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introspection

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward. Cornell University 2008 Aristotle. 1961 . De Anima , ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1963 . “Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... about the knowledge that Mary acquires. What the gods might lack despite their propositional omniscience is not any distinctive kind of information, but certain abilities of introspection. The motivating idea is that knowledge one acquires by exercising introspective abilities cannot fail to be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
... probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspection. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 Proof. One consequence of having...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Michael LeBuffe Spinoza's remarks about consciousness in the Ethics constitute two theories about conscious experience and knowledge. Several remarks, including 3p9 and 4p8, make the point that self knowledge—an especially valuable good for Spinoza—is not available to introspection. We are, as a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 138–142.
Published: 01 January 2016
... Access Problem. Disjunctivism seems implausibly to imply that one has reflective access to contingent facts about the environment. The Distinguishability Problem. Disjunctivism seems inconsistent with the fact that good and bad cases can be introspectively indistinguishable. The Basis Problem. The...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 435–437.
Published: 01 July 2004
... persuasiveness with which the authors press these difficulties (on each side) and the vigor with which they resist them—something that is all the more impressive given their focus on introspective beliefs, the grounding of which is significantly more difficult to think and write clearly about than is the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2016
... causal or relational properties perceptually. Although he expresses some sympathy for this, he rejects it on the grounds that the perception involves inference and that we can know an object's causal or relational properties perceptually. But he says that when you are introspectively aware that your...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis . According to this proposition, “our introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and…these properties actually...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 577–582.
Published: 01 October 2004
... suggest that having regard for another for her sake can be the object of first- personal introspection––that we can simply look inward and know the differ- ence between having regard for someone and having some other attitude toward her? Introspection would thus give us demonstrative access to care and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 134–138.
Published: 01 January 2019
... aware of this and would no doubt justify it by insisting on the revelatory nature of conscious experience. If you are like me, however, you find consciousness a slippery business. My humility kicks in a bit earlier, when I try to draw conclusions based on introspection. When Strawson asks me to think...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 300–303.
Published: 01 April 2001
... constituents or aspects of reality that lie outside the relevant boundaries. Thus, one conclusion main- tains that experience itself has a dimension that is hidden from us, being alto- gether inaccessible to introspection. “Consciousness is like an iceberg,” McGinn tells us, “where the water line...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 307–310.
Published: 01 April 2013
... visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 310–314.
Published: 01 April 2013
... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 314–317.
Published: 01 April 2013
... visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 318–322.
Published: 01 April 2013
... visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 322–325.
Published: 01 April 2013
... visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 325–327.
Published: 01 April 2013
... visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 621–624.
Published: 01 October 2000
....) But why think there are such inner acts? Prichard’s straightforward appeal to introspection is no longer found to be compel- ling,’ and volitionism these days strikes many as a surprising view. But new arguments have been developed in its defense. Timothy Cleveland devotes much of this book...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 296–300.
Published: 01 April 2001
... relevant boundaries. Thus, one conclusion main- tains that experience itself has a dimension that is hidden from us, being altc- gether inaccessible to introspection. “Consciousness is like an iceberg,” McGinn tells us, “where the water line corresponds to the limits of introspec- tion’’ (144...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
... think about going to the store, or to feel bit- ten—at least when these are active and introspectible mental features. Creatures without such mental properties—perhaps the deeply coma- tose—need not apply. Suppose then that a creature c has a mental property M.1 How can we get at the concept of...