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intention

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Jesus H. Aguilar Berent Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. vi, 252. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) Berent Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s no evidence that it’s not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Harold Kincaid MEASURING THE INTENTIONAL WORLD: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCLENCES. By J. D. Trout. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 287. Cornell University 2000 Cohen, Jacob. 1994 . “The Earth is Round (p < .05).” American Psychologist. 49...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 469–472.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Muhammad Ali Khalidi DYNAMICS IN ACTION: INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM. By Alicia Juarrero. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. x, 288. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical hinu,Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001) DMVAMICS INACTION: INTENTONAL BEHAWOR AS...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... alternative resemblance account, drawing on Grice's account of nonnatural meaning and its role in determining sentence meaning to argue that something depicts an object if it bears intention-based resemblances to the object that jointly capture its overall appearance. In addition to solving the metaphysical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
...Kim Frost Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 359–410.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Abraham Sesshu Roth Cornell University 2004 Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963 . Intention . 2d ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bratman, Michael. 1987 . Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason . Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1992 . Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 339–393.
Published: 01 July 2003
... University Press. Roth, A. 2000 . The Self-Referentiality of Intentions. Philosophical Studies 97 : 11 -52. Searle, J. 1983 . Intentionality . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M. 1987 . The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 : 36 -61. ____. 1994 . The Moral Problem...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 632–635.
Published: 01 October 2000
... content, even implicitly, a specification of the content of the utterance it refers to. In “Intrinsic Intentionality” (1986; here chap. 7)McCann holds, rightly, that volition is intrinsically intentional: “it would be self-contradictory to say that Tom unintentionally willed the [exertional...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... compress into one sentence. Semantic theory should assign sentences a (1) truth-conditional content that is (2) determined compositionally with (3) limited input from context that (4) does not contain speaker intentions as a parameter. The methodology involves countenancing (nonobvious) context sensitivity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
..., and no doubt many readers are already familiar with Hyman's (1999) earlier work on knowledge as an ability. The core of the modern theory of the will is the claim that the will is the source of voluntary, intentional, rational, and distinctively human action, and the ground of attributions of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... kind of applied mindreading. We go about the world compulsively attempting to discern one another's thoughts. As socially intelligent agents, we also often attempt to shape others' discernments of our own thoughts. Communication is a special case of the latter, wherein one intentionally triggers and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
... Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 26 : 103 -37. Arpaly, N. 2000 . On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement. Ethics 110 : 488 -513. Bratman, M. 1987 . Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1998 . Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
.... As I use these terms, one can communicate an intention without expressing that intention, for example, by intentionally indicating that you have the intention. And one can express an intention without communicating it, for example, by recording it in one’s secret diary. For more on expression...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
..., where we exercise free will (defined as “acting intentionally without their intentions being fully determined by prior causes” [202]) only when we are motivationally conflicted. The main argument of chapter 7 is that we have no current scientific data against this conception of free will and we are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
...: our plan- ning agency. In earlier work I have focused on the central roles of plans and planning in our agency, and I have developed what I have called a planning theory of intention.14 We do not simply act from moment to moment. Instead, we settle on complex-and, typically, partial and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 483–486.
Published: 01 July 2002
... participated intention- ally in a harm, this will indeed be rare. It is not enough that they participated in the activity of forming and sustaining the company. Rather, I would argue that it is the people who actually have participated intentionally in those harms, namely, the chief officers and board...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... specific: General question: In virtue of what does a mental state possess intention- ality at all (i.e., in virtue of what is it of or about anything at all)? Specific question: Assuming a mental state possesses intentionality, what determines its specific intentional...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... being moved by spirits). Wegner thinks these cases gen- erate problems for (H), but Mele disagrees. He begins by asking whether the people in question are intentionally moving their bodies. If they’re not, then there’s no threat here to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
... there’s no threat here to (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible...