Skip Nav Destination
Search Results for future
1-20 of 449 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 405–451.
Published: 01 October 2022
...Dilip Ninan This essay uses a puzzle about assertion and time to explore the pragmatics, semantics, and epistemology of future discourse. The puzzle concerns cases in which a subject is in a position to say, at an initial time t , that it will be that ϕ , but is not in a position to say, at a later...
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 320–325.
Published: 01 April 2023
...David Boylan Cariani Fabrizio , The Modal Future . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2021 . xxv + 292 pp. © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 Cariani’s The Modal Future is a book about future language. At its heart is a challenge to the received symmetric picture...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 95–130.
Published: 01 January 2020
... for present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument , and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a problem: because which desires one will have...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... foreknowledge and human freedom and the Ockhamist's way. In particular, this essay further demonstrates that when it comes to divine foreknowledge's compatibility with human freedom, the fundamental question is not the Ockhamist's question of whether God's beliefs about what an agent will do in the future...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
..., foreseeable way in which what is rational to believe now depends on what one expects to be doing in the future. That is, epistemic rationality fundamentally concerns time . However, I will argue that there is indeed an exploration/exploitation trade-off in belief, because of the connection between our...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 295–325.
Published: 01 July 2022
... came from and so did not begin to exist at fertilization. This implies that a zygote does not have a “future like ours” and strongly suggests that it is not a human being. Marquis’s point is that preventing an ovum and a sperm from fusing is morally wrong only if an ovum and a sperm are the same...
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
... situation, then one can know that that possibility does not obtain. This explains how people can have inductive knowledge that goes beyond what is strictly entailed by their evidence. We motivate the framework by showing how it illuminates knowledge about the future, knowledge of lawful regularities...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... make for the probability of the effect. I conclude by discussing my results and outlining future research avenues. The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 specifies the sense of causal strength that I would like to explicate: the difference that causes make to their effects. I also motivate causal...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 495–499.
Published: 01 July 2020
... in the book’s title suggests, there are others: future bias (preferring that good things be in the future and bad things in the past), structural bias (caring about the overall sequence of events in your life; think of the preference for a life that starts out bad but continually improves over a life...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
... of Arkansas, and the Dartmouth-UVM Sym- posium, and I’d like to thank members of those audiences for stimulating questions. Part of the paper descends from my comments on Richard Fo- ley’s paper “How should future opinion affect current opinion?” read at the 1993 meeting of the Central Division...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 256–260.
Published: 01 April 2018
... universe seem much less appealing and apparent. However, even adopting this refined version of laws leaves open the concern that our future choices are in some way fated. On this concern, there are facts about the future in place beforehand, and it is only our ignorance of those facts that makes us...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 278–281.
Published: 01 April 2002
... expression (for example, “The tomato”) by virtue of a property-token possessed by the referent (the tomato) (46). If Ludlow wishes to hold that only what is present possesses property-tokens, he will have to argue that nothing possesses property-tokens of pastness or futurity. Few attempts have even been...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 215–245.
Published: 01 April 2003
... neutrality—appears to require the agent to subordinate her current ideals to her future ones or at least to moderate pursuit of cur- rent ideals in light of future ones. But this demand may seem to sacri- fice authenticity, if we suppose that authenticity requires acting on the ideals that the agent...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
... AND PATRICK TODD 2. Merricks’s Argument Here is the Main Argument and Merricks’s initial reﬂections on it: Let time t be just a few minutes in the future from now, and consider the Main Argument: (1) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t was true a thousand...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
....” In Polish Logic 1920-1939 , ed. Storrs McCall, 40 -65. Oxford: Clarendon. MacFarlane, John. 2003 . “Future Contingents and Relative Truth.” Philosophical Quarterly 53 : 321 -36. McKay, Thomas, and David Johnson. 1996 . “A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism.” Philosophical...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... Objective Becoming is therapy for those of us who, like Auden, feel alienated by the non-Euclidean space-time that modern physics offers us. Here is one way of understanding the tension. Suppose you think there is a real difference between the past, present, and future. And there is some kind of change...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2017
..., that there are no whales. (In another much-discussed example, Dalton defined ‘atom’ in terms of indivisibility.) Suppose it seems to us now that the concept of agency is the concept of a kind of closing off of a previously open future. Might it turn out that the concept of agency was not so rigid as to force us...