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genuine knowledge

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 169–213.
Published: 01 April 2022
..., which he sometimes called “genuine knowledge” (真知). I argue for a new interpretation of this notion, according to which genuine knowledge requires freedom from a form of doxastic conflict. I propose that, in Wang’s view, a person is free from this form of doxastic conflict if and only if they are acting...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 73–114.
Published: 01 January 2018
...Conor Mayo-Wilson Epistemic closure ( ec ) is the thesis that knowledge is closed under known entailment. Although several theories of knowledge violate ec , failures of ec seem rare in science. I argue that, surprisingly, there are genuine violations of ec according to theories of knowledge widely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... in a perceived agreement between ideas but is still knowledge of real existence. However, Owen thinks that Locke is not entitled to claim that sensitive knowledge is genuine, infallible knowledge.  6. In Draft A, Locke claims that we can have sensitive knowledge that qualities of different sense...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 423–425.
Published: 01 July 2000
... conceived (which he allows himself to possess), leave untouched the central difficulty, which is that while Socrates was reliably virtuous he claims that only genuine knowledge (which he says he lacks) can guarantee (that is, is reliably sufficient for) virtue (85). Neha- 423 BOOK REvlEWS mas s radical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 499–503.
Published: 01 July 2023
... consonant with his final view, so that it need not be framed as a puzzle that false statements somehow work to return genuine knowledge. Idealizations are usually presupposed to be false; authors like Potochnik (2017), in fact, define them as false, such that if it is an idealization, then by definition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 403–408.
Published: 01 July 2018
... of natural teleology that results in his denial that we can ever have genuine knowledge of life, Kreines argues that Hegel reintroduces an Aristotelean way of thinking about biological type and token in an attempt to counter Kant's skepticism (89, 93). Part 2 argues that Kant's Transcendental Dialectic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 272–275.
Published: 01 April 2015
... language 2 —is irrelevant to the solution of his puzzle. The reason is that his puzzle concerns “genuine normative requirements”—but only one of these “ought” claims can express a “genuine normative requirement.” However, whether this objection is effective depends on what this expression means...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2001
... Atomism.” Reprinted in his Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Marsh, 175 -281. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956 . ____. 1924 . “Logical Atomism.” Reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, 323 -43. ____. 1984 . Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript. Ed. Elisabeth R. Eames. London: Routledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
...), moreover, takes sense-data to supply “the most obvious and striking example of knowledge by acquaintance,” this passage should carry some weight as a guide to how he is thinking of our cognitive contact with the bearers of genuine Russellian names more generally. Russell’s emphasis on perfect...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
.... At the heart of this paper, then, is a puzzle: a puzzle for a picture of epistemic normativity that doesn't accommodate the norms of inquiry, and a puzzle about how to conduct ourselves in our efforts to get more information, acquire knowledge, and understand better. I want to start by getting a feel...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
... to rationally believe it, is ruled out by Lord's setup: since he wants to analyze rationality in terms of reasons, he can't rely on the notion of rational belief to analyze what it takes to possess a reason, lest his account be circular. To avoid circularity, he adopts a knowledge-first account of possessing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2014
... violations nonetheless. I'm on board with this, but for many this is the central problem with Nozick's epistemology. Will critics find Zalabardo's theory a genuine improvement here? First, before developing his theory of knowledge, Zalabardo responds to Bonjour's (1985) qualms about externalism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 119–122.
Published: 01 January 2013
... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 122–125.
Published: 01 January 2013
... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 125–128.
Published: 01 January 2013
... union merely consists in the interaction of mind and body. As he notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 129–131.
Published: 01 January 2013
... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 132–134.
Published: 01 January 2013
... union merely consists in the interaction of mind and body. As he notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 135–139.
Published: 01 January 2013
... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 139–143.
Published: 01 January 2013
... union merely consists in the interaction of mind and body. As he notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 144–147.
Published: 01 January 2013
... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...