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The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 1–58.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Christian Onof; Dennis Schulting In his argument for the possibility of knowledge of spatial objects, in the Transcendental Deduction of the B-version of the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant makes a crucial distinction between space as “form of intuition” and space as “formal intuition.” The...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 540–542.
Published: 01 October 2006
...Jonas Olson Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. xi + 244 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. 2 vols...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 235–266.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Houston Smit Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2000) Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition Houston Smit The distinction between concept and intuition is of the utmost importance for...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 413–418.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Eugen Fischer References Alter A. L. , and Oppenheimer D. M. 2009 . “ Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation .” Personality and Social Psychology Review 13 : 219 – 35 . Cappelen H. 2012 . Philosophy without Intuitions . Oxford...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Daniel Sutherland Despite the importance of Kant's claims about mathematical cognition for his philosophy as a whole and for subsequent philosophy of mathematics, there is still no consensus on his philosophy of arithmetic, and in particular the role he assigns intuition in it. This inquiry sets...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... more intuitively attractive theory. But these “bad ideology” cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favor externalism over internalism. These cases are, moreover, analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
... determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed to perform. This essay argues...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... subjectivists should hold that x values ϕ to the extent that x judges or believes that ϕ is good for x . The resulting “judgment subjectivism” is intuitively superior to, and maintains important structural advantages over, its desiderative rival. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
... qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this way, we can best explain the distinct features of modesty, keep much of what is intuitive...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... accommodate the intuitive idea that causation is an intrinsic relation between events. The second half (sections 3–4) explores the implications of these observations for the mental causation problem. In section 3, I first argue that the attempt of Karen Bennett (2003, 2008) and similar attempts to resolve the...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
... important phenomenon. Section 1 provides background on deflationism. Section 2 considers an intuitive argument by Stephen Leeds to the effect that deflationism precludes RI; the essay argues that this argument does not succeed. The rest of the essay presents its own, distinct argument for the...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... transmit only because of premise circularity. Finally, it applies this account to the Neo-Moorean and Zebra Deductions and shows that, given the essay's permissive view, these deductions transmit in an intuitively acceptable way—at least if either a certain type of circularity is benign or a certain view...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters. The...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture of the...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
..., being variables, refer rigidly in the latter merely intensional contexts, but may vary their reference in hyperintensional contexts. This conforms to the intuition that the content of attitude ascriptions encapsulates referential uncertainty . Furthermore, names in hyperintensional contexts are...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Andy Clark How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 297.
Published: 01 April 2015
..., the last five lines of the quoted text should read: …space and time first become possible. For since through it [that is, through synthesis] (in that the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
... maintains that it is prima facie justified by intuition (which he takes to be an intellectual seeming) together with background knowledge. The relevant intuition is conditional in form: if dogs and tree trunks are distributed through space in the way they seem to be, then there are no trogs. The relevant...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... our world that is profoundly unlike mere spatial variation. Whatever time is, it genuinely passes. Objects in time change in profound ways as well. I will call this package the Passage Intuition. The Passage Intuition seems easiest to model if we think of time as divided up into instants, some past...