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intention
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they
are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to
do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since
intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Harold Kincaid MEASURING THE INTENTIONAL WORLD: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCLENCES. By J. D. Trout. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 287. Cornell University 2000 Cohen, Jacob. 1994 . “The Earth is Round (p < .05).” American...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 469–472.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Muhammad Ali Khalidi Cornell University 2001 DYNAMICS IN ACTION: INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM. By Alicia Juarrero. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. x, 288. BOOK REVIEWS
The Philosophical hinu,Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Jesus H. Aguilar Berent Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. vi, 252. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005)
Berent Enç, How We Act...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... respects. It does not always follow that the marks in fact
depict the object at issue. As I have noted, pictures are artifacts, and the
maker must therefore have produced those marks intentionally if they
are to depict the object at issue. Moreover, someone might intention-
ally produce marks...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... is this? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's representing the bases as justifying...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
.... There are good reasons to restrict the contents proper to telic attitudes. Intentional action involves distinctive features that require an account. For instance, as Anscombe (2000, 11) has noted, when one acts intentionally, one seems to know without observation or inference what one is doing. It is also...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 359–410.
Published: 01 July 2004
... intentionally F without it being the case that
one intends to F.50 Moreover, if I am engaged in the intentional activity
of going to the store, then there must be some psychological attitude of
intending that plays the relevant role in my cognitive economy. That is,
I am settled on this course of activity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 339–393.
Published: 01 July 2003
...-Referentiality of Intentions. Philosophical Studies 97 : 11 -52. Searle, J. 1983 . Intentionality . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M. 1987 . The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 : 36 -61. ____. 1994 . The Moral Problem . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stocker...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
.... Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 26 : 103 -37. Arpaly, N. 2000 . On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement. Ethics 110 : 488 -513. Bratman, M. 1987 . Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1998 . Toxin, Temptation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
... an intention without expressing that
intention, for example, by intentionally indicating that you have the intention. And
one can express an intention without communicating it, for example, by recording it in
one’s secret diary. For more on expression and indication, see Owens forthcoming...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
.... References Anscombe Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret 2000 . Intention . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Ginet Carl 1990 . On Action . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Hyman John 1999 . “ How Knowledge Works .” Philosophical Quarterly 50 , no. 197...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
... that this very inten-
tion issue in action. Such an intention is, among other things, a
second-order pro attitude in support of that which is motivating
action. If one acts intentionally one will have such a second-order
pro attitude. But Frankfurt’s unreflective “wanton,” though he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 632–635.
Published: 01 October 2000
... implicitly, a specification of the content of the utterance
it refers to.
In “Intrinsic Intentionality” (1986; here chap. 7)McCann holds, rightly,
that volition is intrinsically intentional: “it would be self-contradictory to
say that Tom unintentionally willed the [exertional] changes his golf...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... intentionally triggers and guides an audience's attempt to read one's mind, in part by revealing the intention to do so. Intentions to hijack others' mindreading capacities in this way are called ‘communicative intentions’. According to intentionalists, communication happens when an audience recognizes what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... state possess intention-
ality at all (i.e., in virtue of what is it of or about anything at all)?
Specific question: Assuming a mental state possesses intentionality, what
determines its specific intentional content (i.e., in virtue of what isit
about certain things...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 316–320.
Published: 01 April 2023
...). Suppose these five categories leave us wanting (perhaps a bigger ‘if’ than Pasternak argues, as my side remarks above suggest). In that case, we must utilize Pasternak’s core conceptual innovation: genuinely intentional citizenship . You are a genuinely intentional citizen of a state if you meet two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... no intentional action. And if they
are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to
do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since
intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s no evidence
that it’s not actual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
.... If they’re not, then
there’s no threat here to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they
are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to
do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since
intentions can be unconscious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 461–467.
Published: 01 July 2011
... to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they
are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to
do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since
intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s...
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