/E) ¼ n, and Cr E (A) ¼ r, where Cr E gives the agent’s...

... in the case where an agent learns new certainties at a later time without losing any others. Furthermore, as Titelbaum shows in chapter 6, this generalized principle can derive plausible verdicts in various cases of memory loss. This chapter also tries to explain the failure of the “reflection principle...

..., heading toward a pile of five suitcases. Above each track is a footbridge, on which is perched one suitcase. You can stop each trolley, but only by pushing the suitcase on the footbridge above it into its path. You learn that Alexia is in a suitcase in the vicinity of the first track (henceforth Alexia's...

... by the Meno , Phaedo , and Republic— is a “well-considered response to Clitophon's challenge” (7). Chapter 3 argues that “ de novo discovery”—the alternative to learning from another—is possible, thanks to the hypothesis of recollection in the Meno . Chapter 4 argues that Plato does not, contrary...