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The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability of...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose an...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
... the referent of the complement clause that p . On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—for example, the proposition that p —as they are in the case of believes . In many...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... Can We Do?” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 435 -445. Davidson, Donald. 1963 . “Actions, Reasons, and causes.” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 685 -700. Gibbard, Alan, and William Harper. 1978 . “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Value.” In Foundations and Applications of Decision...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
... two kinds of expectations: the empirical expectation that others will conform to the same norms we do; and the normative expectation that others will believe that people ought to conform to these norms (35). This means that social norms never float free from the groups to which we belong; and in...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 323–326.
Published: 01 April 2021
... sides. Moreover, Goldberg not only aims to give an extensionally adequate theory of epistemic justification, but he also digs into hard questions about the nature of epistemic normativity. According to Goldberg, our epistemic obligations are rooted in the expectations we have of each other. As such, he...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
... Mathematics Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Norton, J. D. 1998 . When the Sum of Our Expectations Fails Us: The Exchange Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 : 34 -58. Oppy, Graham. 1990 . On Rescher on Pascal's Wager. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... . 2017 . “ Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters .” Philosophy of Science 84 , no. 2 : 189 – 213 . De Bona, Glauber, and Julia Staffel . 2018 . “ Why Be Coherent? ” Analysis 78 , no. 3 : 405 – 15 . Dorst, Kevin . 2019 . “ Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy .” Mind 128 , no...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 154–158.
Published: 01 January 2021
... thoughts and implicit expectations regarding possible futures. The interaction of these two deep features turns out to have a rich variety of consequences for decision-making, meaning in life, the value of commitment, and attitudes like boredom and contentment. For Calhoun, actively leading a life is a...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 296–300.
Published: 01 April 2001
..., that is, the theory of choice built around the principle of maximizing expect- ed utility, both to its causal version and (equally importantly) to the more tra- ditional noncausal approach. The author's success in clarifylng the founda- tions of the standard decision theory in general, and causal...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
.... When (SI) is true for some perceiver and object perceived, there are also relations that one would expect to hold between that object, the perceiv- er’s experiences, and movements of her eyes. Perspectival connectedness is one such relation. 358 Subject...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
... displays. This held for a variety of basic-level categories, including people, cats, chairs, cups, and tools. Similar results have been found for superordinate categories. For example, Stein and Peelen (2017) found that when subjects were cued to expect animals, they were better at detecting the presence...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... objective expected posterior accuracy would be the same (invariant), regardless of whether her prior credences reflect a particularly accurate hunch or not, then that hunch plausibly plays no role in explaining why she has a particularly high (or low) chance of attaining a particularly high (or low...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
... my impending absence but the general idea is clear. It is often harm- ful to others for them to have false expectations about how I am going to behave, and so I have some obligation to ensure that this does not hap- pen by making only well-grounded predictions about my future behavior and...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... for conditionalization. Reflection states that agents should treat their future selves as experts or, roughly, that an agent’s current credence in any proposition A should equal his or her expected future credence in A. Although Reflection is intuitively plausible, it is vulnerable to numerous...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
... is the one (ignoring the possibility of ties) with the greatest expected utility—the one such that your expectations for how well things will turn I am particularly grateful to David Braddon-Mitchell for the series of conversations that led to this paper and for many further conversations as...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 269–272.
Published: 01 April 2015
... will supply easy exemplars, but these expectations are soon confounded. At first sight, our subject's contours appear evident enough—worlds of point masses held together through action-at-a-distance forces monitored by Newton's three laws of motion—yet these simple outlines grow misty as we approach...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 118–120.
Published: 01 January 2003
...- erative scheme when the benefit to one of the combination of one’s own con- tribution with those that one expects to be made by others exceeds that of not contributing. One consequence is that if all that individuals know about one another is that they all observe the PCR then cooperation will not be...