Search Results for know
1-20 of 659 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 469–496.
Published: 01 October 2005
..., Clarendon Press. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) How to Know the Good: The Moral Epistemology of Plato’s Republic Jyl Gentzler 1. John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... and the Open Future. Philosophical Quarterly 48 : 67 -82. ____. 2000 . Now You Know It, Now You Don't. In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy , vol. 5 , 91 -106. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center. ____. 2002 . Assertion, Knowledge, and Context...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Paolo Santorio Know-how and expressivism are usually regarded as disjoint topics, belonging to distant areas of philosophy. This paper argues that, despite obvious differences, the two debates have important similarities. In particular, semantic and conceptual tools developed by expressivists can...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2005
...Travis Butler Lloyd P. Gerson, Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. x, 308. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 1 (January 2005) Lloyd P. Gerson, Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato. New York...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 413–415.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Stephen Butterfill Lucy O'Brien, Self-Knowing Agents . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xi + 231. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Christopher Shields, Aristotle. London: Routledge, 2007. xvi + 456 pp. This delightful and fully engaging book, written in a sparkling style...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 135–139.
Published: 01 January 2013
...E.J. Coffman Sosa Ernest , Knowing Full Well . Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2011 . xii +164 pp . © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 BOOK REVIEWS Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. xix þ241 pp. Paula...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Matthew McGrath Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it's a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such is the case. This phenomenology...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Matthew Mandelkern What does ‘might’ mean? One hypothesis is that ‘It might be raining’ is essentially an avowal of ignorance like ‘For all I know, it's raining’. But it turns out these two constructions embed in different ways—in particular, as parts of larger constructions like Wittgenstein's ‘It...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Shamik Dasgupta Sometimes, ignorance is inexpressible. Lewis recognized this when he argued, in “Ramseyan Humility,” that we cannot know which property occupies which causal role. This peculiar state of ignorance arises in a number of other domains too, including ignorance about our position in...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... time. It proposes that the puzzle can be resolved by a view according to which for an agent to watch an object throughout a period of time is for that agent to maintain visual awareness of that object with the aim of perceptually knowing what that object is doing. The essay goes on to make some further...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... matter of course, conscious of ourselves, but we do not, as a matter of course, know ourselves. A second group of remarks, all of which occur in part 5 of the Ethics , emphasizes a different point about consciousness and knowledge: the knowledge that distinguishes the minds of the most powerful or...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Delia Graff Fara One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... assert is what one knows—promises to provide a large and important part of the answer to this question. It also turns out that the knowledge account of assertion dissolves the most pressing problem confronting contextualism and, on top of that, provides a powerful positive argument in favor of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Patrick Rysiew Blome-Tillmann Michael , Knowledge and Presuppositions . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2014 . x + 197 pp. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Epistemic contextualism (EC) is the view that what's expressed by claims of the form ‘ S knows [/doesn't know] that p ’ depends...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2014
... says that S knows that p only if, were p false, S would not believe that p. Zalabardo's version of tracking also accommodates the insights underlying both Nozick's appeal to adherence (if p were true, S would believe it) and the increasingly popular safety condition (in close worlds where S believes...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... : 877 -93. Moffett, M. n.d. Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: The Problem of Doxastic Shift . Parsons, T. 1990 . Events in the Semantics of English: A Study of Subatomic Semantics . Cambridge: MIT Press. ____. 1993 . On Denoting Propositions and Facts. Philosophical Perspectives...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 395–404.
Published: 01 July 2003
... what you know is a fair 1,000,000-ticket lottery with exactly one winner, and that, given the odds, you believe your ticket is a loser. If it is a loser indeed, do you know that it is? The widely shared intuition is that the answer should be negative. However, since there are few empirical facts...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
.... ____. 2004 . “The Context-Insensitivity of `Knowing More' and `Knowing Better'.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 : 313 -26. ____. 2005a . “A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 : 207 -28. ____. 2005b . “A Principled Solution to Fitch's Paradox...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of “physical” that includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and...