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The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
.... In particular, I'll be discussing whether, or to what extent, the overdetermination problem turns on particular conceptions of causation. The essay falls into two parts. In the first half (sections 1–2), after briefly presenting the overdetermination problem in section 1, I address the question whether...
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The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
... assume—without argument but for its sake— that you care about this. The answer to the first question may hinge partly on the answer to a different question: what kind of thing am I? I’ll suppose for the sake of argument...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
... are relevant. In section 4, I'll highlight cases in which perceptual processes (namely, those involved in visual search and texture segregation) are constrained in just this way. It is an open question whether all cognitive systems are wide-scope encapsulated. But even if they are, this does...
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The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
... the salivation results or a crucial passage in a Tolstoy novel. But this divided state need not go on forever—in fact, as I’ll discuss in more detail, the bandit analogy suggests that radical exploration should mainly occur in the beginning of inquiry. In fact, Pavlov left behind an unfinished essay...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 401–425.
Published: 01 July 2007
... of interpretation. Further, and leaving Lewis’s project aside for a moment, Williams’s argument highlights some important—and some fairly gen- eral—points concerning the relationship between model theory and semantic determinacy. In these remarks, I plan to do three things. First, I’ll provide a brief...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
... in ⊤ and credence 0 in ⊥ . I'll assume that Yuko has these credences in these propositions. Yuko's possible credal states, then, will differ in what credences are assigned to the proposition expressed by (*) and to its negation. The more fundamental problem with this argument is that PCA 1 doesn't follow from...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...(es) we should assign to such paradoxical sen- tences. But the two questions are intimately related. Sometimes, given an account answering the latter question, the answer to the former is obvious.1 But this is not the case for every account of semantic paradox. For the type of account that I’ll...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 157.
Published: 01 January 2008
... Cornell University 2007 Erratum for Andrew Chignell 2007. “Belief in Kant.” Philosophical Review 116: 323–360. In the section titled “E.2. Theoretical Belief,” p. 345, the sentence beginning “I’ll refer to it here as Theological Belief should instead read: “I’ll refer to it here...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
... ; Kvanvig 2011 ; Grimm 2012 ; Kelp 2014, 2018 . 12. In general, the zetetic requirements and permissions I'll be discussing are “all zetetic things considered” requirements and permissions. That said, it's worth making clear that this does not make them the final word on what subjects should or may...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
... that snow is green without believing that snow is green, and even that the intuitions are clearer in this case than in mine. But I'll just note my disagreement here. I think that, though Burge has shown us that we may have incomplete mastery of a concept but still employ the concept in believing as we do...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 250–254.
Published: 01 April 2019
... find it hard to find an interesting way to push back. So I'll push forward, encouraging Callender further in a direction he seems to be heading anyway. My point concerns his answer to the question what makes time special, but I'll begin with some broader issues—issues close to the surface...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... I’ll discuss all rest on a common conceptual frame- work. All three theories advise agents about how to behave in decision situa- tions. An agent’s ultimate goal in a decision situation is to attain the out- come with the highest value. But since agents in decision situations are typically...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 397–430.
Published: 01 July 2016
... many” cardinalities, there would then be too many contingent truths T k to totalize. Any answer along these lines will have to indulge in set theory if the claim of “too many” is even to be articulated. 15 Not all indulgences are equal. Here I'll consider three different forms such an answer...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 483–523.
Published: 01 October 2003
... of autonomy that shed greater light on this ambivalence without doing violence to other core intuitions. I’ll argue that we can. I propose that what unsettles us, in certain especially deep cases of deference, is the profound difficulty we encounter in attempting to engage the agent in justificatory...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 633–645.
Published: 01 October 2007
...: A Reply to Matthew Stuart Michael Jacovides Purdue University Let me first acknowledge the justice of Matthew Stuart’s criticism of my earlier treatment and offer a revised account of Locke’s semantics for secondary quality words. I’ll...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 437–440.
Published: 01 July 2015
... (nonobvious) context sensitivity only where syntactic or type-level intuitions about lexical items demand. The book lucidly and creatively defends SM and provides a nice explanation of SM's competitors. Nonetheless, as reviewer rather than cheerleader, I'll focus on some parts I find worrisome. A key...
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 139–141.
Published: 01 January 2005
... outcome—you can’t be creatively evil. (I’ll discuss another of Novitz’s suggestions later.) Stein Haugom Olsen contrasts accounts of art in terms of creativity with those in terms of mere making. Noël Carroll argues that tradition is no barrier to creativity—indeed, it is necessary for it. Jerry...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
... it is already Friday, it’s pretty unlikely that I’ll change my mind after read- ing tomorrow’s newspapers, so I predict that I’ll be there, and it would 6. Raz 1977, 218. Many authors maintain that we cannot take on a promissory obligation unintentionally, that promissory obligations fall only...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 101–125.
Published: 01 January 2004
... of the Meditations—on how Descartes employs doubt as a tool for founding knowledge. I’ll have much more to say about part 2. A careful treatment of the topics of this book has been long overdue. Broughton’s ideas are innovative, engaging, and clearly developed at every stage. The wide-ranging issues...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 473–480.
Published: 01 July 2020
... provides the basis for his larger philosophical system. In this review, I'll restrict attention to Brentano’s theory of mind, and focus on the topics of intentionality and consciousness. Both Kriegel and Textor consider Brentano’s entire body of work, including lecture notes, letters, and posthumous...