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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 6. Agents faced with cognitive search choices, choosing via expected accuracy. Red agents are better at finding flaws in q -opposing studies; blue agents vice versa. Thin lines are individuals; thick lines are averages.
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Image
Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 5. (Color online.) Top: Correlation between P ( Find | Flaw ) and the expected accuracy of scrutiny. Bottom: Rates of selective scrutiny based on expected accuracy ( y -axis) grow as the average gap in P ( Find | Flaw ) between incongruent and congruent studies
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
... fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make choices over time. This article extends the trade-off to belief. We can be torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected to be more accurate in light of current evidence, whereas the other is expected to lead to more learning...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
..., a rational agent will obey this principle if and only if she expects chance to be at least as accurate as she is on every good way of measuring accuracy. Much of the discussion, and the technical results, extend beyond chance to deference to any kind of expert. Indeed, you will trust someone about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
... is the referent of the complement clause that p . On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—for example, the proposition that p —as they are in the case of believes . In many cases...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
... of the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way, reveals...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 355–458.
Published: 01 July 2023
...Figure 6. Agents faced with cognitive search choices, choosing via expected accuracy. Red agents are better at finding flaws in q -opposing studies; blue agents vice versa. Thin lines are individuals; thick lines are averages. ...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... Can We Do?” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 435 -445. Davidson, Donald. 1963 . “Actions, Reasons, and causes.” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 685 -700. Gibbard, Alan, and William Harper. 1978 . “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Value.” In Foundations and Applications of Decision...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 323–326.
Published: 01 April 2021
... sides. Moreover, Goldberg not only aims to give an extensionally adequate theory of epistemic justification, but he also digs into hard questions about the nature of epistemic normativity. According to Goldberg, our epistemic obligations are rooted in the expectations we have of each other. As such, he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
... Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Norton, J. D. 1998 . When the Sum of Our Expectations Fails Us: The Exchange Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 : 34 -58. Oppy, Graham. 1990 . On Rescher on Pascal's Wager. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 : 159...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
... of expectations: the empirical expectation that others will conform to the same norms we do; and the normative expectation that others will believe that people ought to conform to these norms (35). This means that social norms never float free from the groups to which we belong; and in this respect...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... treat their future selves as experts or, roughly,
that an agent’s current credence in any proposition A should equal
his or her expected future credence in A. Although Reflection is
intuitively plausible, it is vulnerable to numerous prima facie counterex-
amples. Why is this a problem...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... credences reflect some sort of hunch that goes beyond her prior evidence (as Dr. Jim's did), so that her posterior accuracy depends, in large part, on fortuitous prior accuracy? First, we will outline the answer. Then we will unpack it. The answer, briefly, is this: If her objective expected posterior...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
..., there are also
relations that one would expect to hold between that object, the perceiv-
er’s experiences, and movements of her eyes. Perspectival connectedness
is one such relation.
358
Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience
The central...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
... is clear. It is often harm-
ful to others for them to have false expectations about how I am going to
behave, and so I have some obligation to ensure that this does not hap-
pen by making only well-grounded predictions about my future behavior
and warning them when these predictions are likely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
... may naturally fall between others, and some pairs of categorical values may be closer together (more similar) than others (see Gärdenfors 2000 : 7–17 for discussion). 4. I'll understand cognitive states to include both doxastic states (beliefs and expectations) and conative states (desires...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
... . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gibbard, Allan, and William Harper. 1978 . “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.” In Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory , vol. 1 , ed. Clifford Hooker, J. J. Leach, and Edward McClennen, 123 -62. Dordrecht: Riedel. Gilboa, Itzhak...
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