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The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 281–283.
Published: 01 April 2001
...Thomas Hurka VALUE... AND WHAT FOLLOWS. By Joel J. Kupperman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. vi, 168. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVLEWS The Philosophical Reviezu, Vol. 110, No. 2 (April 2001) VALUE . . . AND WATFOLLOWS. By JOEL...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
... different past , all the way back to the Big Bang or beyond. Which would it be? Those who reject miracles accept a Backtracking Principle (BT), according to which the past would (have to) be different. If this is correct, then it follows by (FP) that you cannot now do anything other than what you are...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Michael Caie Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... that thirders are committed to the GTP since it follows from the premises that underlie each of the main arguments for the one-third solution. In section 4, it discusses the relevance of Dutch book arguments to the conflict between CA and the GTP. And the essay argues that both synchronic and...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... other sorts of probabilistic evidence. Far from excluding cases of the latter kind, Lewis’s Principal Principle explicitly allows for them, in the form of the caveat that credences should follow beliefs about chances only in the absence of “inadmissible evidence.” The essay then exhibits a tension in...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... are both represented by credence 0, which violates a principle known as “regularity.” Following Skyrms 1980 and Lewis 1980, they recommend that we should instead use a much richer set of numbers, called the “hyperreals.” This essay argues that this popular view is the result of two mistakes. The first...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Tim Henning Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Seth Yalcin As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Kieran Setiya This essay is about love and its place in ethics. It argues that there is no one it is irrational to love, that it is rational to act with partiality to those we love, and that the rationality of doing so is not conditional on love. It follows that Anscombe and Taurek are right: you...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2014
... David Lewis's (1969) seminal Convention . According to Marmor, a social rule R is a convention if and only if: There is a population P that normally follows R in circumstances C. There is a reason A for members of P to follow R in C. There is at least one other potential rule, S, that if...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 415–419.
Published: 01 July 2015
..., though, that although I won't discuss the empirical studies reported in chapter 5, these results and the account of the forced-march sorites that they motivate should be of interest to anyone working on vagueness. First, let's consider Raffman's account of borderline cases. The following is what...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... that the liar sentence l or its negation are not true, we can say that neither l nor its negation are determinately true; that is, we can say that it is indeterminate whether l is true. The arguments that follow are directed at anyone who advocates a paracomplete treatment of the semantic...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 260–264.
Published: 01 April 2018
..., propositions, or properties? These are questions that are traditionally at the heart of metaphysics. But they appear to have depressingly easy answers. Each of the following innocent statements appears to entail an affirmative answer to a metaphysical question: The number of moons of Jupiter is four. It is...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 481–532.
Published: 01 October 2015
... interaction of grounding and metaphysical modality. It begins negatively. Most philosophers writing on grounding have held that grounding is an internal relation in the following sense: if φ grounds ψ , it is necessary that if φ and ψ both obtain, then φ grounds ψ . 1 But...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 107–109.
Published: 01 January 2000
... systematic study of the uses of tropes in metaphysics. By a trope Bacon says he understands either a thing’s having a property (e.g., Socrates’ being wise) or the property as localized to that thing (Socrates’ wisdom) (1, 4). Bacon believes that entities belonging to the following ontological...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
... are no possible worlds satisfying the antecedent of such counterfactuals. But it is generally thought, following Kripke (1971, 1980) , that facts about identity are necessary. That is, the following two principles are widely accepted: 1 NecId. a = b ⊨ □ ( a = b ) and a...
Includes: Supplementary data
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 311–313.
Published: 01 April 2002
... that go beyond the traditional framework provided by Aristotle and Boethius on Topics. Burley's first example of an accidental infer- ence is "If a man is an ass, you are sitting," which follows by virtue of the rule 312 BOOK REVIEWS...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 132–136.
Published: 01 January 2017
.... The book can be divided into two parts followed by a stand-alone final chapter. The first part is made up of chapters 1–4, which criticize other views and set out Hanks's own view. Chapter 1 sketches the Platonist view, Hanks's Act-Based view, and Scott Soames's similar view, and argues that the...