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higher-order indeterminacy
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1
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... to indeterminacy requires that the indeterminacy operator iter-
ate in a nontrivial manner; we must not, for example, have II f o I f.In
particular, this is required in order to adequately treat higher-order par-
adoxical sentences that employ the determinacy operator.29 In addition
to first-order indeterminacy...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
... of problems. Although revenge paradoxes of different strengths can be formulated, they are found to be indeterminate at higher orders and not inconsistent. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 revenge paradox semantic paradox higher-order indeterminacy determinacy operators truth According...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 1–31.
Published: 01 January 2005
... in this way, they fit comfortably with a
classical semantics. We will then be in a position to respond effectively
to the arguments from symmetry, indeterminacy, higher-order border-
line cases, and accessibility.
2.
The view I will propose is often evident in writings...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
.... What makes this dialectically worrying is that two rival stories about the cognitive loads of indeterminacy in a broadly supervaluational setting are among those that do not verify the partition assumption. 36 What we need in order to address this is a slightly stronger deployment of our...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 1–49.
Published: 01 January 2022
... domain does not have higher-order vagueness or sorites-susceptibility. If such a case exists, it may be a case of indeterminacy, but I do not characterize it as vagueness. 7 At any rate, domain exactness and domain vagueness capture the kind of fundamental nomic exactness and fundamental nomic...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 136–140.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Christian Wüthrich 1. One cannot help but wonder for what convenient reason space and time, unlike causation and kinds, apparently play no role in “imposing order on the world.” Despite the fact that the only essay in the collection that addresses what the collection's title suggests...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 263–266.
Published: 01 April 2003
... is a chapter from his Consciousness, Color and Con-
tent). Horgan’s paper outlines and defends a theory of mental properties that
Horgan wishes to count as nonreductive, and responds to objections Lewis
raises in various places to causally efficacious higher-order unreduced mental
properties. (Horgan does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... does not claim that intuitions
require concepts in order to intuit.
19. Critique of Pure Reason B147.
295
TYLER BURGE
like cause, Kant is not proposing that higher animals and young children
lack experience in an ordinary sense...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 361–399.
Published: 01 July 2007
...) to different versions of interpretationism. On (a), an appendix to Putnam 1981
sketches an extension of the permutation argument to modal languages. This is further
developed in Hale and Wright 1997, including treatment of languages involving higher-
order resources. Elsewhere, I have worked through...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 517–523.
Published: 01 October 2006
... sometimes add
to existing law in order to reconcile laws and legal precedent. Second, judges
have a precedence-setting authority that art interpreters lack. Third, we can
tolerate a greater degree of utterance indeterminacy with artworks than with
law. Legal interpretation has “grave practical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 524–526.
Published: 01 October 2006
... sometimes add
to existing law in order to reconcile laws and legal precedent. Second, judges
have a precedence-setting authority that art interpreters lack. Third, we can
tolerate a greater degree of utterance indeterminacy with artworks than with
law. Legal interpretation has “grave practical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 527–529.
Published: 01 October 2006
... sometimes add
to existing law in order to reconcile laws and legal precedent. Second, judges
have a precedence-setting authority that art interpreters lack. Third, we can
tolerate a greater degree of utterance indeterminacy with artworks than with
law. Legal interpretation has “grave practical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 530–532.
Published: 01 October 2006
... the self-evidence of that propo-
sition (41). The former is a form of fi rst-order knowledge about prima facie
duties; the latter is a form of higher-order knowledge about why these prima
facie duties are indeed prima facie duties (44). Possessing fi rst-order knowl-
edge about prima facie duties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 533–535.
Published: 01 October 2006
... the self-evidence of that propo-
sition (41). The former is a form of fi rst-order knowledge about prima facie
duties; the latter is a form of higher-order knowledge about why these prima
facie duties are indeed prima facie duties (44). Possessing fi rst-order knowl-
edge about prima facie duties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 536–539.
Published: 01 October 2006
... the self-evidence of that propo-
sition (41). The former is a form of fi rst-order knowledge about prima facie
duties; the latter is a form of higher-order knowledge about why these prima
facie duties are indeed prima facie duties (44). Possessing fi rst-order knowl-
edge about prima facie duties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 540–542.
Published: 01 October 2006
... sometimes add
to existing law in order to reconcile laws and legal precedent. Second, judges
have a precedence-setting authority that art interpreters lack. Third, we can
tolerate a greater degree of utterance indeterminacy with artworks than with
law. Legal interpretation has “grave practical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 543–545.
Published: 01 October 2006
... the self-evidence of that propo-
sition (41). The former is a form of fi rst-order knowledge about prima facie
duties; the latter is a form of higher-order knowledge about why these prima
facie duties are indeed prima facie duties (44). Possessing fi rst-order knowl-
edge about prima facie duties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 546–548.
Published: 01 October 2006
... sometimes add
to existing law in order to reconcile laws and legal precedent. Second, judges
have a precedence-setting authority that art interpreters lack. Third, we can
tolerate a greater degree of utterance indeterminacy with artworks than with
law. Legal interpretation has “grave practical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (2): 206–211.
Published: 01 April 2024
...-relative’ reasons. Appearances are not fact-relative or belief-relative reasons. They aren’t evidence-relative reasons either. Those are more demanding: as Worsnip’s discussion of higher-order evidence in chapter 3 suggests, one can have conclusive evidence for p even though it doesn’t appear from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 481–532.
Published: 01 October 2015
... it is unclear what grounds what. I consider two ways of dealing with these situations. The first is supervaluationist. Proceeding in this way has the consequence that it can be indeterminate what grounds what—even when there is no indeterminacy in the claims not involving ground. On the second—to my mind...
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