Search Results for identity
1-20 of 518 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
..., Identity, and Abortion Eugene Mills Virginia Commonwealth University I. The Metaphysics and Morality of Origination When did I come into existence, and why should you care? Take the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 425–430.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Paul F. Snowdon © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 Gasser Georg Stefan Matthias , eds., Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2012 . xi+259 pp. The papers in this collection are committed to contributing to the debate as to whether...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 469–471.
Published: 01 July 2000
...Alan Sidelle OCCASIONS OF IDENTITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSISTENCE, CHANGE, AND SAMENESS. By André Gallois. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 296. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVIEWS sciousness (Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett, Ruth Millikan...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 91–94.
Published: 01 January 2001
...John Heil THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS: SUBSTANCE, IDENTITY, AND TIME. By E. J. Lowe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. x, 275. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVLEWS concerns the metaphysics of Lewis, Plantinga, Forbes, and Rosen...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2002
...John MacFarlane Colin McGinn, Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. vi, 114. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS If the complement clause ascribes a first-person content, it expresses...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Alexander W. Kocurek A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem nontrivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions...
Includes: Supplementary data
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
... mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... ambiguous between de re * and de dicto * interpretations. This fact is used to account for asymmetric mistaken identity attributions (for example, Biron thinks Katherine is Rosaline, but he doesn't think Rosaline is Katherine ). The variable theory compares favorably with its alternatives, including...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Sydney Shoemaker Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the “Parfit people,” creatures psychologically like us...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... theory and a dynamic system of contingent identity. I then consider a variant on the initial puzzle that helps us to choose between the two theories. The variant also sheds light on how the phenomenon discussed in this essay relates to Frege's Puzzle about attitude ascriptions. © 2018 by Cornell...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
... space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
... section “Of personal identity” and the Appendix—there cannot be a further perception in that mind, and so those perceptions do not form a whole. Hence, Hume's views were inconsistent. This essay argues that, unlike most others, this interpretation explains his retreat to skepticism in the Appendix. To...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
... indeterminate identity and indeterminate synonymy—and argues that each is unsatisfactory. To aid in our discussion of Leeds's argument, we'll use ‘ Δ ’ and ‘ ∇ ’ to express determinacy and indeterminacy, respectively. The concepts are related as follows: ∇ p iff ¬ Δ p and ¬ Δ...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2007) 116 (1): 51–91.
Published: 01 January 2007
..., Donald. 1988a . “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense.” Mind 97 : 575 -82. ____. 1988b . “Many-One Identity.” Philosophical Papers 17 : 193 -216. Bennett, Karen. 2004 . “Global Supervenience and Dependence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 : 501 -29. Boolos, George...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 153–155.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Michael Jacovides Stuart Matthew , Locke's Metaphysics . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2013 . xi +522 pp . Peter Geach, Bruce Langtry, and others have read Locke as a relative identity theorist, but Stuart has worked out the details and he has taken the textual case much...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 598–602.
Published: 01 October 2002
... entertaining book (based on his 1999 Jean Nicod lec- tures), John Perry supposes that type-identity physicalism is antecedently plau- sible, and that rejecting this thesis requires good reason (this is “antecedent physicalism He aims to show that experience gap arguments, as given by Jackson (the knowledge...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2005
..., Gerson defends the “Two- Worlds” account of Plato’s epistemology: knowledge is only of forms and belief is only of sensibles. On the radical side, the view seems to commit Plato to the numerical identity of all knowing selves and the identity of these selves, in turn, with the object they know. More...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
... is not making a mistake when she values grass-counting. What criteria of justification do we apply in reflection? Korsgaard argues that one's practical identity provides the criteria. A practical identity is “a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... context of personal fusion. It is difficult to see how to maintain a particular family of desert views in light of the cases here presented. But people who accept Desert Requires Identity would reject Irrelevance of Others. They would claim that the Only Lefty Survives and Only Righty Survives cases...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 63–85.
Published: 01 January 2000
... proposes an account of the sources of all normativity, including and especially the sources of normative reasons.) The theory says we assess our desires and other impulses to act in light of practical conceptions of our identities, and then legislate reasons for our- selves on their basis. So...