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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 463–467.
Published: 01 July 2021
...Mari Mikkola [email protected] McGowan Mary Kate , Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2019 209 pp. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 This relatively short book has a powerful message. It identifies an overlooked way in which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Sarah Moss This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... the latter constitutively play the functional role of explaining what state one just plain ought to be in. The authors conjecture that all and only practical reasons are authoritative. Hence, in one important sense, all reasons for belief are practical reasons. But this account also preserves the autonomy...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
..., and dogmatists. That is, such “bad ideology” cases are, in all relevant respects, just like cases that are thought to count against externalism—except that they intuitively favor externalism. This, the author argues, is a serious worry for internalism. What is more, it bears on the debate over whether...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... Watkins's more specific claims that Kant completely rejects a model on which the first relatum of a phenomenal causal relation is an event and that he maintains that real grounds are metaphysically and not just epistemically indeterminate. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 Our thanks are owed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
... a particular question just in case you expect that person to be more accurate than you are about that question. accuracy deference chance Principal Principle Epistemic Utility Theory Humeanism New Principle Objective chance presents two types of problems. The first is metaphysical. We need...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
... that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, and so on, do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and admiration. And third, even for non-doxastic attitudes like that, not just any description will allow it. The article argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... it have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Matthew McGrath Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it's a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such is the case. This phenomenology...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... sufficient for overdetermination. I then argue that counterfactual analyses of overdetermination face the same kinds of problems as counterfactual analyses of causation and show that the source of these problems is that counterfactual analyses of overdetermination—just as those of causation—cannot...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
... Descartes's two characterizations. It proposes that both characterizations invoke a type of independence that obtains just in case there is no relation to another entity that holds by the nature of the entity in question. Even though the ultimate subject of properties is sometimes not independent in other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 325–349.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Anthony S. Gillies What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
..., as is commonly thought, just on the presence of an operator ‘actually’. This essay argues that this phenomenon provides evidence that mood admits of bound and free readings along the lines of tenses and pronouns. It therefore favors the hypothesis that natural language contains variables and quantifiers...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 415–419.
Published: 01 July 2015
... “the Standard Analysis” of borderline cases: The Standard Analysis: x is borderline ϕ just in case x is neither definitely ϕ nor definitely not- ϕ . Now it is worth noting that there are various versions of the Standard Analysis that are possible depending on how one understands the notion being...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 469–496.
Published: 01 October 2005
... “a coarse and impercep-
tive interpretation of Plato,” in addition to a mistaken account of the
epistemic requirements of moral objectivism (2001, 238). But one
might worry that the case Annas makes for the homely nature of Pla-
tonic moral knowledge—it’s just like plumbing, only non-optional
(2001...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 279–322.
Published: 01 July 2018
... of naturalness does not imply that nomic beliefs are valuable (if they are) because natural beliefs are valuable. My point is just that it is hard to see how else the explanation could go. After all, the only difference between the laws and the graws is that the former are analyzed in terms of naturalness...
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