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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 525–544.
Published: 01 October 2000
...Michael Huemer Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 4 (October 2000) Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument Michael Huemer Peter van Inwagen has presented a compelling argument for the incompatibility of free will...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Michael McKenna Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Peter Van Inwagen PERSONS AND BODIES: A CONSTITUTION VIEW. By Lynne Rudder Baker.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xii, 233. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS enology of sense includes representing moving objects, Clark’s theory seems to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 397–430.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Samuel Levey It can be shown by means of a paradox that, given the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), there is no conjunction of all contingent truths. The question is, or ought to be, how to interpret that result: Quid sibi velit? A celebrated argument against PSR due to Peter van Inwagen and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 554–557.
Published: 01 October 2018
...Seth Shabo References Frankfurt Harry 1969 . “ Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility .” Journal of Philosophy 66 : 829 – 39 . van Inwagen Peter 1983 . An Essay on Free Will . Oxford : Clarendon . 1. While van Inwagen believes that we are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 235–241.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Helen Beebee Cornell University 2002 Fischer, J. M. 1994 . The Metaphysics of Free Will . Oxford: Blackwell. Huemer, M. 2000 . “Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument.” Philosophical Review 109 : 525 -44. Lewis, D. K. 1979 . “Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow.” Noûs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 479–481.
Published: 01 July 2001
... literature. Two examples, one old, one new. (i) Casati and Varzi hold, with David Lewis, that mereology is ontologically innocent. But they make no mention of Peter van Inwagen’s “Composition as Identity This is a fatal oversight. Van Inwagen offers a sustained and powerful attack of the thesis...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 279–283.
Published: 01 April 2004
... they have developed at greater length elsewhere. It is, of course, impossible to discuss every article in the book; here I shall mention only a handful of the more salient. Perhaps confirming the suspicions of many determinists and compatibilists, Peter van Inwagen contributes a (reprinted...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 411–416.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Michael Huemer Cornell University 2004 Beebee, H. 2002 . “Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument.” Philosophical Review 111 : 235 -41. Huemer, M. 2000 . “Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument.” Philosophical Review 109 : 525 -44. Lewis, D. K. 1981 . “Are We Free to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 612–615.
Published: 01 October 2002
... Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 . Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will . New York: Oxford University Press, 1996 . Van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will . Oxford: Oxford University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 586–588.
Published: 01 October 2002
... baseballs is not a trivial consequence of the existence of atoms arranged base- ballwise.) Unlike Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990 with whose ontology Merricks’s has much in common, Merricks does not temper his eliminativist ontology with a folk-friendly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
... deliberating over which of two doors by which to leave a room when one knows that one is locked. I can of course dart across the room and throw myself against one of them, but this is random guessing, not deliberation. For as van Inwagen sees it, “to deliberate is to try to I wish to thank the editors...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2017
... discussion to the topic of animal agency, she has not simply changed the subject. Animal agency remains a necessary condition of the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. Steward therefore remains very much in contact with the familiar literature on free will. She takes up van Inwagen's well...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
... and Belief . Oxford: Clarendon. Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann. 1991 . “Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5: Philosophy of Religion , ed. James Tomberlin, 395 -424. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1983 . An Essay on Free Will...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
... . “Is Disagreement Epistemically Insignificant? A Reply to Kelly.” Unpublished manuscript. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1996 [ 1999 ]. “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence.” In Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions , ed. Eleonore Stump and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 241–286.
Published: 01 April 2016
... x has no choice at t as to whether or not p is true ( Ginet 1966 ). (ii) p is true, and x has no choice at t about the fact that p is true ( van Inwagen 1983, 93ff. ). (iii) p is true, and at t it is not up to x whether p is true ( van Inwagen 1983, 56 ). (iv) p is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 297–326.
Published: 01 July 2005
... Alvin Plantinga , ed. James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, 145 -86. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Fitch, G. W. 1996 . In Defense of Aristotelian Actualism. Philosophical Perspectives 10 : 53 -71. Glanzberg, Michael. Forthcoming. Quantification and Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 145–151.
Published: 01 January 2009
.... Conflict of Interest and Public Life: Cross-National Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xiii + 260 pp. Van Den Hoven, Jeroen, and John Weckert, eds. 2008. Information Technology and Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xi + 415 pp. Van Inwagen, Peter...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 289–306.
Published: 01 April 2013
... Press . Sobel J. 1994 [1986] . “ Notes on Decision Theory .” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 : 407 – 37 . Reprinted in his Taking Chances, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 141-73. Citation refers to the 1994 edition . Van Inwagen P. 1983 . An Essay on Free...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 256–260.
Published: 01 April 2018
... place before we act; instead our actions play a role in determining what the laws will be. Ismael cites Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument as a straightforward statement of an incompatibilist argument. Tersely, the Consequence Argument claims that since we control neither the past nor the...