1-20 of 447 Search Results for

intention

Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Harold Kincaid MEASURING THE INTENTIONAL WORLD: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCLENCES. By J. D. Trout. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 287. Cornell University 2000 Cohen, Jacob. 1994 . “The Earth is Round (p < .05).” American...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Jesus H. Aguilar Berent Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. vi, 252. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) Berent Enç, How We Act...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 469–472.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Muhammad Ali Khalidi DYNAMICS IN ACTION: INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM. By Alicia Juarrero. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. x, 288. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical hinu,Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... is this? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's representing the bases as justifying...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... respects. It does not always follow that the marks in fact depict the object at issue. As I have noted, pictures are artifacts, and the maker must therefore have produced those marks intentionally if they are to depict the object at issue. Moreover, someone might intention- ally produce marks...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
... .” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53 : 227 – 46 . Baier A. 1970 . “ Act and Intent .” Journal of Philosophy 67 , no. 19 : 648 – 58 . Baier A. 1977 . “ The Intentionality of Intentions .” Review of Metaphysics 30 , no. 3 : 389 – 414 . Blackburn S. 1988...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 359–410.
Published: 01 July 2004
... intentionally F without it being the case that one intends to F.50 Moreover, if I am engaged in the intentional activity of going to the store, then there must be some psychological attitude of intending that plays the relevant role in my cognitive economy. That is, I am settled on this course of activity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 339–393.
Published: 01 July 2003
.... Roth, A. 2000 . The Self-Referentiality of Intentions. Philosophical Studies 97 : 11 -52. Searle, J. 1983 . Intentionality . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M. 1987 . The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 : 36 -61. ____. 1994 . The Moral Problem . Cambridge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
.... Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 26 : 103 -37. Arpaly, N. 2000 . On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement. Ethics 110 : 488 -513. Bratman, M. 1987 . Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1998 . Toxin, Temptation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
... an intention without expressing that intention, for example, by intentionally indicating that you have the intention. And one can express an intention without communicating it, for example, by recording it in one’s secret diary. For more on expression and indication, see Owens forthcoming...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Kim Frost The core of the modern theory of the will is the claim that the will is the source of voluntary, intentional, rational, and distinctively human action, and the ground of attributions of responsibility, praise, and blame. Some versions of the theory commit the sin of chauvinism about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
... is motivating action. If one acts intentionally one will have such a second-order pro attitude. But Frankfurt’s unreflective “wanton,” though he is not in the business of reflective endorsement, does act intention- ally. So simply by appeal to second-order pro attitudes concerning what is to motivate...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 632–635.
Published: 01 October 2000
... implicitly, a specification of the content of the utterance it refers to. In “Intrinsic Intentionality” (1986; here chap. 7)McCann holds, rightly, that volition is intrinsically intentional: “it would be self-contradictory to say that Tom unintentionally willed the [exertional] changes his golf...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... state possess intention- ality at all (i.e., in virtue of what is it of or about anything at all)? Specific question: Assuming a mental state possesses intentionality, what determines its specific intentional content (i.e., in virtue of what isit about certain things...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... Review 117 : 77 – 98 . Grice Paul 1989 . Studies in the Way of Words . New York : Oxford University Press . Harris Daniel W. 2016 . “ Intentionalism versus the New Conventionalism .” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 : 173 – 201 . Lepore Ernie and Stone...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 316–320.
Published: 01 April 2023
...). Suppose these five categories leave us wanting (perhaps a bigger ‘if’ than Pasternak argues, as my side remarks above suggest). In that case, we must utilize Pasternak’s core conceptual innovation: genuinely intentional citizenship . You are a genuinely intentional citizen of a state if you meet two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s no evidence that it’s not actual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
.... If they’re not, then there’s no threat here to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 461–467.
Published: 01 July 2011
... to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s...