Search Results for jury

... DIFFERENT EVIDENCE: A jury is deliberating about whether the defendant in a murder trial is innocent or guilty. Each member of the jury is privy to evidence that the defendant was seen fleeing the scene of the crime with blood spatter on his clothes, but it is grounded in hearsay that, though reliable...

..., there is one more approach to characterizing justified group belief that I would like to consider, one that is inspired by the Condorcet jury theorem and developed in the work of Christian List. 31 Though List presents his account specifically as one of group knowledge, it can be adapted for our purposes...

... that each citizen make up his own mind. On the Condorcetian interpretation of Rou~seaua single motivation informs both stipulations and so they come to the same thing. The motivation is to secure the ap- plicability of Condorcet’s jury theorem to the majority voting that declares the general...

... of collective entity, and this entity is itself an agent” (67). For instance, I express certain views as a member of a jury, which itself is something that deliberates, comes to a verdict, and so on. According to Graham’s definition, a number of individuals form a collectiv- ity only if they “act in ways...

... out further how this kind of reduction should work. On a more productive note, I think Goldberg's account opens new doors for thinking about epistemic normativity. One of the main questions for accounts of epistemic normativity for groups (like juries, boards, etc.) is how to ground...

... set of such beliefs on the basis of that justification, and that this is so even if one is an ideally rational epistemic agent. Final assessment of Smithies’s view hinges on determining how best to handle these two distinctions. While the jury is still out on that, I can confidently say...

...; moreover, requiring a defendant to prove he is not responsible is certainly normatively debatable, even if constitutionally permissible. Why would it be defensible to place the burden on the state to prove a mental state going to the wrong done, but then require the defendant to persuade a jury that she...

...- onstrating that we can and do make causal judgments that are both true and justified. This task Longuenesse does not address, indeed cannot ad- dress insofar as she explicates the subjective Deduction, which only con- cerns the quid facti of how we make such judgments, and not the quid juris...

..., on Walton s view, concrete dialogues very often go off track precisely because a move that is legitimate and relevant in some types of dialogues (for example, threats in a negotiation) is used in a setting where it is inappropriate (for example, threats by a jury member during deliberations). Frequently...

...Philipp Schink References Elster Jon 2013 . Securities against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Pettit Philip 1997 . Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press...

... democratic imaginary.” Her discussion of democracy does not focus on prac- tices such as voting and the lot, on institutions such as the assembly and jury, or on ideals such as liberty and equality. (She grants that Plato “denounces major- ity rule, Assembly debate, equality, and the celebration...

... discussion of the Deduction (chap. 12) is his challenge to the standard reading of Kant's distinction between questions quid juris and quid facti . But again: how does it even make sense to talk about “extending” the purely intellectual synthesis of the categories to the purely aesthetic...

... categories. Even the police or the jury must ask themselves what sort of explanatory value there is in a suspect’s giving his alibi in the form of a story. ~ As I have suggested, the question how storytelling conveys understand- ing is inseparable from the question what...

... responsible. I certainly recognize that I have only sketched the indeterministic cases, and I have only scratched the surface of an adequate analysis. But for my purposes here, I simply want to motivate the idea that the jury is still out with respect to the indeterministic horn of the Dilemma...

...? In other terms, borrowed from J. L. Austin, it can be viewed as a question about whether illocutions of valuing are verdictive or exerci- tive. Are they like “Guilty,” said by the jury; or “Sentence: twenty years,” said by the judge? Are they like “Out!” said by the umpire, watching the ball...

... to accept a proposition about his wife’s fidelity only if he can discern its truth. If he were to accept some other norm as having juris- diction over this episode of thought, then he could not consider his activity as one of belief-formation. This is part of what is meant by the thought that beliefs...

...-Blanco Veronica , 31 – 51 . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Tenenbaum Sergio 2016 . “ Reconsidering Intentions .” Noûs 52 , no. 2 : 443 – 72 . von Wright Georg Henrik 1991 . “ Is There a Logic of Norms? ” Ratio Juris 4 , no. 3 : 265 – 83 . Way...

... that stereotypical cases of basing involve explicit reasons, it is plausible that mental states can in fact be based on implicit reasons. The paradigm case of basing on reasons as deliberation on a jury need not perfectly extend to all cases. Consider beliefs formed in response to information stored implicitly...

.... “Ownership, Use, and Exclusivity: The Kantian Approach.” Ratio Juris 31, no. 2: 123–38. Weinrib, Ernest. Forthcoming. Reciprocal Freedom, Private Law, and Public Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Westphal, Kenneth. 1997. “Do Kant’s Principles Justify Property or Usufruct?” Jahrbuch für Recht...

... that they could go to heaven (Rust 2006, A3). Far from being judged logical, she was ultimately found by a jury to be not guilty by reason of insanity (ibid 27 CRAIG DUNCAN not be adopted as a permanent policy. A persecutor might decide...