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ignorance

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Shamik Dasgupta Sometimes, ignorance is inexpressible. Lewis recognized this when he argued, in “Ramseyan Humility,” that we cannot know which property occupies which causal role. This peculiar state of ignorance arises in a number of other domains too, including ignorance about our position...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 393–402.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Peter Ludlow Michael Devitt, Ignorance of Language . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. xiii + 320 pp. Cornell University 2009 Baker, M. 2001 . The Atoms of Language . New York: Basic Books. Chomsky, N. 1980 . “Rules and Representations.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 269–273.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Kelly Trogdon Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. ix + 249 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 117–120.
Published: 01 January 2001
...A. W. Moore KANTIAN HUMILITY: OUR IGNORANCE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES. By Rae Langton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xiv, 232. Cornell University 2001 Kant, Immanuel. 1781/1787. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. English translation: Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 501–532.
Published: 01 October 2009
... the Indispensability and the Consistency Problems. By what right does Kant present affection by supersensible entities as an indispensable requirement of experience? And how could any argument for such indispensability avoid violating the Critique's doctrine of noumenal ignorance? This essay develops a new solution...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
...' ignorance simply consists in their lack of introspective abilities. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 black-and-white Mary the two gods ability hypothesis indexical knowledge introspection Mary in the room knew everything there is to know about physical facts, but when she is released...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Matthew Mandelkern What does ‘might’ mean? One hypothesis is that ‘It might be raining’ is essentially an avowal of ignorance like ‘For all I know, it's raining’. But it turns out these two constructions embed in different ways—in particular, as parts of larger constructions like Wittgenstein's...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 443–450.
Published: 01 July 2012
... for Conditionalization? Rachael Briggs’s “suppositional test” is supposed to differentiate between Diachronic DBAs that we can safely ignore (including the DBA for Reflection) and Diachronic DBAs that we should find compelling (including the DBA for Conditionalization). I argue that Brigg’s suppositional test is wrong...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Nicolas Bommarito The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 219–222.
Published: 01 April 2022
... but think they should not. And yet when Aristotle comes to treat lack of self-control (or akrasia ) in NE 7, he takes it for granted that the agent who lapses from his own best judgment is affected by a transient “ignorance” ( agnoia , 7.3, 1147b6) of how he should act. If so, willing becomes a condition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 451–454.
Published: 01 July 2001
... in themselves are real objects. On this distinction, we have a metaphysics of two worlds, two sorts of objects, virtual and real; and an epistemology that makes ignorance of things in themselves ignorance of the real. I focus on one argument, of special interest to me because it draws on Kant’s...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 454–456.
Published: 01 July 2001
... objects (logical constructions of conscious states), things in themselves are real objects. On this distinction, we have a metaphysics of two worlds, two sorts of objects, virtual and real; and an epistemology that makes ignorance of things in themselves ignorance of the real. I focus...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
... ’ in context C ↔  x 's belief that p is properly based and x 's evidence eliminates all ¬  p -worlds, except for those that are properly ignored in C . (31) Blome-Tillmann accepts the Lewisian idea that actuality is never properly ignored, which secures the factivity of ‘knows’ (33, 92–95...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
..., for example, by claiming that we are actually ignorant of the intentions of the drivers, and we tend to read off intentions from actions ( Richards 1986 ; Rescher 1993 ). Or one might say that it is reasonable to demand differential responses as part of a demand for virtue, in light of (mere) causal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 416–419.
Published: 01 July 2005
... of uncertainty. 417 BOOK REVIEWS Jamieson disagrees. The problem is not one of uncertainty or even fallibility, but rather ignorance. “To put the point bluntly, we don’t know enough about the consequences of deploying many...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 129–168.
Published: 01 April 2022
... is decidable, or, equivalently, for whether a question is answerable. Kant writes: [T]ranscendental philosophy has the special property that there is no question at all dealing with an object given by pure reason that is insoluble by this very same human reason; and that no plea of unavoidable ignorance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 421–425.
Published: 01 July 2001
... are concerned with what enables persons to exercise a sense ofjustice, it must be because they care about treating one another fairly. Ensuring the fair treatment of all is something the veil of ignorance is supposed to force the parties to do. But if they already care about offering one another...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 118–120.
Published: 01 January 2003
... will not be produced. In a way, this is welcome, for we are surrounded by innumerable possible coop- erative activities that we all know to have real benefits if only we all took part in them, but that we sensibly ignore. In another way this seems to define its way out of the problem other philosophers struggle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 603–632.
Published: 01 October 2007
... or amend well-being, not why he rejects it in favor of something else. 606 Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . or Well Being? particular component to some individuals (say, in a remote area), should society ignore the cost difference and provide...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 123–126.
Published: 01 January 2017
... that the necessary existence of substance is a logical truth, he reminds us that he is ignoring Spinoza's arguments for his claims: “I ignore Spinoza's proof theory” (128n10). Instead, he declares that it is an axiom. It is a bit odd that Almog justifies his calling it an axiom by defiantly reiterating his...