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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Robert Sugden EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALITY: GAME THEORY REVISID BY DECISION RULES. By Paul Weirich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 235. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVEWS consistency and organic character of his political philosophy...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 421–425.
Published: 01 July 2001
... like to thank Joshua Cohen and Dale Dorsey for helpful discussion of points developed in this essay. The Philosqhical Review, Vol. 110, No. 3 (July 2001) EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALITY: GAME THEORY REVISELI BY DECISION RULES. By PAULWEIRICH. Cambridge: Cambridge University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 285–290.
Published: 01 April 2012
... natural language meaning. Prashant Parikh approaches mean- ing through looking at how utterances work in communicative contexts. He uses the formal tools of game theory to develop a model of utterance-meaning as an equilibrium within a complex structure of interdependent and interlocking games of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 291–293.
Published: 01 April 2012
... work in communicative contexts. He uses the formal tools of game theory to develop a model of utterance-meaning as an equilibrium within a complex structure of interdependent and interlocking games of partial information. The model is fascinating and valuable, both for its detailed contribution to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 294–298.
Published: 01 April 2012
... work in communicative contexts. He uses the formal tools of game theory to develop a model of utterance-meaning as an equilibrium within a complex structure of interdependent and interlocking games of partial information. The model is fascinating and valuable, both for its detailed contribution to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 298–301.
Published: 01 April 2012
... work in communicative contexts. He uses the formal tools of game theory to develop a model of utterance-meaning as an equilibrium within a complex structure of interdependent and interlocking games of partial information. The model is fascinating and valuable, both for its detailed contribution to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 302–304.
Published: 01 April 2012
... natural language meaning. Prashant Parikh approaches mean- ing through looking at how utterances work in communicative contexts. He uses the formal tools of game theory to develop a model of utterance-meaning as an equilibrium within a complex structure of interdependent and interlocking games of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 304–308.
Published: 01 April 2012
.... xiii þ334 pp. Language and Equilibrium is a sustained development of a thought-provoking new approach to natural language meaning. Prashant Parikh approaches mean- ing through looking at how utterances work in communicative contexts. He uses the formal tools of game theory to develop a model of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 169–198.
Published: 01 April 2006
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 142–147.
Published: 01 January 2002
... constructivism that occur to us are self-refuting or manifestly implausible. The heart of the book explores the far more sophisti- cated arguments for relativism based on the ideas of our most influential phi- losophers: Wittgenstein (language-game, private language, rule-following), Quine (naturalism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... own prescription about such cases. For the moment, I simply assume, follow- ing Lewis, that chance and inadmissible evidence can come apart in this way, and that our game involves an example of that phenomenon. For future reference, let us also introduce a variant of the game, which makes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
... excels. Using tools from philosophy, game theory, and psychology, she provides a rigorous account of how social norms behave in the wild; and more importantly, she uses case studies, as well as formal models and empirical tools, to explain how we can successfully change social norms that are deeply...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 291–295.
Published: 01 April 2001
... body of work on nonmonotonic logics. Third, games are playing a growing role in logic; examples include Hintikka’s game-theoretic semantics, the dialogue games of Lorenzen, and the Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse back- and-forth games that are increasingly prominent in model theory. Such approaches...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
... fiction (1990), is broadly this. Suppose we have in place the notion of a game of make-believe: roughly, a stretch of imaginative activity, involving one or more actors, subject to rules that determine what is to be imagined as part of the game. In Walton’s influential development of this idea...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 285–288.
Published: 01 April 2005
... participant (post-institutionally) deserves. The state here is like a casino that hosts a poker tournament. The casino decides what games will be played, sets the rules of each game, and charges players a fixed percentage of their chips at the end of the night. It is not inco- herent for the players to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 435–439.
Published: 01 July 2016
... epistemological skeptic; it is that it leaves us nonskeptics with almost no guidance as to what to believe or do ourselves. Reasoning, on Laden's picture, is like a game that has no rules other than to play fair and keep playing: it would be hard to know how to play such a game, since almost anything could be a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 470–473.
Published: 01 July 2002
... thinks (xi). This is big game indeed. Seemingly, the Frege-Montague-Lewis and the Tarski-Davidson traditions in philosophy of language are to be rejected, as is the whole Fodor- style representational theory of mind. We gather that the two parts of the target come together in the rejection of a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 443–450.
Published: 01 July 2012
... Principle. Briggs proves a related claim in her argument for “Qualified Reflection” (Briggs 2009, 69). However, to demand that every coherent agent must be a “conditionalizer” in this sense is to set the bar for coherence too high. To see this, consider an agent watching a game of chess. At a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 465–470.
Published: 01 July 2002
... of the theory. They argue that the concept of rational choice is circular: in particular, they present games in which rational choices exhibit the kind of circularity we saw with circular definitions. (A related point is made by Skyrms.) They argue that a more satisfying account of rationality can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 151–196.
Published: 01 April 2018