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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Scott Stapleford McCormick Miriam Schleifer , Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief . New York: Routledge , 2015 . xiv + 144 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 A spanner in the works: that's how evidentialists will see this new book by Miriam...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94.
Published: 01 January 2002
... is at stake, as long as the “ought” is one of responsibility, not epistemic rationality. So, it seems that evidentialists need not take intu- itions about cases like the Train Cases as decisive against their view. They can respond by arguing that the intuitions at work, though real, are misdescribed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... of the attractions of the proposal offered in the present essay is that it promises to end this standoff by showing us how to bring together the seemingly conflicting intuitions of Causalists and Eviden- tialists (that is, two-boxers and one-boxers). Briefly, this compromise agrees with traditional Evidentialists...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
... be contrasted with more state-oriented epistemic norms, which tell us which states to be in (rather than which states to get into). 2 I'll discuss epistemic norms for states a bit later in the paper. EP a is a fairly standard (weak) evidentialist norm, and KP a is a kind of generalization of that sort...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 289–306.
Published: 01 April 2013
... CDT from that evidentialist argument, on whose merits this is not the place to comment. The evidentialist argument presupposes that in Newcomb-like cases we should ignore the causal independence of the relevant state of the world (what is in the opaque box) on the agent’s decision (“one-boxing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 629–631.
Published: 01 October 2001
... evidence for religious matters. Though it is commonplace to acknowledge the way cer- tain passions—intense anger, jealousy, and envy, for example—can cause rea- soning to go off the rails, this fact is seldom acknowledged by evidentialists. Helm’s discussion, however, focuses mainly on the ways...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 117–121.
Published: 01 January 2018
... 11 through 13 are devoted to Reid's epistemology, in which Van Cleve argues that we should understand Reid as a particularist, evidentialist, externalist. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers Reid presents us with what he calls “first principles” ( Reid 2002, 6.5 ) that declare consciousness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... with which to explain epistemic normativity. This model also can explain the followability and transmission differences noted above, capturing a wide range of both evidentialist and pragmatist insights. The generality of our account is furthermore advantageous since it offers a framework for thinking about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... of evidential support that falls outside this range, but I argued that the prospects of this strategy look bleak. So far, this is bad news for conciliationism: if we look at the peer disagreement debate purely in evidentialist terms, conciliationism will not succeed. I then argued for some good news...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
... for accuracy, which is in turn understood in terms of compliance with evidence, the account entails that justified belief is itself nonaccidentally successful relative to the evidence. This result enables the account to get better predictions about cases of improper basing than some assume evidentialists get...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
... of CDT. Evidentialists cannot rejoice in this, how- ever—the news for the ratifi cationist defense of EDT is equally bad, as ratifi cationist EDT also fails to endorse the unratifi able option of one- boxing in Newcomb’s Firebomb. 110 Some...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
.... “ An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry about Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism .” Dialectica . Hájek A. 1997 . “ Mises Redux—Redux: Fifteen Arguments against Finite Frequentism .” Erkenntnis 45 : 209 – 27 . ———. 2009 . “ Fifteen Arguments against Hypothetical Frequentism .” Erkenntnis 70 : 211 – 35...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
... to the agent, we can treat it as a ‘result’ in the same way that we considered truth to be a value resulting from the choice over beliefs. Similarly, an internalist evidentialist might think that the value in belief has to do with justification, and adheres even if the belief is false. The fact...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 323–360.
Published: 01 July 2007
..., that the soul exists, that there is an afterlife, that God will ensure that happiness is proportionate to virtue, and so forth. Thus we can see that Kant adopts the pendant of Locke’s famous evidentialist position in the ethics of belief according to which in matters of “maximal concernment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
... . 2012 . “ Belief and Indeterminacy .” Philosophical Review 121 , no. 1 : 1 – 54 . de Finetti Bruno . 1974 . Theory of Probability . Vol. 1 . New York : John Wiley and Sons . Easwaran Kenny , and Fitelson Branden . 2012 . “ An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry about Joyce's...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... a difference in cognitive processes. 17. In what follows, I will focus on prima facie justification; this is what I take reliabilism primarily to be a theory of. If defeat cannot be understood in terms of process reliability but only in, say, responsibilist or evidentialist terms ( Beddor 2015...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... notion, and there are many, many different theories of evidence. 61 But if we plug into our evidentialist formula a nonteleological theory of evidence, then the resulting theory will be nonteleological. My second example of a nonteleological approach to epistemic normativity can be found...