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inference

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 105–108.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Lawrence Nolan INSIGHT AND INFERENCE: DESCARTES'S FOUNDING PRINCIPLE AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Murray Miles. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. Pp. xviii, 564. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS S are not P” should rather have been “S does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 639–641.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Christopher Hitchcock CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE. By Judea Pearl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 384. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001) CAUSALITY...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Daniel W. Harris Lepore Ernie and Stone Matthew , Imagination and Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . viii + 292 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Humans are social primates, and our particular...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 185–189.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Conor Mayo-Wilson Mayo Deborah , Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get beyond the Statistics Wars . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2018 . xv + 471 pp . © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 For more than three decades, Deborah Mayo has defended severe...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 289–293.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Robert Stern James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xviii + 241 pp. Cornell University 2008 BOOK REVIEWS James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
...) obligations that become overridden are not always lost (i.e., sometimes you keep having an obligation when you acquire a stronger incompatible obligation) entails that (ONIM) “ought” does not imply “must” (i.e., some obligations are not all-things-considered). It is standard to infer ONIM—via (2)—from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
...E. J. Green A venerable view holds that a border between perception and cognition is built into our cognitive architecture and that this imposes limits on the way information can flow between them. While the deliverances of perception are freely available for use in reasoning and inference...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward. Cornell University 2008 Aristotle. 1961 . De Anima , ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1963 . “Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
... is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article considers two notable efforts, one by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza and another by David...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... observations about representations of particulars more generally. © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches CNN. She watches Al-Jazeera...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Casey O'Callaghan Stemming from inference does not just explain epistemic downgrade in hijacking. It also anchors Siegel's case that experiences can be more or less rational. A subject who has a downgraded experience suffers rationally. Siegel's conception thus levels the psychological landscape...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 311–313.
Published: 01 April 2002
... is of two works. The brief unfinished Shorter Treatise, which survives in only two manuscripts, deals with rules of inference (or consequences) and syncategorematic terms. It was presumably written before the Longer Treatise, which repeats long sections of the Shorter Treatise verbatim but which also...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 289–337.
Published: 01 July 2003
... or warrant into an argument. When I recall a general fact, I use substantive content mem- ory. When I recall an event, I use experiential memory. When I use an earlier-instantiated step in an argument to combine with an inference rule, I rely on purely preservative memory. I introduced substantive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408.
Published: 01 July 2000
... : 355 -72. Reprinted in The Theory of Knowledge, ed. L. Pojman, 144-153 (Boston: Wadsworth, 1999). Harman, Gilbert. 1968 . “Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 5 : 164 -73. ____. 1973 . Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ____. 1986...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference.” In New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge , ed. Susana Nuccetelli, 57 –78. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 2004 . “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 : 167 –212. ———. 2008 . “The Perils...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... follows from relatively modest assumptions about the semantics of the expressions involved. Consider, for example, the inference from (1)–(3) to (4). Let c be a context of utterance relative to which (1)–(3) are all true, and let o be an arbitrary ticket. Given (3), we know that o must be identical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 572–575.
Published: 01 October 2003
... syllogistic logic and compan- ion forms of inference. Hume is said to have refined their nonformal accounts of inference, adopting a naturalistic theory. Owen argues that all three philos- ophers had a conception of human reasoning different from today’s models of deductive validity. It is not clear...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 284–287.
Published: 01 April 2002
... this concep- tion to normative vocabulary, which (it’s argued) enables the explicit expres- sion of commitment to practical inferences. Chapter 3 takes on perceptual reports, defending a form of reliabilism that retains a central role for reason- giving: to take a reporter to be reliable is to endorse...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 533–581.
Published: 01 October 2021
... , … , and in which each inference proceeds in the correct direction, tracing the order of explanation. I will call such inferences explanatory . 6 I know of no helpful analysis of the distinction between explanatory and non-explanatory inferences, nor of the closely related idea of proceeding in the right...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 481–532.
Published: 01 October 2015
... ( φ )       ( 0 = 0 ∨ T ⌜ φ ⌝ ) ∨ ( T   ⌜ φ ⌝ ∨ 1 = 1 ) To see the problems raised by this sentence, consider figure 7 . (Take 0 = 0 and 1 = 1 to be truths not requiring explanation; take the arrows to represent explanatory inferences.) Figure 7   The way...
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