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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... do in the future are “hard facts.” Rather, the fundamental question is whether God's beliefs about what an agent will do in the future depend on what that agent will do in the future. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Thanks to the Metaphysics Group at the University of Virginia and an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... make for the probability of the effect. I conclude by discussing my results and outlining future research avenues. Notably, causal strength is blind to the presence of multiple paths leading from C to E , or the number of mediators between C and E (see figure 2 ). This choice is conscious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 256–260.
Published: 01 April 2018
..., causation, and the relationship between past and future” (88). Specifically she argues for Humean conceptions of laws and causation. Physical laws should not be viewed as things that are in place beforehand, guiding events from past to present, and causation should not be viewed as necessitating events in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 278–281.
Published: 01 April 2002
... of pastness or futurity. Few attempts have even been made by solipsistic presentists1 to argue that nothing possesses pastness or futurity, and it’s not clear that any of those attempts suc- ceed. Solipsistic presentists typically adopt this as an assumption and proceed as if the problems with...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
... University of Arkansas, and the Dartmouth-UVM Sym- posium, and I’d like to thank members of those audiences for stimulating questions. Part of the paper descends from my comments on Richard Fo- ley’s paper “How should future opinion affect current opinion?” read at the 1993 meeting of the Central...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 131–134.
Published: 01 January 2019
... perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. In a nutshell, what is distinctive about (AF) is the idea that vision is partly future-tensed . For (AF) posits visual contents that involve anticipation —that is, visual contents that are not just about how the objects of vision are right...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... past/present/future, it does not entail that there is no unique past/present/future foliation of space-time. The metaphysician might add the assumption that there is a unique foliation, thereby saving both the Passage Intuition and Unique Present Intuition. However, Skow describes defects in this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
... MARTIN FISCHER AND PATRICK TODD 2. Merricks’s Argument Here is the Main Argument and Merricks’s initial reflections on it: Let time t be just a few minutes in the future from now, and consider the Main Argument: (1) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t was...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2003) 112 (2): 215–245.
Published: 01 April 2003
... neutrality—appears to require the agent to subordinate her current ideals to her future ones or at least to moderate pursuit of cur- rent ideals in light of future ones. But this demand may seem to sacri- fice authenticity, if we suppose that authenticity requires acting on the ideals that the agent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
....” In Polish Logic 1920-1939 , ed. Storrs McCall, 40 -65. Oxford: Clarendon. MacFarlane, John. 2003 . “Future Contingents and Relative Truth.” Philosophical Quarterly 53 : 321 -36. McKay, Thomas, and David Johnson. 1996 . “A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2017
... spouting fish with horizontal tails, that there are no whales. (In another much-discussed example, Dalton defined ‘atom’ in terms of indivisibility.) Suppose it seems to us now that the concept of agency is the concept of a kind of closing off of a previously open future. Might it turn out that the concept...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 411–416.
Published: 01 July 2004
... to perform some future action, but at a later time (prior to the time at which the action would have occurred) lose that ability. 411 MICHAEL HUEMER In my initial statement of the argument for incompatibilism, I unfor- tunately did not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 274–276.
Published: 01 April 2000
... providence (a metaphysical perspective that was first articulated by Luis de Molina, a sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit theologian), According to this perspective, God not only knows all that has occurred, is occurring, and will actually occur in the future, God also possesses middle knowledge. That...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2005) 114 (3): 399–410.
Published: 01 July 2005
.... Rovane (who is consistently scrupulous about raising and seeking to answer important objections to her views) seeks to address this sort of objection in an imaginative and provocative discussion of the ways in which an ordinary human-sized person’s intentional control over its future actions must be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 281–284.
Published: 01 April 2002
... or future is presently past or future and solipsistic presentism the view that something present and nothing is past or future. 2 William Lane Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000). 3 Quentin Smith, “Reference to the Past and Future,” in Time, Tense and Reference, ed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 241–272.
Published: 01 April 2017
... hope to suggest that preemptive forgiving can serve important purposes. I then reject the reply that these apparent instances of preemptive forgiving are actually instances of promising to forgive in the future. Part 3 sketches, roughly, some of the implications that preemptive forgiving may hold...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 281–286.
Published: 01 April 2000
..., previously unpublished pieces by Prior in which he elaborates his temporal realism about past, present, and future: time genuinely passes; formerly future events become present (assuming we endorse future events), and present events become irrevocably past. In McTaggart’s terms (roughly), history...