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expert

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
..., a rational agent will obey this principle if and only if she expects chance to be at least as accurate as she is on every good way of measuring accuracy. Much of the discussion, and the technical results, extend beyond chance to deference to any kind of expert. Indeed, you will trust someone about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 92–95.
Published: 01 January 2024
... Chudnoff defends a new response of this kind in his latest book, Forming Impressions . Crucial to his response is the claim that whether we are experts or not, we can have different, and indeed better, intuitions as we increasingly think about some issue. In the course of developing this response Chudnoff...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... ( just as credence and chance are, in Lewis’s own account). For the moment, this suggestion is likely to strike experts on both sides of the EDT/CDT dispute as little more than a verbal trick—a pro- posal simply to change what we mean by the term causation, in effect. Surely—they will object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
.... Dutch Book considerations, on inspection, give us no reason to deny that an agent may rationally fail to have probabilistically coherent credences. Call one who is reliably mistaken in her judgment about φ an anti-expert about φ . 2 Andy Egan and Adam Elga (2005) have shown: Anti...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...—and the case of So-Hyun is clearly not of this kind. 17. See van Wietmarschen 2013 and Silva 2016 for arguments to the effect that expert testimony of the kind imagined here affects not the ex ante justification that So-Hyun has for believing that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 423–425.
Published: 01 July 2000
... the knowledge that he, Socrates, maintains to be necessary for that success (68, 85). Nehamas correctly observes that the standard attempts to resolve this difficulty by distinguishing strict or certain or expert knowledge (which Socrates disclaims) from non-expert knowledge, or knowledge as ordinarily...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 139–144.
Published: 01 January 2020
... of a more perfectly informed expert (138), or active consideration of the omniscient credences of God (141) may all successfully disqualify intermediate credence from knowledge-like status. Yet, Moss suggests, this is no argument that intermediate credence generally fails to be knowledge. The gambit...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 394–398.
Published: 01 July 2022
... would this framework handle our cases? Start with misled Missy. The following credence-forming process is available to her: trusting the opinion of experts on the topic , absent any evidence that the experts are unreliable . This process is generally reliable, even though it will produce an inaccurate...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 399–404.
Published: 01 July 2017
... an expert judgment, which differs from ordinary judgment in that the relevant endeavor is to affirm with more reliability. The same goes for the seminar room when discussing skepticism. Depending on the social context, it might be clear which kind of judgment is relevant. In an ordinary case, one typically...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 108–113.
Published: 01 January 2002
... of an intermediate group of readers, neither beginners nor experts, but, as just such a reader, I often feel that I would learn more from an essay that fell more decisively into one category or the other. The semi-specialized essay, with its inevitable repetitions and re-presentations of what is common knowledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 130–132.
Published: 01 January 2002
... a great deal. In congressional and public policy debates surrounding stem cell research, human cloning, and the Human Genome Project, bioethics and bioethicists have gained national attention and been subject to public scrutiny. Commentators have asked who these self-appointed moral experts are to tell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2003
...- lar Maddy has a near-miraculous gift for explaining mathematical technicali- ties in a way that is comprehensible to the non-expert. The book is therefore well worth reading not just for the new and bold philosophical position it pro- motes, but also as a philosopher’s guide to what is going...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 219–222.
Published: 01 April 2022
... at the heart of Aristotle’s moral psychology. Together they define the focus of a book that may serve the novice as a lucid introduction, and the expert as a reminder of the richness of relevant material. Though Aristotle’s tone is rarely one of hesitancy, his conception is ambivalent, and it is good...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 222–226.
Published: 01 April 2022
...Robert Pasnau This is a book that can be judged on three different levels: as an encyclopedic guide, as an intellectual history, and as a philosophical analysis. As a guide, it is a unqualified success. Hoffmann collects with exemplary diligence the relevant texts, offering expert information...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 499–502.
Published: 01 October 2022
... contexts of action. In general, Gasser-Wingate’s book is lucid and convincing. He accomplishes the difficult task of presenting a synoptic account of Aristotle’s notion of perceptual experience by integrating textual evidence from many different works, with different theoretical purposes. Experts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 583–587.
Published: 01 October 2021
... as the legislative expert or spoudaios would (157, 164), but does not suggest how this concern should affect our understanding of Aristotelian equity in implementation—-a worry heightened by his closing sentence, that “the rule of law turns out to be the rule of the truly practically reasonable agent” (165...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2023
..., anthropology, moral psychology, analyses of complex systems, experimental economics, studies of norms, economic development, policy studies, analyses of governance and collective action, randomized control trials and much more” (ix). I am not expert in any of those fields, much less all of them. I said as much...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 508–511.
Published: 01 July 2023
..., energy, and subtlety. Subject experts on the philosophers profiled may complain that Van Der Lugt rarely gives her opinion regarding contested interpretations, but Van Der Lugt is relentlessly unconcerned with these issues. The story of Dark Matters is the story of pessimism and optimism after Bayle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 453–456.
Published: 01 July 2000
... of a luxury-or at least not required of a conscientious philosopher the way a passing knowledge of logic is. Philosophy of mathematics is thus regarded with a benign neglect: best left to the experts, whose opinions should be deferred to, but mostly irrelevant to the central concerns of the working...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 456–459.
Published: 01 July 2000
... subdiscipline, a passing knowledge of its subject matter is considered something of a luxury-or at least not required of a conscientious philosopher the way a passing knowledge of logic is. Philosophy of mathematics is thus regarded with a benign neglect: best left to the experts, whose opinions should...