Search Results for judgment
1-20 of 485 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 429–435.
Published: 01 July 2002
...Hannah Ginsborg Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment. Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. lii, 423. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 289–293.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Robert Stern James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xviii + 241 pp. Cornell University 2008 BOOK REVIEWS James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 399–404.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Matthew McGrath Sosa Ernest , Judgment and Agency . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . xiii + 269 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Virtue epistemology follows two traditions, as Ernest Sosa explains in this fine new book. One conceives of epistemic normativity in...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 440–443.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Natalie Brender KANT'S CONCEPTION OF MORAL CHARACTER: THE “CRITICAL” LINK OF MORALITY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT. By G. Felicitas Munzel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Pp. xxii, 377. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS political...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This essay defends the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a friend as a practical and moral agent requires allowing your friend's judgment to decide what you are to do, even when you disagree with that judgment (and even...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Neil Sinhababu This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
... propositions , Russell's solution commits him to regarding some instances of sentences as incomplete symbols and to denying that we have acquaintance with propositions. This in turn leads Russell in Principia Mathematica to adopt the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment, and thus to embrace agnosticism about...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... subjectivists should hold that x values ϕ to the extent that x judges or believes that ϕ is good for x . The resulting “judgment subjectivism” is intuitively superior to, and maintains important structural advantages over, its desiderative rival. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 I’d like to thank...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... propositional justification) and well-groundedness (or doxastic justification). The discussion focuses on conciliatory views, according to which peer disagreements require you to significantly revise your view or to suspend judgment. The article argues that for a wide range of conceptions of evidential support...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay rejects the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... constrained by the epistemic status of the beliefs of their individual members. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 epistemic justification group belief justified group belief collective epistemology judgment aggregation Groups are often said to believe things. 1 For instance, we talk about...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 399–403.
Published: 01 July 2018
... book, R. Lanier Anderson provides a novel, compelling reconstruction of the historical context for the emergence of Kant's formative distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. After an introduction that provides helpful orientation for what follows, Anderson devotes close attention to Kant's...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 281–285.
Published: 01 April 2017
... specialized issues in aesthetics and biology, Ginsborg argues that these two Critiques are of a piece because they both make an invaluable contribution to Kant's theory of cognition. It is, in particular, Kant's analysis of the reflecting power of judgment in the third Critique that, Ginsborg claims...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 645–648.
Published: 01 October 2000
... of certain a priori concepts, the Categories. However, this is only the surface of Kant’s much deeper, though neglected view about the nature of reason and judgment. Kant holds that even our a priori concepts are acquired, not from sensation, but “originally,” because our mind has a...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 374–377.
Published: 01 July 2014
... vicious circularity or some infinite regress or hierarchy. Focusing on Sharon Street's view that the truth of a normative judgment is determined by whether that very judgment “withstands scrutiny” from the rest of one's normative judgments, Dale Dorsey argues that if constructivism is construed as an...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 413–418.
Published: 01 July 2018
... philosophical thought experiments appeal to reason and argument at every stage, and to intuitions at none. He seeks to debunk the “myth of the intuitive” by “demonstrating that analytic philosophers give arguments for their judgments about thought experiments and cases” (xvi), and that these arguments provide...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Sarah Williams Holtman A THIRD CONCEPT OF LIBERTY: JUDGMENT AND FREEDOM IN KANT AND ADAM SMITH. By Samuel Fleischacker. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. x, 300. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 283–286.
Published: 01 April 2001
... be left with the suspicion that the metaethical terrain leaves no BOOK REVLEWS space for the position staked out. Because Timmons refuses to offer para- phrases of the contents of moral judgments it is hard to get a handle on what the content of a...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 225–240.
Published: 01 April 2009
... epistemic as opposed to pragmatic justification. Before we come to Boghossian’s characterization of epistemic rel- ativism, we must first understand three auxiliary notions: • an epistemic judgment • an epistemic principle • an epistemic system First, an epistemic judgment is a...