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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Richard Vallée Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xiii + 449 pp. Cornell University 2008 BOOK REVIEWS
McDowell, for example) and in “continental” philosophy (in the many chal-
lenges...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 310–313.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Ram Neta David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 182 pp. Cornell University 2008 Bar-On, Dorit, and Douglas Long. 2001 . “Avowals and First-Person Privilege.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 : 311 -35...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Naomi Scheman INTERPRETING THE PERSONAL: EXPRESSION AND THE FORMATION OF FEELINGS. By Sue Campbell. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. x, 204. Cornell University 2000 McFall, Lynne. 1991 . “What's Wrong with Bitterness?” In Feminist Ethics, ed. Claudia Card, 146 -60...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Zoltán Gendler Szabó Consider the hypothesis that every quantified sentence in every natural language contains some expression or other whose extension constrains the domain of quantification. If the hypothesis is correct, quantificational domains are fixed in fundamentally different ways...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Cian Dorr; John Hawthorne Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Mark Schroeder According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions —the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (4): 579–627.
Published: 01 October 2023
...Gabriel Greenberg It is common to distinguish two great families of representation. Symbolic representations include logical and mathematical symbols, words, and complex linguistic expressions. Iconic representations include dials, diagrams, maps, pictures, 3-dimensional models, and depictive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Peter van Elswyk A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 1–49.
Published: 01 January 2022
... worlds and the presence of several other accompanying features. Under certain assumptions, such vagueness prevents the fundamental physical theory from being completely expressible in the mathematical language. Moreover, I suggest that such vagueness can be regarded as vagueness in the world . For a case...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
..., expressing the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, is necessary but not a priori. However, what Chalmers and Jackson demonstrate, if anything, is that the conditional that includes all the microphysical plus the phenomenal in the antecedent, and nonphenomenal macro facts (such as facts about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... of a conditional is independent of any proposition inconsistent with its antecedent. But they also point to something important, namely, that our uncertainty about conditionals is not confined to uncertainty about the facts (what the actual world is like) but also expresses uncertainty about the counterfacts (what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... they are in the scope of epistemic modals or attitude verbs. The new view has two interesting philosophical consequences. First, it vindicates a broadly Fregean perspective on referential expressions, essentially refuting the idea that indexicals are rigid designators. Second, it suggests a new picture...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
..., revealing that counterfactual talk about causation is expressively impoverished. I conclude in section 4 by briefly discussing a possible picture of mental causation that suggests itself in light of these results. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 Suppose you endorse a physicalist outlook. You...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
..., sentence-like entities
whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sen-
tences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of
such a view of propositions elsewhere.1 In the present work, I shall
assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
... For is about expressivist semantics for natural language.
The sort of expressivism Schroeder is concerned with holds:
(uses of) declarative sentences express mental states;
while some of these states are beliefs, others—in particular, those ex-
pressed by ascriptions of goodness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 99–117.
Published: 01 January 2008
... that on this way of using the term ‘complex demonstrative,’ the criteria
for being a complex demonstrative are syntactic. Some do not seem to use the term
this way, including Nathan Salmon (2006a, 2006b—discussed below) who seems to
claim that some expressions that satisfy the syntactic criteria I provide...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 326–329.
Published: 01 April 2011
... For is about expressivist semantics for natural language.
The sort of expressivism Schroeder is concerned with holds:
(uses of) declarative sentences express mental states;
while some of these states are beliefs, others—in particular, those ex-
pressed by ascriptions of goodness...
Journal Article
The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 399–403.
Published: 01 July 2018
... has—in Anderson's terms: what a judgment “ expresses ” (vii, 31). This is opposed to the widely adopted epistemological interpretation (advocated by Allison, among others), which draws the distinction in terms of differences in the way in which the truth (or falsity) of judgments can be known...
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