... of the members’ relevant beliefs that are justified render it vertically justified. Indeed, it is precisely this vertical perspective that Goldman adopts when offering his positive account of the justification of group beliefs. Moreover, Goldman claims that it is preferable to think of justifiedness...

... of their justified beliefs that p yields a belief set that is coherent. (2) Full disclosure of the evidence relevant to the proposition that p , accompanied by rational deliberation about that evidence among the members of G in accordance with their individual and group epistemic normative requirements, would...

..., none of this intuitively precludes Charles from justifiably believing—indeed, I think, knowing —that the college is classist. Charles’s belief that the college is classist, like Nour’s belief that her host is racist, is true not as a matter of good luck, of happy accident, but as a function of his...

... are dedicated to the core criteria, while chapters 5 and 6 flesh out the general expectations that believers must also meet for their beliefs to be justified. I worry that this reduction might not work in some cases. We could imagine a social practice, for example, where a group of agents believe...

...- ysis, according to which “the condition of personal identity” is “the condition that gives rise to … a commitment to achieving overall rational unity” (8) among “beliefs, desires and other psychological states and events” (20–21). Rovane claims that this condition can be satisfied both by “group...

... point {complete systems of belief} and not for the focal point {beliefs}. Against the former: then the theory's teleological structure is doing no work (and then it is forced to equate justified beliefs with true beliefs, but presumably not all true beliefs are justified). Against the latter...

... or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs; induction was justifi ed by noting that induction...

... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...

... or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs; induction was justifi ed by noting that induction...

... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...

... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...

... was evidence that he or she had certain thoughts or feelings because of the meaning or “logical grammar” of talk about thoughts and feelings; perceptual experiences were said to justify beliefs about the environment because those experiences constituted by defi ni- tion grounds for such beliefs...

... says anything at all about which beliefs are justified and how much ( Feldman 1985 , Conee and Feldman 1998 ). 3 One worries that the reliabilist is applying the theory to particular cases by consulting her intuitions of justifiedness, cherry-picking a process type with a matching degree...

...Zoe Jenkin According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set...

... in friendship rationally begin? It cannot be justified by friendship or involve the belief that we are already friends. Friendship cannot be a reason for the emotional vulnerabilities through which it comes to be. Kolodny (2003 , 169–70) replies to this objection with an incremental view. We first interact...

... beliefs about a subject matter are justified only if S does not believe that the beliefs are not explained by facts about that subject matter. This is arguably too demanding of a constraint on justification (cf. Fairchild and Hawthorne 2018 ). Consider, for example, my belief that all bachelors...

... Reasons Thesis plausibly describes the conditions under which our beliefs are epistemically worthy or justified. Our beliefs have epistemic worth—are epistemically justified (not just justifiable)—when we believe them for the epistemic reasons whywe ought to believe them—when, that is, we...

... for, that is, to justify, our beliefs about the world: And, according to him, no state that does not have conceptual content can be a reason for a belief. Now, there are many ways in which Evans’s basic idea, that perceptual content is nonconceptual, might be developed; some of these, I shall argue, would...

..., that pursuing the second is like trying to trisect an arbitrary angle with ruler and compass or proving the con- sistency of arithmetic with finitary means. It’s impossible to throw away all our beliefs, start from scratch, and justify the claim that the objects about which we form perceptual beliefs...

..., Simon. 1999 . “Believing Conjunctions.” Synthese 118 : 201 -27. Foley, Richard. 1979 . “Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 : 247 -57. ____. 1987 . The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1993 . Working...