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The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 1–58.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Christian Onof; Dennis Schulting In his argument for the possibility of knowledge of spatial objects, in the Transcendental Deduction of the B-version of the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant makes a crucial distinction between space as “form of intuition” and space as “formal intuition...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 540–542.
Published: 01 October 2006
... moral propositions are self-evident and so knowable by means of intuition. In The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value, Robert Audi defends intuitionism in both senses; as a position in nor- mative ethics and as a moral epistemology. Audi takes his point of departure...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 235–266.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Houston Smit Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2000) Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition Houston Smit The distinction between concept and intuition is of the utmost importance...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 413–418.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Eugen Fischer Deutsch Max , The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2015 . xx +194 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 This engaging and accessible book offers a spirited defense of armchair philosophy...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Daniel Sutherland Despite the importance of Kant's claims about mathematical cognition for his philosophy as a whole and for subsequent philosophy of mathematics, there is still no consensus on his philosophy of arithmetic, and in particular the role he assigns intuition in it. This inquiry sets...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... intuitively attractive theory. But these “bad ideology” cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favor externalism over internalism. These cases are, moreover, analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats, clairvoyants...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
... determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed to perform. This essay argues...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 191–226.
Published: 01 April 2021
...Lara Buchak In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one's own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one's opinion on important matters...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 385–449.
Published: 01 July 2021
...” demanding “demotion of space and time to mere forms of our sensory intuition.” This paper aims at an adequate understanding of Kant’s enigmatic idealist argument from handed objects, as well as an understanding of its relation to the other key supports of his idealism. The paper’s central finding...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
... important phenomenon. Section 1 provides background on deflationism. Section 2 considers an intuitive argument by Stephen Leeds to the effect that deflationism precludes RI; the essay argues that this argument does not succeed. The rest of the essay presents its own, distinct argument...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... should hold that x values ϕ to the extent that x judges or believes that ϕ is good for x . The resulting “judgment subjectivism” is intuitively superior to, and maintains important structural advantages over, its desiderative rival. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 I’d like to thank Ben...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
... qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this way, we can best explain the distinct features of modesty, keep much of what is intuitive...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... accommodate the intuitive idea that causation is an intrinsic relation between events. The second half (sections 3–4) explores the implications of these observations for the mental causation problem. In section 3, I first argue that the attempt of Karen Bennett (2003, 2008) and similar attempts to resolve...
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The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
..., being variables, refer rigidly in the latter merely intensional contexts, but may vary their reference in hyperintensional contexts. This conforms to the intuition that the content of attitude ascriptions encapsulates referential uncertainty . Furthermore, names in hyperintensional contexts...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... to transmit only because of premise circularity. Finally, it applies this account to the Neo-Moorean and Zebra Deductions and shows that, given the essay's permissive view, these deductions transmit in an intuitively acceptable way—at least if either a certain type of circularity is benign or a certain view...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters. © 2010 by Cornell...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Andy Clark How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
... .” Noûs 51 , no. 2 : 238 – 70 . Many thanks to John Hawthorne, Daniel Korman, Marko Malink, Michael Raven, Jonathan Schaffer, and Alexander Skiles for helpful comments and discussion. More generally, I worry that many of the intuitions that Korman invokes as justification for his...