Skip Nav Destination
Close Modal
1-20 of 427 Search Results for
fitting
Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account
Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
1
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (2): 206–211.
Published: 01 April 2024
... 1993). Further explanation of this fittingness is needed. The Kantian option is to say that global consistency and fit with appearances are constitutive ideals of reasoning, associated with imperfect duties of rationality. There is no conflict of requirements, just two ideals. A wider...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
...Kim Frost Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
... holds the
quintessentially sentimentalist thesis that an act is wrong whenever guilt
over it would be fitting from the agent, and resentment fitting from oth-
ers.49 This proposal raises some inevitable questions: What makes guilt
fitting, when it is; and how is such talk of the fittingness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
... explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. Cornell University 2009 The Humean Theory of Motivation
Reformulated and Defended
Neil Sinhababu...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object system...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Thomas Sattig It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
...-free.” Russell's notion of acquaintance, since it fits this bill, is therefore motivated by his solution to the puzzle, as is his choice of sense-data to be the referents of genuine Russellian names of particulars. Finally, the article argues that since a version of the George IV puzzle arises...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (4): 329–365.
Published: 01 October 2024
...Sophia Dandelet Veritism is the idea that what makes a belief epistemically rational is that it is a fitting response to the value of truth. This idea promises to serve as the foundation for an elegant and systematic treatment of epistemic rationality, one that illuminates the importance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (4): 441–447.
Published: 01 October 2024
..., that to label x amusing is to hold that there is sufficient, fit-related reason to feel amusement toward x ; and so forth. The third tenet is “the distinctive way” the authors “connect the sentimental and rational aspects of the view,” by offering a story according to which the fittingness conditions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
... are the fittingness conditions of amusement, that is, what makes amusement fitting? This is an ambiguous question. On the one hand, it might refer to what, in any individual purported instance of the funny , makes amusement fitting. Here the answer will refer to specific objective properties of the appraised target...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 185–189.
Published: 01 January 2021
... that are plausibly consequences of ¬ H and then argues that the data were sufficient to reject only one of the four; call it ¬ H 1. Mayo concludes that the experimental data failed to fit H , as researchers could not reject three statistical hypotheses that were compatible with ¬ H . Further, Mayo argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
... this problem, Lewis introduces a third theoretical virtue called fit . On Lewis’s official view, one probability function fits a world better than another just in case it renders that world more likely. To allow for chance, Lewis takes the actual laws to be the set of claims that strike the best balance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 327–358.
Published: 01 July 2005
....
Starting with (8), the contrastive strategy fits intuition by flatly deny-
ing fragility. The same event could still be present, even with slight dif-
ferences.13
Jumping to (14), the contrastive strategy stays principled by divorcing
causation from the presence/absence distinction. The question...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 626–630.
Published: 01 October 2008
.... Heisler, I. L., and J. Damuth. 1987 . “A Method for Analyzing Selection in Hierarchically Structured Populations.” American Naturalist 130 : 582 -602. Matthen, M., and A. Ariew. 2002 . “Two Ways of Thinking about Fitness and Natural Selection.” Journal of Philosophy 99 : 55 -83. Okasha, S...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 607–610.
Published: 01 October 2008
... fit well into Gassendi’s epistemology, as LoLordo herself
argues. Gassendi needs some evidential basis for the bridge principles, which
it is not clear that he has (96ff
These criticisms raise problems for Gassendi’s philosophical system...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 610–614.
Published: 01 October 2008
... fit well into Gassendi’s epistemology, as LoLordo herself
argues. Gassendi needs some evidential basis for the bridge principles, which
it is not clear that he has (96ff
These criticisms raise problems for Gassendi’s philosophical system...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 615–617.
Published: 01 October 2008
... fit well into Gassendi’s epistemology, as LoLordo herself
argues. Gassendi needs some evidential basis for the bridge principles, which
it is not clear that he has (96ff
These criticisms raise problems for Gassendi’s philosophical system...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 618–620.
Published: 01 October 2008
... fit well into Gassendi’s epistemology, as LoLordo herself
argues. Gassendi needs some evidential basis for the bridge principles, which
it is not clear that he has (96ff
These criticisms raise problems for Gassendi’s philosophical system...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2008
... fit well into Gassendi’s epistemology, as LoLordo herself
argues. Gassendi needs some evidential basis for the bridge principles, which
it is not clear that he has (96ff
These criticisms raise problems for Gassendi’s philosophical system...
1
