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inclination

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 169–213.
Published: 01 April 2022
... a perfect fit for zhi in the texts that I will discuss. In a battery of important passages, for instance, Wang describes the relationship between zhi and what he calls yi (意), a term which I will translate as “inclination,” but which is often rendered as “will”, “intention”, or “thought”. 7 In all...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 428–434.
Published: 01 July 2000
..., conceptions of virtue give a prominent role to cultivation of proper emotions and appetites, whereas Kant insists that a good will be determined by reverence for the moral law, not emotion or inclination. Elements of this sharp contrast have been under re-examination lately in work on Greek and Kantian ethics...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 63–114.
Published: 01 January 2005
... is good or evil depends upon the relative priority he assigns to the two basic incentives that we all expe- rience, morality as respect for the moral law as embodied in the Cate- gorical Imperative, and self-love as the pursuit of happiness through maximal satisfaction of the inclinations (R 6:36...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 140–144.
Published: 01 January 2018
... for the theory. It also obscures the relevance of its resolutions to the puzzles. The puzzle of coincidence gives a simple illustration (chapter 3). We incline to identify a statue and a piece of clay because they coincide. We also incline to distinguish them because only the clay survives reshaping...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
... one form of realism, he decided that the goodness was not in the objects themselves. Were it not for our desires and inclinations . . . we would not find their objects good. Kant saw that we take things to be important because they are important to us—and he concluded that we must therefore take...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 651–656.
Published: 01 October 2020
... maxims. He indeed incorporates the moral law into those maxims, together with the law of self-love; since, however, he realizes that the two cannot stand on an equal footing, but one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 539–572.
Published: 01 October 2002
... of agents and their actions. When we ask about the conscious accessibility of maxims, we are likely to be inclined toward different answers depending upon which of these three roles we keep foremost in mind. The first role played by maxims is that of structuring moral deliber- ation. When we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 597–601.
Published: 01 October 2016
... this to be true of himself, and “in this blind submission” to nature, he reports, “I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles” (THN 1, 4, 7, 10, 269). And in Hume's view, if we are to philosophize, “it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 125–128.
Published: 01 January 2000
... not obligated to do what I am already inclined to do. (iv) Commonsense morality and Kant also hold that I have special obligations to those close to me. (v) Yet these are the people I am already inclined to help, and so, by (iii), I should not have special obligations to them. Virtue ethics avoids...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 639–642.
Published: 01 October 2000
... of awareness. Since Descarles employs clear and distinct ideas, in a theory of doxastic inclinations, as well as in a theory of understanding, Vinci finds Descartes’s claim that we can have a clear and distinct perception of a nonpropositional item, like extension, perplexing. According to Vinci...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 642–645.
Published: 01 October 2000
... of propositions. Vinci admits his claim is hard to prove, because Des- cartes sometimes confuses propositional and nonpropositional forms of awareness. Since Descarles employs clear and distinct ideas, in a theory of doxastic inclinations, as well as in a theory of understanding, Vinci finds Descartes’s...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 291–294.
Published: 01 April 2002
... of nominalistic reading of Peirce in his discussion of immediate and dynamical objects. At times his own inclinations and aversions—for example, an aversion to reli- gion—seem to affect his interpretations of Peirce’s texts. I appreciate his link- ing of Peirce with Frege and Wittgenstein, but on many...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 128–132.
Published: 01 January 2000
...- 130 BOOK REVIEWS ris, however, assumes that Kant and Kantians must deny this. He argues that this conclusion implies that the natural inclination of sympathy some- times regulates respect for the moral law and that this in turn proves that practical reason...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 263–268.
Published: 01 April 2015
... on the Metaphysics of Morals and the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason , Guyer argues that autonomy in its “full” sense has an ineliminable empirical component: the compliance with moral law necessary for autonomy, he says, can be achieved only by gradually mastering one's inclinations and cultivating...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 153–177.
Published: 01 April 2005
... also insists that per- versity cannot be reduced to merely the influence of inclination on our choices. Kant (R 6:31, 37) argues that our wills always harbor a funda- mental antagonism to morality from which we cannot extricate our- selves, even though we are morally responsible for putting up...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 495–532.
Published: 01 October 2007
... judgments of token causation are strongly aligned with counterfactual dependence. That is, when e  counterfactually depends upon c   in a self-contained net- work, then we are strongly inclined to judge that c  is a token cause of e; and when e  does not counterfactually depend upon c  in a self...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
... Endorsement: Authority and Explanatory Power Begin with our reflectiveness. Many philosophers have emphasized that we have the capacity not merely to be moved by our desires and inclinations. We have the capacity to step back and reflect on our desires and inclinations.2 We have the capacity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 95–97.
Published: 01 January 2002
... rather sketchy treatment does little to give a reader not already inclined to see such notions as having great moral significance a sense of how they might do substantive ethical work. Thus, the thumos of the Rulers will be modulated by their early training and, later, ordered by the dictates...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... phenomenal consciousness.) Pereboom might reply by urging that we have an inclination to attribute phenomenal states to embodied androids like C3PO, at least when we have reason to think that their brains are structurally similar to ours. There is some merit in this claim, but I think that the inclination...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 415–419.
Published: 01 July 2015
... that the Standard Analysis attributes to the status of being borderline, but it is not correct to identify this status with the status of being borderline. The question that arises, then, is whether there is really any substantive dispute here or whether the dispute is ultimately verbal. I'm at least inclined...