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intention

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Jesus H. Aguilar Berent Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. vi, 252. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) Berent Enç, How We Act...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... (H) because there’s no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s no...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Harold Kincaid MEASURING THE INTENTIONAL WORLD: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCLENCES. By J. D. Trout. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 287. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REWWS theories successfully in referring...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 469–472.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Muhammad Ali Khalidi DYNAMICS IN ACTION: INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM. By Alicia Juarrero. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. x, 288. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical hinu,Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... alternative resemblance account, drawing on Grice's account of nonnatural meaning and its role in determining sentence meaning to argue that something depicts an object if it bears intention-based resemblances to the object that jointly capture its overall appearance. In addition to solving the metaphysical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's representing the bases as justifying the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
...Kim Frost Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 359–410.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Abraham Sesshu Roth Cornell University 2004 Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963 . Intention . 2d ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bratman, Michael. 1987 . Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason . Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1992 . Shared Cooperative Activity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 339–393.
Published: 01 July 2003
... University Press. Roth, A. 2000 . The Self-Referentiality of Intentions. Philosophical Studies 97 : 11 -52. Searle, J. 1983 . Intentionality . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M. 1987 . The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 : 36 -61. ____. 1994 . The Moral Problem...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 632–635.
Published: 01 October 2000
... without containing in its content, even implicitly, a specification of the content of the utterance it refers to. In “Intrinsic Intentionality” (1986; here chap. 7)McCann holds, rightly, that volition is intrinsically intentional: “it would be self-contradictory to say that Tom...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... theses that I will compress into one sentence. Semantic theory should assign sentences a (1) truth-conditional content that is (2) determined compositionally with (3) limited input from context that (4) does not contain speaker intentions as a parameter. The methodology involves countenancing (nonobvious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
... of the book. But there is already plenty to discuss, and no doubt many readers are already familiar with Hyman's (1999) earlier work on knowledge as an ability. The core of the modern theory of the will is the claim that the will is the source of voluntary, intentional, rational, and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
... intentionally triggers and guides an audience's attempt to read one's mind, in part by revealing the intention to do so. Intentions to hijack others' mindreading capacities in this way are called ‘communicative intentions’. According to intentionalists, communication happens when an audience recognizes what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
.... Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 26 : 103 -37. Arpaly, N. 2000 . On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement. Ethics 110 : 488 -513. Bratman, M. 1987 . Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____. 1998 . Toxin, Temptation and the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
.... As I use these terms, one can communicate an intention without expressing that intention, for example, by intentionally indicating that you have the intention. And one can express an intention without communicating it, for example, by recording it in one’s secret diary. For more on expression...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... free will, where we exercise free will (defined as “acting intentionally without their intentions being fully determined by prior causes” [202]) only when we are motivationally conflicted. The main argument of chapter 7 is that we have no current scientific data against this conception of free will and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
...: our plan- ning agency. In earlier work I have focused on the central roles of plans and planning in our agency, and I have developed what I have called a planning theory of intention.14 We do not simply act from moment to moment. Instead, we settle on complex-and, typically, partial and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 483–486.
Published: 01 July 2002
... participated intention- ally in a harm, this will indeed be rare. It is not enough that they participated in the activity of forming and sustaining the company. Rather, I would argue that it is the people who actually have participated intentionally in those harms, namely, the chief officers and board...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... general, one specific: General question: In virtue of what does a mental state possess intention- ality at all (i.e., in virtue of what is it of or about anything at all)? Specific question: Assuming a mental state possesses intentionality, what determines its specific...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... no intentional action. And if they are intentionally moving their bodies, then it may be that they’ve got intentions to do this and that these intentions are causally relevant to their actions. Since intentions can be unconscious, this is clearly possible, and there’s no evidence that it’s not...