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intentional

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Harold Kincaid MEASURING THE INTENTIONAL WORLD: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCLENCES. By J. D. Trout. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 287. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REWWS theories successfully in referring...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 469–472.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Muhammad Ali Khalidi DYNAMICS IN ACTION: INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM. By Alicia Juarrero. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. x, 288. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical hinu,Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Jesus H. Aguilar Berent Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. vi, 252. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) Berent Enç, How We Act...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Mark Balaguer Mele Alfred R. , Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will . New York : Oxford University Press , 2009 . ix + 178 pp. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 BOOK REVIEWS Alfred R. Mele, Effective Intentions: The Power of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... alternative resemblance account, drawing on Grice's account of nonnatural meaning and its role in determining sentence meaning to argue that something depicts an object if it bears intention-based resemblances to the object that jointly capture its overall appearance. In addition to solving the metaphysical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's representing the bases as justifying the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
...Kim Frost Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 359–410.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Abraham Sesshu Roth Cornell University 2004 Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963 . Intention . 2d ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bratman, Michael. 1987 . Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason . Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1992 . Shared Cooperative Activity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 339–393.
Published: 01 July 2003
...Kieran Setiya Cornell University 2003 Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963 . Intention . 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ____. 1983 . The Causation of Action. In Knowledge and Mind , ed. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker, 174 -90. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ____. 1989 . Practical Inference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 632–635.
Published: 01 October 2000
... noncausal account of reasons expla- nation of action (among other things the argument contends that causal accounts cannot successfully avoid the problem of wayward causal chains). The final group contains two essays on intention formation and rationality; the first (previously published) argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... theses that I will compress into one sentence. Semantic theory should assign sentences a (1) truth-conditional content that is (2) determined compositionally with (3) limited input from context that (4) does not contain speaker intentions as a parameter. The methodology involves countenancing (nonobvious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
... of the book. But there is already plenty to discuss, and no doubt many readers are already familiar with Hyman's (1999) earlier work on knowledge as an ability. The core of the modern theory of the will is the claim that the will is the source of voluntary, intentional, rational, and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... intentionally triggers and guides an audience's attempt to read one's mind, in part by revealing the intention to do so. Intentions to hijack others' mindreading capacities in this way are called ‘communicative intentions’. According to intentionalists, communication happens when an audience recognizes what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
.... Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 26 : 103 -37. Arpaly, N. 2000 . On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement. Ethics 110 : 488 -513. Bratman, M. 1987 . Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1998 . Toxin, Temptation and the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
...David Owens Cornell University 2006 Anscombe, Elizabeth. 1981 . Ethics, Religion and Politics . Oxford: Blackwell. Atiyah, Patrick. 1981 . Promises, Morals and Law . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bratman, Michael. 1999 . Faces of Intention . Cambridge: Cambridge University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... are justified in believing that the participants' testimony is partly caused by their beliefs concerning their mental life. If we have no reason to think that their beliefs about, for example, when they became aware of their intentions, partly caused their reports to the experimenters, then we would...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
...: our plan- ning agency. In earlier work I have focused on the central roles of plans and planning in our agency, and I have developed what I have called a planning theory of intention.14 We do not simply act from moment to moment. Instead, we settle on complex-and, typically, partial and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 483–486.
Published: 01 July 2002
... analysis of collective action and individual intention. The cornerstone of the analysis is the idea that individuals should be responsible for what they participate in, regardless of whether the participation makes a causal difference for the outcome. By the end of the book, Kutz is well placed to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... Saint Louis University Let us say that a representation is an entity with intentional or semantic properties—that is, an entity having properties in virtue of which it is of or about one or more objects. Given this characterization, we can say that a mental representation is just a mental entity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Mark Schroeder Slote Michael , Moral Sentimentalism . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2010 . ix + 184 pp. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 BOOK REVIEWS Alfred R. Mele, Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. New York: Oxford...