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introspection

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward. Cornell University 2008 Aristotle. 1961 . De Anima , ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1963 . “Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... about the knowledge that Mary acquires. What the gods might lack despite their propositional omniscience is not any distinctive kind of information, but certain abilities of introspection. The motivating idea is that knowledge one acquires by exercising introspective abilities cannot fail...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
... that probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspection. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 probabilism rational requirements...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Michael LeBuffe Spinoza's remarks about consciousness in the Ethics constitute two theories about conscious experience and knowledge. Several remarks, including 3p9 and 4p8, make the point that self knowledge—an especially valuable good for Spinoza—is not available to introspection. We...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 138–142.
Published: 01 January 2016
... be introspectively indistinguishable. The Basis Problem. The kinds of factive states one can use to know that p seem themselves to be ways of knowing that p . Pritchard attempts to answer two of these in part 1. In response to the Basis Problem, Pritchard argues that although seeing that p is factive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 435–437.
Published: 01 July 2004
... in the persuasiveness with which the authors press these difficulties (on each side) and the vigor with which they resist them—something that is all the more impressive given their focus on introspective beliefs, the grounding of which is significantly more difficult to think and write clearly about than...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... of evidence, especially the evidence of introspection and reason. Perception tells us about our environment. Intuitively, if two people are looking at numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible objects, then each has perceptual justification for a belief about the seen object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... us assume that this is the case. Is it any surprise that awareness that is supported by altogether different representations would give rise to an impression that the represented phenomena are different? If the introspective system uses altogether different representations than the systems we use...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 527–531.
Published: 01 October 2019
..., and throughout the chapter one often wishes this had been clarified earlier. And while acknowledging the “robust phenomenology” (117) of motion experience, Prosser warns that “direct appeal to introspection” faces two difficulties at least. One concerns the “diaphanousness” of experience so...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
... beliefs, and finds that none succeed. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 self-knowledge introspection Moore's paradox assertion rational requirements rationality To hear philosophers tell it, rationality requires a lot of us. It requires us to have logically consistent beliefs ( Broome...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 577–582.
Published: 01 October 2004
... that having regard for another for her sake can be the object of first- personal introspection––that we can simply look inward and know the differ- ence between having regard for someone and having some other attitude toward her? Introspection would thus give us demonstrative access to care and other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2016
... perceptually. Although he expresses some sympathy for this, he rejects it on the grounds that the perception involves inference and that we can know an object's causal or relational properties perceptually. But he says that when you are introspectively aware that your socks are stripy, “this isn't a matter...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 307–310.
Published: 01 April 2013
... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 314–317.
Published: 01 April 2013
... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 318–322.
Published: 01 April 2013
... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 322–325.
Published: 01 April 2013
... held and has a certain surface plausibility. It is natural to think of visual images as two-dimensional colored patches, and this is how visual sense data have often been thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 325–327.
Published: 01 April 2013
... as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la phenomenalism and the bundle theory of mind, that entities of this sort are the building blocks out of which bodies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 310–314.
Published: 01 April 2013
... thought of. Counting these as experiences, it can be natural to think of them as objects of introspective awareness but not as constitutively involving the subjects of such awareness. And on the picture that goes with this, it can seem coherent to suppose, a` la phenomenalism and the bundle theory...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
... and introspectible mental features. Creatures without such mental properties—perhaps the deeply coma- tose—need not apply. Suppose then that a creature c has a mental property M.1 How can we get at the concept of conscious experience that defenders of the explanatory gap seek to isolate? I will begin...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 300–303.
Published: 01 April 2001
... or aspects of reality that lie outside the relevant boundaries. Thus, one conclusion main- tains that experience itself has a dimension that is hidden from us, being alto- gether inaccessible to introspection. “Consciousness is like an iceberg,” McGinn tells us, “where the water line corresponds...