..., which he sometimes called “genuine knowledge” (真知). I argue for a new interpretation of this notion, according to which genuine knowledge requires freedom from a form of doxastic conflict. I propose that, in Wang’s view, a person is free from this form of doxastic conflict if and only if they are acting...

...Conor Mayo-Wilson Epistemic closure ( ec ) is the thesis that knowledge is closed under known entailment. Although several theories of knowledge violate ec , failures of ec seem rare in science. I argue that, surprisingly, there are genuine violations of ec according to theories of knowledge widely...

... for holding that we have genuine, indeed infallible, knowledge of the existence of objects and their qualities through sensation. This solution becomes clear when one takes into account Locke's views about how simple ideas of sensation represent. The key, I argue, is Locke's argument that all simple ideas...

... conceived (which he allows himself to possess), leave untouched the central difficulty, which is that while Socrates was reliably virtuous he claims that only genuine knowledge (which he says he lacks) can guarantee (that is, is reliably sufficient for) virtue (85). Neha- 423 BOOK REvlEWS mas s radical...

... somehow work to return genuine knowledge. Idealizations are usually presupposed to be false; authors like Potochnik (2017), in fact, define them as false, such that if it is an idealization, then by definition, it could not be true. Rice does not seem to endorse this, yet accurate representation is left...

... the important dispute between Kant and Hegel concerning the knowability of natural purposes, or Naturzwecke . Against Kant's “full” inflationary view of natural teleology that results in his denial that we can ever have genuine knowledge of life, Kreines argues that Hegel reintroduces an Aristotelean way...

... . For an account in terms of more literal aiming, see Steglich-Petersen 2006 . 3. Consider the claim that it would be “absurd” to reject the existence of “genuine normative requirements” (33). 2. See Wedgwood 2006 , Thompson 2008 , Chrisman 2012 , Ridge 2014 , and Finlay 2014 . 1...

... Atomism.” Reprinted in his Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Marsh, 175 -281. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956 . ____. 1924 . “Logical Atomism.” Reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, 323 -43. ____. 1984 . Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript. Ed. Elisabeth R. Eames. London: Routledge...

...), moreover, takes sense-data to supply “the most obvious and striking example of knowledge by acquaintance,” this passage should carry some weight as a guide to how he is thinking of our cognitive contact with the bearers of genuine Russellian names more generally. Russell’s emphasis on perfect...

... to rationally believe it, is ruled out by Lord's setup: since he wants to analyze rationality in terms of reasons, he can't rely on the notion of rational belief to analyze what it takes to possess a reason, lest his account be circular. To avoid circularity, he adopts a knowledge-first account of possessing...

.... At the heart of this paper, then, is a puzzle: a puzzle for a picture of epistemic normativity that doesn't accommodate the norms of inquiry, and a puzzle about how to conduct ourselves in our efforts to get more information, acquire knowledge, and understand better. I want to start by getting a feel...

...Kelly Becker First, before developing his theory of knowledge, Zalabardo responds to Bonjour's (1985) qualms about externalism generally, qualms based on the thought that knowledge requires evidence-based reasons because believing without adequate evidence is irrational and irresponsible...

... union merely consists in the interaction of mind and body. As he notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative...

... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...

... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...

... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...

... union merely consists in the interaction of mind and body. As he notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative...

... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...

... union merely consists in the interaction of mind and body. As he notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative...

... notes, Descartes writes that the union explains interaction, but what interests Hoffman is a further question: given his dualism, did Des- cartes think mind and body together constitute a genuine individual? He argues for an affirmative answer; the human mind is the substantial form of the body...