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hallucination

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 327–359.
Published: 01 July 2022
...Alex Byrne; Riccardo Manzotti When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... studies: hallucination and cognitive penetration of perception. This intuition, that hallucination beliefs remain justified, is surely not only had by internalists; many reliabilists have modified their theories in complicated ways in order to allow victims of a Cartesian demon to be justified when...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 515–519.
Published: 01 July 2023
... in a relation to a truth) and so is available not only in the good case of veridical perception but also in illusion or hallucination. Whether S’s belief is rational cannot hinge on minimal differences, as implied by disjunctivism. Schroeder illustrates this with a pair of cases C 1 and C 2...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... or green )? Chirimuuta's interactionism cannot be extended to hallucination , for the simple reason that here there is no long process/interaction going from an object to the brain. So here she advocates a quite different view: “color [H-color she calls it] is a property of the series of neural events...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 473–480.
Published: 01 July 2020
..., it is this reliance on terms for external objects’ properties to indirectly describe the intrinsic properties of subjects that has misled philosophers to construe thought as an honest-to-goodness relation between a subject and an object” (59). Immanent object talk is still useful in hallucination cases because “we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 523–528.
Published: 01 October 2022
... perceptions and matching hallucinations. The target here is naive realist disjunctivism , which holds that the conscious character of a veridical perception of a yellow ball (say) is constituted by acquaintance with aspects of the external world, whereas the conscious character of a subjectively matching...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
... of Hallucination.” Kim, Jaegwon. 1984 . “Concepts of Supervenience.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 : 153 -76. Kraut, Robert. 1982 . “Sensory States and Sensory Objects.” Noûs 16 : 277 -93. Levine, Joseph. 1997 . “Are Qualia Just Representations? A Critical Notice of Michael...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 309–313.
Published: 01 April 2020
... neutralism, allegedly establishing that one may resist ontological commitments to numbers, composite entities, fictional entities, hallucinations, centers of mass, and so on, without incurring an obligation to either paraphrase or reject sentences that quantify over such objectionable entities. In part 2...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
... from considering the blindsight example. Campbell calls the theory of experi- ence he favors “the Relational view.” This view holds that “the [perceived] object itself is a constituent of the experience” (130), so hallucinations in which no object is perceived are not the same kinds of experience...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
.... Sometimes, it seems as if you are in completely successful contact with the world via vision, when you aren’t. There are two kinds of departures from such complete success compatible with its seeming from a fi rst- person perspective that such success is complete. In hallucinations, per- ceptual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 127–133.
Published: 01 January 2010
...: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. xix + 457 pp. Fischer, John Martin. 2009. Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. viii + 184 pp. Fish, William. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... Dragging and Confirming chose one of the twenty of us at random, gave that person a hallucinatory drug that causes lifelike visual hallucinations of various (but unspecified) ordinary objects, and then placed that person in an empty room. The other nineteen people were placed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 451–457.
Published: 01 July 2012
... and has never experienced red. While investigating Bill’s brain, Mary induces in Bill a hallucination of red. According to Tye’s view of hallucination, this hallucination enables Bill to be acquainted with red. Since acquaintance is a physical relation, and red is a physical property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 457–460.
Published: 01 July 2012
... and has never experienced red. While investigating Bill’s brain, Mary induces in Bill a hallucination of red. According to Tye’s view of hallucination, this hallucination enables Bill to be acquainted with red. Since acquaintance is a physical relation, and red is a physical property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 461–464.
Published: 01 July 2012
... and has never experienced red. While investigating Bill’s brain, Mary induces in Bill a hallucination of red. According to Tye’s view of hallucination, this hallucination enables Bill to be acquainted with red. Since acquaintance is a physical relation, and red is a physical property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
... and has never experienced red. While investigating Bill’s brain, Mary induces in Bill a hallucination of red. According to Tye’s view of hallucination, this hallucination enables Bill to be acquainted with red. Since acquaintance is a physical relation, and red is a physical property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2012
... and has never experienced red. While investigating Bill’s brain, Mary induces in Bill a hallucination of red. According to Tye’s view of hallucination, this hallucination enables Bill to be acquainted with red. Since acquaintance is a physical relation, and red is a physical property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 472–474.
Published: 01 July 2012
... and has never experienced red. While investigating Bill’s brain, Mary induces in Bill a hallucination of red. According to Tye’s view of hallucination, this hallucination enables Bill to be acquainted with red. Since acquaintance is a physical relation, and red is a physical property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 511–514.
Published: 01 October 2022
... representations satisfy the formal conditions of experience and empirical reality (which is not altogether clear), ascertaining whether these representations present empirically real objects rather than empirically ideal pseudo-existents (such as a hallucinated pink elephant) would require us to discern...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 598–601.
Published: 01 October 2000
... that desire contexts are essentially opaque leads him to various implausible assertions (for example, on page 84, that a desire to X can be satisfied by the illusion or hallucination that one is X-ing). The most serious problems with the argument, however, lie in the move- ments from 3 to 5...