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inference

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 289–293.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Robert Stern James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xviii + 241 pp. Cornell University 2008 BOOK REVIEWS James W. Allard, The Logical Foundations of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 554–558.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Daniel W. Harris Lepore Ernie and Stone Matthew , Imagination and Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . viii + 292 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Humans are social primates, and our particular...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 105–108.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Lawrence Nolan INSIGHT AND INFERENCE: DESCARTES'S FOUNDING PRINCIPLE AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Murray Miles. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. Pp. xviii, 564. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS S are not P” should rather have been “S does not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 639–641.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Christopher Hitchcock CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE. By Judea Pearl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 384. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001) CAUSALITY...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
...) obligations that become overridden are not always lost (i.e., sometimes you keep having an obligation when you acquire a stronger incompatible obligation) entails that (ONIM) “ought” does not imply “must” (i.e., some obligations are not all-things-considered). It is standard to infer ONIM—via (2)—from the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward. Cornell University 2008 Aristotle. 1961 . De Anima , ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1963 . “Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
... is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article considers two notable efforts, one by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza and another by...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... CNN, and so she unjustifiably trusts Al-Jazeera more than CNN. basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 It follows from these two uncontroversial points I've just made that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
... external factors, such as reliability. Instead, it stems from what happens within a perceiver. In particular, experiences can stem from inferences, and epistemic variability arises from better or worse inferences. Given inferential routes to experience, the surprising implication is that experiences can be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 311–313.
Published: 01 April 2002
... of two works. The brief unfinished Shorter Treatise, which survives in only two manuscripts, deals with rules of inference (or consequences) and syncategorematic terms. It was presumably written before the Longer Treatise, which repeats long sections of the Shorter Treatise verbatim but which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 284–287.
Published: 01 April 2002
... this concep- tion to normative vocabulary, which (it’s argued) enables the explicit expres- sion of commitment to practical inferences. Chapter 3 takes on perceptual reports, defending a form of reliabilism that retains a central role for reason- giving: to take a reporter to be reliable is to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 572–575.
Published: 01 October 2003
... syllogistic logic and compan- ion forms of inference. Hume is said to have refined their nonformal accounts of inference, adopting a naturalistic theory. Owen argues that all three philos- ophers had a conception of human reasoning different from today’s models of deductive validity. It is not clear...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 289–337.
Published: 01 July 2003
... warrant into an argument. When I recall a general fact, I use substantive content mem- ory. When I recall an event, I use experiential memory. When I use an earlier-instantiated step in an argument to combine with an inference rule, I rely on purely preservative memory. I introduced substantive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
.... ———. 2003 . “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference.” In New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge , ed. Susana Nuccetelli, 57 –78. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 2004 . “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 327–330.
Published: 01 April 2002
... . “The Tractatus on Inference and Entailment.” In From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy , edited by Erich H. Reck, 283 -307. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell. 1962 . Principia Mathematica to *56 . Cambridge: Cambridge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 413–418.
Published: 01 July 2018
... address the question of where intuitions can(not) serve as evidence: this research program uses surveys and experiments to study the sensitivity of intuitions to truth-irrelevant parameters (like the order in which cases are presented) and infers lack of evidentiary value where it observes such...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 373–408.
Published: 01 July 2000
... : 355 -72. Reprinted in The Theory of Knowledge, ed. L. Pojman, 144-153 (Boston: Wadsworth, 1999). Harman, Gilbert. 1968 . “Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 5 : 164 -73. ____. 1973 . Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ____. 1986...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 481–532.
Published: 01 October 2015
...). Transitivity has indeed been questioned ( Schaffer 2012 , Trogdon 2013a , Tahko 2014 ). Litland (2013) and Raven (2013) have taken issue with these counterexamples, but whether these counterexamples are any good is irrelevant here. Even were Transitivity( ≺ / ≺ ) an invalid rule of inference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... at least part of the reason why the puzzle is a puzzle. 3 But the validity of that reasoning also follows from relatively modest assumptions about the semantics of the expressions involved. Consider, for example, the inference from (1)–(3) to (4). Let c be a context of utterance relative to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2016
... knowledge provided by TM, the knowledge is inferred from the rationality assumption that takes one from what one's attitude ought to be to what it is. I will come back to this later. But first let's look at what he has to say about the sources of self-knowledge other than TM. One view he discusses and...