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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
... fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make choices over time. This article extends the trade-off to belief. We can be torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected to be more accurate in light of current evidence, whereas the other is expected to lead to more learning...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
... is the referent of the complement clause that p . On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—for example, the proposition that p —as they are in the case of believes . In many cases...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
... of the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way, reveals...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... Can We Do?” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 435 -445. Davidson, Donald. 1963 . “Actions, Reasons, and causes.” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 685 -700. Gibbard, Alan, and William Harper. 1978 . “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Value.” In Foundations and Applications of Decision...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 323–326.
Published: 01 April 2021
... sides. Moreover, Goldberg not only aims to give an extensionally adequate theory of epistemic justification, but he also digs into hard questions about the nature of epistemic normativity. According to Goldberg, our epistemic obligations are rooted in the expectations we have of each other. As such, he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
... Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Norton, J. D. 1998 . When the Sum of Our Expectations Fails Us: The Exchange Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 : 34 -58. Oppy, Graham. 1990 . On Rescher on Pascal's Wager. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 : 159...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
... of expectations: the empirical expectation that others will conform to the same norms we do; and the normative expectation that others will believe that people ought to conform to these norms (35). This means that social norms never float free from the groups to which we belong; and in this respect...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... treat their future selves as experts or, roughly, that an agent’s current credence in any proposition A should equal his or her expected future credence in A. Although Reflection is intuitively plausible, it is vulnerable to numerous prima facie counterex- amples. Why is this a problem...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... To see this, measure the inaccuracy of your posterior chance estimate—that is, the expected value of the coin's bias B determined by your posterior credence function c  ′: Exp c ′ ( B ) —by one particularly attractive scoring rule, namely, the Brier score (section 5.2). And measure...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
..., there are also relations that one would expect to hold between that object, the perceiv- er’s experiences, and movements of her eyes. Perspectival connectedness is one such relation. 358 Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience The central...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
... is clear. It is often harm- ful to others for them to have false expectations about how I am going to behave, and so I have some obligation to ensure that this does not hap- pen by making only well-grounded predictions about my future behavior and warning them when these predictions are likely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
...). If the cases are genuinely analogous, then we should also expect different high-level perceptual processes to predominate depending on which high-level interpretation one perceives (analogous to activity of the temperature sorter versus the weight sorter). There is evidence for this as well. For example...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
... is the one (ignoring the possibility of ties) with the greatest expected utility—the one such that your expectations for how well things will turn I am particularly grateful to David Braddon-Mitchell for the series of conversations that led to this paper and for many further conversations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 154–158.
Published: 01 January 2021
... by thoughts and implicit expectations regarding possible futures. The interaction of these two deep features turns out to have a rich variety of consequences for decision-making, meaning in life, the value of commitment, and attitudes like boredom and contentment. For Calhoun, actively leading a life...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... doxastic state will be more accurate overall—you will trade certainty in one falsehood for certainty in many truths. Therefore, trying to be accurate can lead to clear irrationality. Against this backdrop, the volume does what you'd expect. It combines a series of new applications of epistemic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 1–50.
Published: 01 January 2007
... Policy , ed. George R. Feiwel, 135 -53. New York: New York University Press. ____. 1990 . Wise Choices, Apt Feelings . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gorovitz, Samuel. 1979 . “The St. Petersburg Puzzle.” In Expected Utility and the Allais Paradox , ed. Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 296–300.
Published: 01 April 2001
..., that is, the theory of choice built around the principle of maximizing expect- ed utility, both to its causal version and (equally importantly) to the more tra- ditional noncausal approach. The author's success in clarifylng the founda- tions of the standard decision theory in general, and causal decision...