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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 416–419.
Published: 01 July 2003
...Thomas D. Senor E. J. Lowe, Subjects of Experience. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. x, 209. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS this certainly reflects my own “historicism” as an erstwhile Marxist, the region’s problems at this stage seem to me so overwhelmingly a matter...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 420–422.
Published: 01 July 2004
...William F. Bracken Pierre Keller, Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. v, 261. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS would face severe challenges in doing so. 4 Self-motion must be understood broadly so as to include self-maintenance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
...Susanna Siegel Cornell University 2006 Armstrong, D. 1991 . “Intentionality, Perception, and Causality.” In John Searle and His Critics , ed. R. van Gulick and E. Lepore, 149 -58. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Bach, K. n.d. “Searle against the World: How Can Experiences Find Their Objects...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 134–138.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Robert J. Howell Strawson Galen , The Subject of Experience . New York: Oxford University Press , 2017 . 336 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 It seems strangely appropriate that the binding of my copy of Galen Strawson's The Subject of Experience was flipped in comparison to the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Geoffrey Lee Prinz Jesse , The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience . New York : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xiii +397 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2015 In his superb book The Conscious Brain , Prinz defends a theory of consciousness: a theory that (among other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 397–420.
Published: 01 July 2001
.... Husserl, Edmund. 1973 . Experience and Judgement: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. ____. 1997 . Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Ed. H.-A. (Leuven). Vol. 7 of Edmund Husserl...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 135–137.
Published: 01 January 2001
...Michelle Grier POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE: UNDERSTANDING KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. By Arthur Collins. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Pp. xix, 200. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVlEWS The Philosophical him,Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001) POSSIBLE EXPERLTNGE...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Andy Clark How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 472–475.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Sonia Sedivy PICTURE, IMAGE AND EXPERIENCE. By Robert Hopkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. 205 Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVLEWS and weather systems may have much to teach those of us interested in the human mind and human action...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 632–634.
Published: 01 October 2001
...David Macarthur PLACE AND EXPERIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL TOPOGRAPHY. By J. E. Malpas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. vii, 218. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001) PLACE AND EXPERIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
...Eric Schwitzgebel We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 501–532.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Desmond Hogan A central doctrine of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason holds that the content of human experience is rooted in an affection of sensibility by unknowable things in themselves. This famous and puzzling affection doctrine raises two seemingly intractable old problems, which can be termed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Michael LeBuffe Spinoza's remarks about consciousness in the Ethics constitute two theories about conscious experience and knowledge. Several remarks, including 3p9 and 4p8, make the point that self knowledge—an especially valuable good for Spinoza—is not available to introspection. We are, as a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
... Press, 2002. Pp. vii, 267. What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Camp- bell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
.... ____. 1992 . “The Projective Theory of Sensory Content.” In The Contents of Experience , ed. Tim Crane, 177 -95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Block, Ned. 1990 . “Inverted Earth.” In Philosophical Perspectives , vol. 4 , ed. James E. Tomberlin, 53 -79. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
... vary. In this view, perception's epistemic status depends on its etiology. If their precursors differ, experiences that share content and phenomenology can differ epistemically and rationally, even if a subject could not tell them apart. But this is not just due to differences in external factors, such...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2003
... Architecture of Reason—reveals a crucial aspect of this theory: in both the theoretical and practical spheres there is a superstructure and a foundation on which it is based. The foundation is the same in both cases: experience, broadly understood. Beliefs are the basic elements of theoret- ical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
..., namely, all and only your experiences and the objects of those experiences. To be clear, it is not merely that your experiences and their objects stand in the two-place relation present-relative-to to you. Everyone is such that his or her experiences (and the objects of those experiences) stand in this...