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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 4. Means of participants’ average confidence in Heads 1 ,… Heads 4 as they saw more tasks, in ambiguous (left) and unambiguous (right) conditions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 13. Density plots of confidence in Heads i when presented with weak evidence (uncompletable string or non-black marble).
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
... Beauty awakens her degree of belief in heads should be one-third. This demonstrates that it can be rational for an agent who gains only self-locating beliefs between two times to alter her degree of belief in a non-self-locating claim. © 2008 by Cornell University 2008 Arntzenius, F. 2003...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... in which she falls asleep on Sunday night, and
the number of times she subsequently awakens is determined by the toss
of a fair coin. If the coin comes up heads, then she is awoken only on
Monday morning, and after she falls asleep on Monday night, she remains
asleep...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2001
... sight, the intuition that every game has a unique objective solution is falsified by Matching Pennies. This game has two players, A and B; each simultaneously chooses Heads or Tails. If both choose Heads or if both choose Tails, A wins $1 from B; otherwise, B wins $1 from A. Let us stipulate, as Weirich...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 355–458.
Published: 01 July 2023
...Figure 4. Means of participants’ average confidence in Heads 1 ,… Heads 4 as they saw more tasks, in ambiguous (left) and unambiguous (right) conditions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. ...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 149–177.
Published: 01 April 2012
... cases we
will look at.
1.2. Uncertain Small Ball
Suppose you are faced with an urn containing either one ball or two,
depending on the result of a fair coin toss—two if Tails, one if Heads.
If Tails lands, one big ball and one small ball will be placed in the urn. If
Heads lands, another fair...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
...” conception of comparative normality. Here is the first case, from Dorr, Goodman, and Hawthorne 2014 : Flipping for Heads A coin flipper will flip a fair coin until it lands heads. Then he will flip no more. Suppose you have evidential knowledge that this is the setup. The coin will in fact land...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 485–531.
Published: 01 October 2014
... .” The proof I gave can be shortened: by integration by parts, as we saw, the total chance of r heads in n tosses is ( n r ) ∫ 0 1 p r ( 1 − p ) n − r d p = ( n r ) n − r r + 1 ∫ 0 1 p r + 1 ( 1...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... that intuitively the system does not.
3. Block also offers a variant on this example in which the Chinese people are
replaced by homunculi. For more on homunculus-headed systems, see section 2 and
later.
141
MICHAEL TYE...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... . Oxford : Oxford University Press . van Fraassen B. 1995 . “ Fine-Grained Opinion, Probability, and the Logic of Full Belief .” Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 : 349 – 77 . Weintraub R. 2008 . “ How Probable Is an Infinite Sequence of Heads? A Reply to Williamson...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... as rational belief. For instance, strong believing that
one knows that it is soup for dinner should preclude only weakly believing
that it is soup for dinner. Similarly, believing that the chance of a coin
landing heads is 0.9 precludes only weakly believing that the coin will land
heads. The thought...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
..., this problem brings to a head a conflict between two
decision rules. In Robert Nozick’s original presentation of the puzzle,
these rules were taken to be Dominance and Maximize Expected Utility
488
Causation, Chance, and Supernatural Evidence
(Nozick 1997 [1969...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
...: the Principal Principle tells you to defer completely to chance under normal circumstances. If you learn the chance of heads is exactly 80 percent, then you should be 80 percent confident in heads. Likewise, the New Principle tells you to have credence exactly 80 percent in heads if you learn that the chance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... rationale—whether it delivers credences that are eligible candidates for constituting probabilistic knowledge. Imagine that a bookie hands you and your friend a coin, and offers you a bet: win \ $ w if it comes up heads; lose \ $ l if not. Neither of you have any prior evidence about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
...
related norms. The appendix gives the proofs of the key theorems.
1. Chance-Credence Norms
Suppose I am at the beginning of my epistemic life. That is, I have accu-
mulated no evidence. In this situation, how strongly should I believe that
a given future coin toss will come up heads conditional...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 143–148.
Published: 01 January 2016
... be given drugs that cause her to dreamlessly sleep all through the day on Tuesday to wake up on Wednesday (if the coin came up heads), or be given different drugs that erase her memories of Monday, so that she wakes up on Tuesday in the same mental state that she woke up in on Monday, and she...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 371–375.
Published: 01 July 2019
... belief appear compelling is the picture of categorical and graded beliefs living closely together in our head while apparently being about the same ‘thing’ (belief). But recent work in cognitive psychology has put some pressure on this guiding picture by questioning the unity of the mind. So-called dual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 391–394.
Published: 01 July 2010
... in comparison with Jackson’s Mary.
First, consider Sleeping Beauty. As is familiar, Sleeping Beauty is put to
sleep on Sunday night after being told that she will be woken up either once or
twice in the next two days, depending on the flip of a fair coin. If heads, sheis
woken up only once, on Monday...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 394–398.
Published: 01 July 2010
... Beauty. As is familiar, Sleeping Beauty is put to
sleep on Sunday night after being told that she will be woken up either once or
twice in the next two days, depending on the flip of a fair coin. If heads, sheis
woken up only once, on Monday, and if tails, she is woken up on Monday and
again...
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