Search Results for judgment

...Robert Stern James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xviii + 241 pp. Cornell University 2008 BOOK REVIEWS James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations...

...Hannah Ginsborg Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment. Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. lii, 423. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS...

...” picture captures the epistemic psychology adequately. When the stakes go up, does one have a sense of there being a multitude of judgment types, some of which one can and others of which one can't properly make? Or does one rather have the sense that one simply cannot make a judgment period ? Empirical...

...Natalie Brender KANT'S CONCEPTION OF MORAL CHARACTER: THE “CRITICAL” LINK OF MORALITY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT. By G. Felicitas Munzel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Pp. xxii, 377. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS political...

...Samantha Matherne Ginsborg Hannah , The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant's “Critique of Judgement.” New York: Oxford University Press , 2015 . iv + 360 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 In the introduction to the third Critique , Kant offers the following...

... disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This essay defends the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a friend as a practical and moral agent requires allowing your friend's judgment to decide what you are to do, even when you disagree with that judgment (and even...

... for propositions , Russell's solution commits him to regarding some instances of sentences as incomplete symbols and to denying that we have acquaintance with propositions. This in turn leads Russell in Principia Mathematica to adopt the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment, and thus to embrace agnosticism about...

... should hold that x values ϕ to the extent that x judges or believes that ϕ is good for x . The resulting “judgment subjectivism” is intuitively superior to, and maintains important structural advantages over, its desiderative rival. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 I’d like to thank Ben...

... (or propositional justification) and well-groundedness (or doxastic justification). The discussion focuses on conciliatory views, according to which peer disagreements require you to significantly revise your view or to suspend judgment. The article argues that for a wide range of conceptions of evidential support...

... experience as you look at those socks, your auditory experience as the interviewer asks you the question, the experience of pain in your back making you want to sit down. Few philosophers or psychologists express plain and general pessimism about the latter sorts of judgment. Or, rather, I should say...

... SINHABABU supposed to apply at least to the moral discourse of actual human beings. Internalism is usually regarded as a conceptual truth about the connection between moral judgment and action, and thus must be true in the actual world and beyond.10 So if we accept the Humean theory as a truth about...

..., knowledge ascriptions sound uniformly terrible: (10) a. ✗ I know that Bud’s coin landed heads. b. ✗ I know whether Bud’s coin landed heads. Our intuitive judgment about (10a) is to be expected given that (9a) is a paradigm case of an indeterminate fictional claim. Whatever else we know...

..., and suspended judgment. But more recently, many theorists have wanted to expand the range of doxastic attitudes, either by including a continuum of degrees of confidence, 16 or by distinguishing between a state of deliberately refraining from adopting a belief and that of merely failing to arrive at a view...

... prove controversial along several fronts. Anderson's main thesis is that Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments should be thought of, first and foremost, as what Anderson calls a “ logical ” distinction, by which he means one based on a difference in the kind of “content” a judgment...

...Sarah Williams Holtman A THIRD CONCEPT OF LIBERTY: JUDGMENT AND FREEDOM IN KANT AND ADAM SMITH. By Samuel Fleischacker. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. x, 300. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001) A THIRD CONCEPT OF L...

... to be Kant’s idea, set out in the Critique of Judgment , that “internal purposiveness”—exemplified by organisms—is an “enabling, empowering condition for judgment” and cognition (61). Ng examines what Hegel called Kant’s “great service to philosophy” in part 1 of her book. She focuses first...

.... Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 26 : 103 -37. Arpaly, N. 2000 . On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement. Ethics 110 : 488 -513. Bratman, M. 1987 . Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1998 . Toxin, Temptation...

... circularity or some infinite regress or hierarchy. Focusing on Sharon Street's view that the truth of a normative judgment is determined by whether that very judgment “withstands scrutiny” from the rest of one's normative judgments, Dale Dorsey argues that if constructivism is construed as an account...

... of certain a priori concepts, the Categories. However, this is only the surface of Kant’s much deeper, though neglected view about the nature of reason and judgment. Kant holds that even our a priori concepts are acquired, not from sensation, but “originally,” because our mind has a fundamental ca...

...–38): Like “judgment,” the term “intuition” can stand for both (a) a mental act and (b) a content. Much metaphilosophical debate, and all negative x-phi, assumes that intuitions in the first sense are adduced as evidence: The fact that certain thinkers intuit certain contents (or that these contents...