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justified group belief

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... of the members’ relevant beliefs that are justified render it vertically justified. Indeed, it is precisely this vertical perspective that Goldman adopts when offering his positive account of the justification of group beliefs. Moreover, Goldman claims that it is preferable to think of justifiedness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
.... Radha’s belief is unjustified because she is the victim of bad ideology . Nour and Charles’s beliefs are justified because their group membership allows them to pierce through bad ideology . Meanwhile, the internalist—in her insistence that justification supervenes solely on a subject’s mental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 399–410.
Published: 01 July 2005
...- ysis, according to which “the condition of personal identity” is “the condition that gives rise to … a commitment to achieving overall rational unity” (8) among “beliefs, desires and other psychological states and events” (20–21). Rovane claims that this condition can be satisfied both by “group...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 323–326.
Published: 01 April 2021
... are dedicated to the core criteria, while chapters 5 and 6 flesh out the general expectations that believers must also meet for their beliefs to be justified. In chapter 3, Goldberg argues that there are default defeasible permissions we have to rely on certain belief-forming processes, like visual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... evaluation of beliefs, just as consequentialist/teleological ethical systems are often characterized as making the good prior to the right with regard to the ethical evaluation of actions. Maybe, in the end, such an approach is justified. But it is hardly an innocent starting point for epistemological...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... whether reliabilism says anything at all about which beliefs are justified and how much ( Feldman 1985 , Conee and Feldman 1998 ). 3 One worries that the reliabilist is applying the theory to particular cases by consulting her intuitions of justifiedness, cherry-picking a process type...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 243–246.
Published: 01 April 2006
... or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs; induction was justifi ed by noting that induction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 246–251.
Published: 01 April 2006
... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 251–255.
Published: 01 April 2006
... or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs; induction was justifi ed by noting that induction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2006
... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 259–262.
Published: 01 April 2006
... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 263–267.
Published: 01 April 2006
... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
...Zoe Jenkin According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
... is that relationships of friendship and romantic love partly consist in, and so cannot precede, the emotional vulnerabilities of love itself. How can the love involved in friendship rationally begin? It cannot be justified by friendship or involve the belief that we are already friends. Friendship cannot be a reason...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
... justification for believing that your perceptual experiences are accurate (100–102). One reason to be skeptical of Korman's response is that it relies upon an internalist explanatory connection constraint on justification to the effect that S's beliefs about a subject matter are justified only if S does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
...- tunity to carry out. Comparison to the epistemic case bears out these intuitions. Something like the Coincident Reasons Thesis plausibly describes the conditions under which our beliefs are epistemically worthy or justified. Our beliefs have epistemic worth—are epistemically justified (not just...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 151–197.
Published: 01 April 2001
..., that pursuing the second is like trying to trisect an arbitrary angle with ruler and compass or proving the con- sistency of arithmetic with finitary means. It’s impossible to throw away all our beliefs, start from scratch, and justify the claim that the objects about which we form perceptual beliefs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 483–523.
Published: 01 October 2000
..., for, very roughly, part of the story about how a particular perception justifies a belief will be that the content of the perception underwrites that of the belief it justifies, in the sense that it logically implies it, or makes it probable, or maybe just in the sense that an inference from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408.
Published: 01 July 2000
.... Cambridge: MIT Press. Evnine, Simon. 1999 . “Believing Conjunctions.” Synthese 118 : 201 -27. Foley, Richard. 1979 . “Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 : 247 -57. ____. 1987 . The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 262–270.
Published: 01 April 2002
... the above-mentioned moral claim of the basic capabilities to be developed a claim that seemed hard to justify in some of Nussbaum s earlier work.4 Nussbaum ably defends the capabilities approach against a family of anti- universalist charges: that this list of capabilities neglects the value of cultural...