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The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 469–496.
Published: 01 October 2005
... Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) How to Know the Good: The Moral Epistemology of Plato’s Republic Jyl Gentzler 1. John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objec- tivism with two...
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... Possibilities and the Open Future. Philosophical Quarterly 48 : 67 -82. ____. 2000 . Now You Know It, Now You Don't. In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy , vol. 5 , 91 -106. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center. ____. 2002 . Assertion, Knowledge...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Paolo Santorio Know-how and expressivism are usually regarded as disjoint topics, belonging to distant areas of philosophy. This paper argues that, despite obvious differences, the two debates have important similarities. In particular, semantic and conceptual tools developed by expressivists can...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows...
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2005
...Travis Butler Lloyd P. Gerson, Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. x, 308. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 1 (January 2005) Lloyd P. Gerson, Knowing...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 413–415.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Stephen Butterfill Lucy O'Brien, Self-Knowing Agents . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xi + 231. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Christopher Shields, Aristotle. London: Routledge, 2007. xvi + 456 pp. This delightful and fully engaging book...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Matthew McGrath Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it's a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such is the case. This phenomenology...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 135–139.
Published: 01 January 2013
...E.J. Coffman Sosa Ernest , Knowing Full Well . Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2011 . xii +164 pp . © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 BOOK REVIEWS Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Peter van Elswyk A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Matthew Mandelkern What does ‘might’ mean? One hypothesis is that ‘It might be raining’ is essentially an avowal of ignorance like ‘For all I know, it's raining’. But it turns out these two constructions embed in different ways—in particular, as parts of larger constructions like Wittgenstein's...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
... >. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational requirements to know one's...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Shamik Dasgupta Sometimes, ignorance is inexpressible. Lewis recognized this when he argued, in “Ramseyan Humility,” that we cannot know which property occupies which causal role. This peculiar state of ignorance arises in a number of other domains too, including ignorance about our position...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... of time. It proposes that the puzzle can be resolved by a view according to which for an agent to watch an object throughout a period of time is for that agent to maintain visual awareness of that object with the aim of perceptually knowing what that object is doing. The essay goes on to make some further...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... are, as a matter of course, conscious of ourselves, but we do not, as a matter of course, know ourselves. A second group of remarks, all of which occur in part 5 of the Ethics , emphasizes a different point about consciousness and knowledge: the knowledge that distinguishes the minds of the most powerful...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Delia Graff Fara One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... to assert is what one knows—promises to provide a large and important part of the answer to this question. It also turns out that the knowledge account of assertion dissolves the most pressing problem confronting contextualism and, on top of that, provides a powerful positive argument in favor...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... : 877 -93. Moffett, M. n.d. Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: The Problem of Doxastic Shift . Parsons, T. 1990 . Events in the Semantics of English: A Study of Subatomic Semantics . Cambridge: MIT Press. ____. 1993 . On Denoting Propositions and Facts. Philosophical Perspectives...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of “physical” that includes everything in completed physics, chemistry...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
.... ____. 2004 . “The Context-Insensitivity of `Knowing More' and `Knowing Better'.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 : 313 -26. ____. 2005a . “A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 : 207 -28. ____. 2005b . “A Principled Solution to Fitch's Paradox...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408.
Published: 01 July 2000
.... The Philosophical Rmiew, Vol. 109, No. 3 (July 2000) The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality Dana K. Nelkin 1. Introduction Jim buys a ticket in a million-ticket lottery. He knows it is a fair lottery, but, given the odds, he believes he will lose. When the winning...