...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...

...Lorraine Besser-Jones Sobel Jordan Howard , Walls and Vaults: A Natural Science of Morals (Virtue Ethics according to David Hume) . Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley and Sons , 2009 . xiii + 414 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS Huw...

..., Black, has come out of retirement to participate in yet another philo- sophical example.2 (After all, what would these thought-experiments be without the venerable eminence´ grise—or should it be noire?) He has secretly inserted a chip in Jones’s brain that enables Black...

... in the future: (1*) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now. (2*) Necessarily, if that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now, then Jones sits at time t. Therefore, (3) Jones has no choice about...

... for their interpretation. The classification of simple sentences as loose probabilistic speech has substantive consequences for the semantics of belief ascriptions, and ultimately for our understanding of the attitude of belief. To start, consider the following sentence: (17) Smith believes that Jones smokes...

... about Jones at t 2 could be a soft fact about the past relative to t 2 would be if one and the same state of mind of the person who was God at t l would count as one belief if Jones did X at t 2 but a different belief…if Jones did not do X at t 2. But it is implausible to suppose that one...

... AND PATRICK TODD 2. Merricks’s Argument Here is the Main Argument and Merricks’s initial reflections on it: Let time t be just a few minutes in the future from now, and consider the Main Argument: (1) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t was true a thousand...

... as to give voice to one’s sincere judgment about one’s own state of mind. But how should we understand this last claim? Suppose that Jones’s unconscious fear of members of another ethnic group causes her to be much too easily convinced that members of that group do harmful things. On one occasion...

... failing to take an umbrella when your evidence doesn't include the fact that it's raining.) This view of rationality gives rise to a puzzle. Suppose Smith and Jones both believe it's raining, and are exactly alike in every psychological respect. Intuitively, there's no difference in what rationality...

.... But intermediate values can fluctuate. Indeed, we may be certain they will, such as when we anticipate observing the outcome of an experiment. As Moss puts it, “When you have a .6 credence that Jones smokes, you necessarily also believe it might be that Jones certainly doesn't smoke” (138). 4...

... for pushing us on this question. 37. Smith's predicament is similar to that of Jones the golfer. 38. This characterization—including its inherent vagueness—may help explain the impurity of ability ascriptions, in the sense of Knobe and Szabó 2013 ; considerations about deontic matters...

... as justified true belief put forward by Gettier (1963). Very briefly, suppose Smith believes with justification that Jones owns a Ford on the basis of very good evi- dence (for example, seeing Jones drive a Ford, hearing Jones say he owns a Ford). It seem to follow that Smith is justified in believ...

...), that when we say x looks green to Jones, we are saying that Jones has an initial tendency, perhaps rightfully suppressed on reflection, to believe that x is green. Nor does he hold, as they suggest (22), that looks talk plays only a fact-stating role (that is, that it can only appear as the conclusion...

... Jones. Smith’s shooting or the fact that Smith shot Jones is causally relevant to Jones’s death. But Smith or Wesson shot Jones in virtue of the fact that Smith shot Jones. So maybe the fact that Smith or Wesson shot Jones is causally relevant, maybe even just as relevant as the fact that Smith...

... JOHN TURRI blackboards that they carry around with them.22 They have different color chalk for different purposes. If one of them, Jones, writes a declarative sen- tence ‘Q’ in yellow chalk on his board and presents it to his interlocutor, Smith, then by convention this counts as Jones...

...: A Natural Science of Morals (Virtue Ethics according to David Hume) reviewed by Lorraine Besser-Jones 634 Stanley, Jason, Knowledge and Practical Interests reviewed by Ram Neta 298 Strevens, Michael, Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation reviewed by Lina Jansson 625 Talbott, William...

... not have refrained from doing A. But in this case you could have refrained from causing your decision and action of killing Jones. (158–59) However, Frankfurt-style cases have been proposed in which the agent is intu- itively morally responsible, but could not have refrained from causing...

... not have refrained from doing A. But in this case you could have refrained from causing your decision and action of killing Jones. (158–59) However, Frankfurt-style cases have been proposed in which the agent is intu- itively morally responsible, but could not have refrained from causing...

... not have refrained from doing A. But in this case you could have refrained from causing your decision and action of killing Jones. (158–59) However, Frankfurt-style cases have been proposed in which the agent is intu- itively morally responsible, but could not have refrained from causing...

... not have refrained from doing A. But in this case you could have refrained from causing your decision and action of killing Jones. (158–59) However, Frankfurt-style cases have been proposed in which the agent is intu- itively morally responsible, but could not have refrained from causing...