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indeterminate identity

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
... indeterminate identity and indeterminate synonymy—and argues that each is unsatisfactory. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017  7. See Lewis 1986, 212 , and Braun and Sider 2007 .  8. Other potential sources of RI include Putnam's (1981) “model-theoretic” considerations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
... the second case too, however, if we adopt the stricter interpretation of personal identity's being what matters . As we saw, how Scotty should react to a broker's offer that benefits one fission-product but not the other turns on what attitude he takes to another indeterminate question: which person he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 279–283.
Published: 01 April 2004
... a modification that appears to successfully patch up the argument. He then proceeds— despite his own libertarian beliefs—to explain why indeterministic agent cau- sation, even if real, would be of little help in understanding free will. In a vari- ant on the traditional charge that indeterminism could do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... Watkins's more specific claims that Kant completely rejects a model on which the first relatum of a phenomenal causal relation is an event and that he maintains that real grounds are metaphysically and not just epistemically indeterminate. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 Our thanks are owed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 472–475.
Published: 01 July 2001
... but that are part of her experience nonetheless). The problem is that outline shapes cannot determine the pictorial contents we enjoy. One way to bring this out is to consider indeterminate styles (as well as exaggerated styles such as caricatures), as Hopkins does in fine-tuning the proposal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 338–343.
Published: 01 April 2023
... are vague since there are borderline cases in which it is indeterminate whether something plays the relevant role. Since materialism identifies consciousness with (or grounds it in) vague properties, it is committed to the vagueness of consciousness. The problem is that it is not vague whether something...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
... of problems. Although revenge paradoxes of different strengths can be formulated, they are found to be indeterminate at higher orders and not inconsistent. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 revenge paradox semantic paradox higher-order indeterminacy determinacy operators truth According...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 1–49.
Published: 01 January 2022
... has exactly 5,250 hairs on his head? There are determinate cases of “bald,” but there are also borderline cases of “bald.” In other words, predicates such as “bald” are indeterminate: there are individuals such that it is indeterminate whether they are bald. 1 Moreover, the boundary between “bald...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 532–536.
Published: 01 October 2022
... has at least one token power not identical with any token power of P . Here distinctness comes through addition: a strongly emergent feature potentially contributes to more effects than its base feature. With these schematic understandings in hand, Wilson devotes chapters 3 and 4 to responding...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 140–144.
Published: 01 January 2018
... reshaping into a ball. Our inclinations appear to conflict. But Sattig's strategy promises to avoid the conflict without violating our inclinations. From a sortal-insensitive perspective, the statue and the clay have the same material subjects. So it is correct materially to predicate identity to them. From...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
.... 2000 . Persons and Bodies . New York: Cambridge University Press. Blackburn, Simon. 1997 . “Has Kant Refuted Parfit?” In Reading Parfit , ed. Jonathan Dancy, 180 -201. Oxford: Blackwell. Butler, Joseph. 1736 . Of Personal Identity . First appendix to The Analogy of Religion. Reprinted...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
... completely indeterminate: some views might be determinately wrong, just as some views of what life is are determinately wrong). Adopting such a perspective might enable Prinz to offer deflationary responses to both the epistemic and explanatory challenges I raised earlier. But his view is that the case...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... have distance zero just in case the qualities represented by those points are phenomenally identical. If these constraints are satisfied, then the structure of the model mirrors the structure of the quality-space. But since standard models cannot capture precision structure, none of these desiderata...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 97–99.
Published: 01 January 2010
.... Dispositional monism is the view that every sparse fundamental property of physics essentially involves a disposition. On Bird’s view, the associ- ation between a fundamental natural property and a disposition is a matter of metaphysical necessity. (Bird goes even further: he argues that the identity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 100–103.
Published: 01 January 2010
... that the identity of a given fundamental natural property is exhausted by its dispositional character.) Therefore, it is metaphysically necessary that anything possessing a certain sparse fundamental property of physics will exhibit certain further properties when suitably stimulated. These regularities...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 104–108.
Published: 01 January 2010
... is the view that every sparse fundamental property of physics essentially involves a disposition. On Bird’s view, the associ- ation between a fundamental natural property and a disposition is a matter of metaphysical necessity. (Bird goes even further: he argues that the identity of a given fundamental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 108–112.
Published: 01 January 2010
... argues that the identity of a given fundamental natural property is exhausted by its dispositional character.) Therefore, it is metaphysically necessary that anything possessing a certain sparse fundamental property of physics will exhibit certain further properties when suitably stimulated...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2010
... is the view that every sparse fundamental property of physics essentially involves a disposition. On Bird’s view, the associ- ation between a fundamental natural property and a disposition is a matter of metaphysical necessity. (Bird goes even further: he argues that the identity of a given fundamental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2010
.... Dispositional monism is the view that every sparse fundamental property of physics essentially involves a disposition. On Bird’s view, the associ- ation between a fundamental natural property and a disposition is a matter of metaphysical necessity. (Bird goes even further: he argues that the identity...