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expression

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Richard Vallée Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xiii + 449 pp. Cornell University 2008 BOOK REVIEWS McDowell, for example) and in “continental” philosophy (in the many chal- lenges to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 310–313.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Ram Neta David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 182 pp. Cornell University 2008 Bar-On, Dorit, and Douglas Long. 2001 . “Avowals and First-Person Privilege.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 : 311 -35...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Naomi Scheman INTERPRETING THE PERSONAL: EXPRESSION AND THE FORMATION OF FEELINGS. By Sue Campbell. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. x, 204. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVlEWS ferences between geometry and the theory of numbers. Frege put the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Zoltán Gendler Szabó Consider the hypothesis that every quantified sentence in every natural language contains some expression or other whose extension constrains the domain of quantification. If the hypothesis is correct, quantificational domains are fixed in fundamentally different ways in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Mark Schroeder According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions —the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Cian Dorr; John Hawthorne Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
..., expressing the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, is necessary but not a priori. However, what Chalmers and Jackson demonstrate, if anything, is that the conditional that includes all the microphysical plus the phenomenal in the antecedent, and nonphenomenal macro facts (such as facts about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... a conditional is independent of any proposition inconsistent with its antecedent. But they also point to something important, namely, that our uncertainty about conditionals is not confined to uncertainty about the facts (what the actual world is like) but also expresses uncertainty about the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... scope of epistemic modals or attitude verbs. The new view has two interesting philosophical consequences. First, it vindicates a broadly Fregean perspective on referential expressions, essentially refuting the idea that indexicals are rigid designators. Second, it suggests a new picture of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
..., revealing that counterfactual talk about causation is expressively impoverished. I conclude in section 4 by briefly discussing a possible picture of mental causation that suggests itself in light of these results. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 Suppose you endorse a physicalist outlook. You...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
... about expressivist semantics for natural language. The sort of expressivism Schroeder is concerned with holds: (uses of) declarative sentences express mental states; while some of these states are beliefs, others—in particular, those ex- pressed by ascriptions of goodness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 326–329.
Published: 01 April 2011
... Being For is about expressivist semantics for natural language. The sort of expressivism Schroeder is concerned with holds: (uses of) declarative sentences express mental states; while some of these states are beliefs, others—in particular, those ex- pressed by ascriptions of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
..., sentence-like entities whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sen- tences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of such a view of propositions elsewhere.1 In the present work, I shall assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 399–403.
Published: 01 July 2018
... based on a difference in the kind of “content” a judgment has—in Anderson's terms: what a judgment “ expresses ” (vii, 31). This is opposed to the widely adopted epistemological interpretation (advocated by Allison, among others), which draws the distinction in terms of differences in the way in which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 99–117.
Published: 01 January 2008
.... Note that on this way of using the term ‘complex demonstrative,’ the criteria for being a complex demonstrative are syntactic. Some do not seem to use the term this way, including Nathan Salmon (2006a, 2006b—discussed below) who seems to claim that some expressions that satisfy the syntactic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 459–462.
Published: 01 July 2002
... properties of the metarepresentational operators. Metarepresentations are transparent and semantically innocent per se, since they do not impose an altered reading upon the expressions occurring within their scope. In particular, they do not shift the context of interpretation (“Kaplan’s Thesis However...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 415–448.
Published: 01 October 2006
... does he still receive billing? More to the point, how is it that, under A, (1) makes no men- tion of Brando even though ‘x ’, which occurs twice therein, designates Brando? Frege admonished that one should never ask for the designatum or content of an expression in isolation, but only in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2002
... object, the property in question is of the form “being jointly instan- tiated in world w and time t.” When the speaker has a merely descriptive inten- tion, the property is of the form “being jointly instantiated.” Thus contextually saturated, the resulting relation is, like those expressed by the...