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The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 95–130.
Published: 01 January 2020
... present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument , and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a problem: because which desires one will have in...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... do in the future are “hard facts.” Rather, the fundamental question is whether God's beliefs about what an agent will do in the future depend on what that agent will do in the future. Foreknowledge and Freedom Trenton Merricks University...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... make for the probability of the effect. I conclude by discussing my results and outlining future research avenues. © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 causality causal strength causal Bayes nets probability difference-making measure sensitivity Causation is a central concept in human...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 495–499.
Published: 01 July 2020
... book’s title suggests, there are others: future bias (preferring that good things be in the future and bad things in the past), structural bias (caring about the overall sequence of events in your life; think of the preference for a life that starts out bad but continually improves over a life that...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 256–260.
Published: 01 April 2018
... should not be located in the underlying physics. This is because, at the microlevel, the global laws are temporally symmetric. Thus our standard notion of causation cannot apply at that level, since basing causation on these laws would mean that the future causes the past just as well as the past causes...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 278–281.
Published: 01 April 2002
... of pastness or futurity. Few attempts have even been made by solipsistic presentists1 to argue that nothing possesses pastness or futurity, and it’s not clear that any of those attempts suc- ceed. Solipsistic presentists typically adopt this as an assumption and proceed as if the problems with...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
... University of Arkansas, and the Dartmouth-UVM Sym- posium, and I’d like to thank members of those audiences for stimulating questions. Part of the paper descends from my comments on Richard Fo- ley’s paper “How should future opinion affect current opinion?” read at the 1993 meeting of the Central...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 131–134.
Published: 01 January 2019
... perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. In a nutshell, what is distinctive about (AF) is the idea that vision is partly future-tensed . For (AF) posits visual contents that involve anticipation —that is, visual contents that are not just about how the objects of vision are right...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... Objective Becoming is therapy for those of us who, like Auden, feel alienated by the non-Euclidean space-time that modern physics offers us. Here is one way of understanding the tension. Suppose you think there is a real difference between the past, present, and future. And there is some kind of change in...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
... minutes in the future from now, and consider the Main Argument: (1) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. (2) Necessarily, if that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago, then Jones sits at time t...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 215–245.
Published: 01 April 2003
... neutrality—appears to require the agent to subordinate her current ideals to her future ones or at least to moderate pursuit of cur- rent ideals in light of future ones. But this demand may seem to sacri- fice authenticity, if we suppose that authenticity requires acting on the ideals that the agent...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
....” In Polish Logic 1920-1939 , ed. Storrs McCall, 40 -65. Oxford: Clarendon. MacFarlane, John. 2003 . “Future Contingents and Relative Truth.” Philosophical Quarterly 53 : 321 -36. McKay, Thomas, and David Johnson. 1996 . “A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2017
... no whales. (In another much-discussed example, Dalton defined ‘atom’ in terms of indivisibility.) Suppose it seems to us now that the concept of agency is the concept of a kind of closing off of a previously open future. Might it turn out that the concept of agency was not so rigid as to force us to...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 411–416.
Published: 01 July 2004
... to perform some future action, but at a later time (prior to the time at which the action would have occurred) lose that ability. 411 MICHAEL HUEMER In my initial statement of the argument for incompatibilism, I unfor- tunately did not...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 154–158.
Published: 01 January 2021
... thoughts and implicit expectations regarding possible futures. The interaction of these two deep features turns out to have a rich variety of consequences for decision-making, meaning in life, the value of commitment, and attitudes like boredom and contentment. For Calhoun, actively leading a life is a...
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 399–410.
Published: 01 July 2005
.... Rovane (who is consistently scrupulous about raising and seeking to answer important objections to her views) seeks to address this sort of objection in an imaginative and provocative discussion of the ways in which an ordinary human-sized person’s intentional control over its future actions must be...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 274–276.
Published: 01 April 2000
... providence (a metaphysical perspective that was first articulated by Luis de Molina, a sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit theologian), According to this perspective, God not only knows all that has occurred, is occurring, and will actually occur in the future, God also possesses middle knowledge. That...