... foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward. Cornell University 2008 Aristotle. 1961 . De Anima , ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1963 . “Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible...

... in the argument for Extended/Wholehearted.) Suppose that a person genuinely knows filiality. Then by (i) something is an episode of their genuinely knowing filiality. Given that identical properties are coextensive (see note 41 ), Introspective Knowledge implies that the episode of their genuinely knowing...

... about the knowledge that Mary acquires. What the gods might lack despite their propositional omniscience is not any distinctive kind of information, but certain abilities of introspection. The motivating idea is that knowledge one acquires by exercising introspective abilities cannot fail...

... that probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspection. 16. The disadvantage of this version of accuracy considerations...

...Michael LeBuffe Spinoza's remarks about consciousness in the Ethics constitute two theories about conscious experience and knowledge. Several remarks, including 3p9 and 4p8, make the point that self knowledge—an especially valuable good for Spinoza—is not available to introspection. We...

... be introspectively indistinguishable. The Basis Problem. The kinds of factive states one can use to know that p seem themselves to be ways of knowing that p . Pritchard attempts to answer two of these in part 1. In response to the Basis Problem, Pritchard argues that although seeing that p is factive...

... concrete facts with causes and effects. (2) Instantiations of representational properties constitute abstract facts that cannot feature as causes or effects. So, the naive realist can agree with Papineau that we had better not radically disconnect sensory consciousness from introspection...

... in the persuasiveness with which the authors press these difficulties (on each side) and the vigor with which they resist them—something that is all the more impressive given their focus on introspective beliefs, the grounding of which is significantly more difficult to think and write clearly about than...

.... The idea that this is impossible, however, is only tenable given Smithies’s counterintuitive claims about the various kinds of evidence, especially the evidence of introspection and reason. Perception tells us about our environment. Intuitively, if two people are looking at numerically distinct...

... introspective representations are inaccurate. The misrepresentation thesis asserts that this possibility is in fact realized. Pereboom does not himself divide the qualitative inaccuracy thesis into these two components, but the distinction can be useful because the misrepresentation thesis can give rise...

..., and throughout the chapter one often wishes this had been clarified earlier. And while acknowledging the “robust phenomenology” (117) of motion experience, Prosser warns that “direct appeal to introspection” faces two difficulties at least. One concerns the “diaphanousness” of experience so...

... statement, endorsing Sadie's Moorean conjunction does not violate E ndorsement  →  B elief c . © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 self-knowledge introspection Moore's paradox assertion rational requirements rationality To hear philosophers tell it, rationality requires a lot of us...

... that having regard for another for her sake can be the object of first- personal introspection––that we can simply look inward and know the differ- ence between having regard for someone and having some other attitude toward her? Introspection would thus give us demonstrative access to care and other...

... perceptually. Although he expresses some sympathy for this, he rejects it on the grounds that the perception involves inference and that we can know an object's causal or relational properties perceptually. But he says that when you are introspectively aware that your socks are stripy, “this isn't a matter...

... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...

... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...

... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...

... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...

... as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la phenomenalism and the bundle theory of mind, that entities of this sort are the building blocks out of which bodies...

... thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la phenomenalism and the bundle theory...