Search Results for fact
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The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 602–604.
Published: 01 October 2002
...John P. Burgess Hartry Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. xvi, 401. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS Lewis, David. 1972. Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australa- sian Journal of Philosophy 50...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 105–107.
Published: 01 January 2006
...David Merli Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. This...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 273–277.
Published: 01 April 2018
... method is syntactic, and consists of paraphrasing ordinary first-order sentences into sentences of the factalist language. For instance, the ordinary sentence “All humans are mortal” will be paraphrased as “Every hypersurface which picks out a true fact in the human quality space, picks out a true fact...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Boris Kment Antihaecceitists believe that all facts about specific individuals—such as the fact that Fred exists, or that Katie is tall—globally supervene on purely qualitative facts. Haecceitists deny that. The issue is not only of interest in itself, but receives additional importance from its...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Dilip Ninan When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are “further facts,” over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
..., expressing the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, is necessary but not a priori. However, what Chalmers and Jackson demonstrate, if anything, is that the conditional that includes all the microphysical plus the phenomenal in the antecedent, and nonphenomenal macro facts (such as facts about...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... ambiguous between de re * and de dicto * interpretations. This fact is used to account for asymmetric mistaken identity attributions (for example, Biron thinks Katherine is Rosaline, but he doesn't think Rosaline is Katherine ). The variable theory compares favorably with its alternatives, including...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
... not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... a conditional is independent of any proposition inconsistent with its antecedent. But they also point to something important, namely, that our uncertainty about conditionals is not confined to uncertainty about the facts (what the actual world is like) but also expresses uncertainty about the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... female ones and despite the number of mosquitoes that don't carry the virus being ninety-nine times the number that do. Puzzling facts such as these have made generic sentences defy adequate semantic treatment. However complex the truth conditions of generics appear to be, though, young children grasp...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... and shows why this idea, though initially appealing, does not address the real problem. As the essay shows, the idea derives its spurious plausibility from the fact that the dependency conception cannot even make sense of our pretheoretic idea of causal redundancy. The essay concludes by briefly...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
... like. Is such knowledge to be understood as knowledge of a fact, or rather as a kind of ability? From the claim that the knowledge in the target cases is not immediate, and the fact that these cases are paradigm cases of immediate knowledge of objects' kinds, the essay concludes that perception does...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... when the judgment is in fact mistaken). In these instances, your friendship can make it the case that you may not act on your own practical and even moral judgments because, at those times, you have a duty as their close friend to defer to their judgments. As a result, treating your friend properly as...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Daniel Jacobson This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist. First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism; second, that this logical space is, in fact...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Michael McKenna Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... do in the future are “hard facts.” Rather, the fundamental question is whether God's beliefs about what an agent will do in the future depend on what that agent will do in the future. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Thanks to the Metaphysics Group at the University of Virginia and an...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
... elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the same time avoiding the complexities of alternative theories. The second part of the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
...Dilip Ninan This essay presents a puzzle concerning the interaction of epistemic modals, singular terms, and quantifiers. The puzzle poses a number of problems for both static and dynamic theories of epistemic modals. The trouble arises because neither approach takes into account the fact that...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... arguments against identifying normative with natural statements and facts do not transfer seamlessly to identifying normative with natural properties. Volume 2, by contrast, focuses mostly on metaethics. Here, nothing like a Triple Metaethical Theory is in the offing. Parfit vigorously defends his...