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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
... or after. For biological conception is most plausibly seen as a momentous event in the continuing life of a preexisting organism—the egg—rather than a cataclysmic event ending one life and creating another. This article considers and rebuts the most likely challenges to this claim. This metaphysical point...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn't reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we raise questions about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
...) “aim at realization.” This essay traces the ills of direction of fit theory to a misunderstanding of Anscombe and proposes a cure that distinguishes theoretical and practical thought by appeal to a distinction between thought in the form of a state and thought in the form of an event. We can clarify...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... accommodate the intuitive idea that causation is an intrinsic relation between events. The second half (sections 3–4) explores the implications of these observations for the mental causation problem. In section 3, I first argue that the attempt of Karen Bennett (2003, 2008) and similar attempts to resolve...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
... are articulated on the basis of fundamental epistemological concepts. This review is focused on the manner in which these two features find their way into Enç’s discussion of two crucial issues of contemporary action theory: the possibility of reducing actions to events and the problem of causal deviance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 609–611.
Published: 01 October 2002
... ‘even’ and ‘if’. After reading his work, it’s hard to take seriously work that does not share this methodology. Lycan’s semantics for conditionals makes central use of what he calls ‘events’. An event is not a possible world, for it need not be complete or con- sistent. It is more like what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 1–25.
Published: 01 January 2003
...J. David Velleman Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 1 (January 2003) Narrative Explanation J. David Velleman The Problem of Narrative Explanation A story does more than recount events; it recounts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... it seems that mental events very often cause physical events, they probably do (100–101). This argument is, as far as I know, wholly original and in my estimation brilliant—one of the most important contributions of the book. Given property dualism, Swinburne assumes epiphenomenalism entails...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 176–180.
Published: 01 January 2021
... looks gray to me, and it looks that way to you too. The same pattern is displayed by sentences about ways of occurring for other sorts of events, like walking events, as in (4)–(5). (4) a. Mary walks proud.  b. Mary walks how ? (5) Mary walks proud, and John walks that way too...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 327–358.
Published: 01 July 2005
... . The Open Door: Counterfactual versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In Causation and Laws of Nature , ed. Howard Sankey, 175 -85. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Bennett, Jonathan. 1987 . Event Causation: The Counterfactual Analysis. In Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 1 , Metaphysics, ed. James Tomberlin...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 291–294.
Published: 01 April 2002
... of (1)—a Strawsonian personal dual- ism, with a token-dualism of Davidsonian event particulars. He assents to (4) by contending that distinctively mental trying-events bring about bodily behavior. However, he emphatically disavows Cartesian single-chain interactionism and is unwilling to abandon (2...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 527–531.
Published: 01 October 2019
...Philippe Chuard Prosser Simon , Experiencing Time . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016 . xv + 221 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 Ought we think of time A-theoretically—with events being present , past , or future , and time essentially involving passage? Our...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... , Frigg and Hoefer 2010 ) to a semantic approach linking chance to ability ( Eagle 2011 ). One strategy is to argue that the objective chance of an event depends on the level of description (for example, Loewer 2001 , Glynn 2010 , Strevens 2011 ). According to this strategy, saying...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... : 877 -93. Moffett, M. n.d. Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: The Problem of Doxastic Shift . Parsons, T. 1990 . Events in the Semantics of English: A Study of Subatomic Semantics . Cambridge: MIT Press. ____. 1993 . On Denoting Propositions and Facts. Philosophical Perspectives...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 109–112.
Published: 01 January 2000
... psychology and compatible with the supposed theory-ladenness of language, problems he thinks doom extant distinctions. The new distinction separates sentences that report events under descriptions attributing physical properties from sentences that re- port events under the description...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 79–103.
Published: 01 January 2006
... 1 picture leads to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1 , causes another mental event, m2 . Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2002
... use of what he calls ‘events’. An event is not a possible world, for it need not be complete or con- sistent. It is more like what Barwise and Perry call a ‘situation’. Conditionals are quantifiers over events, as follows: P if Q = P in any event in which Q P only if Q = P in no event...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 614–619.
Published: 01 October 2021
...: 31–46. Kroedel’s second version is also problematic. For example, [ efficacy ], if formulated in terms of sufficient causes, would be unnecessarily strong. The validity of the exclusion argument doesn’t require that a mental event be the sufficient cause of some physical effect, but only...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 417–420.
Published: 01 July 2017
... exploits characteristic differences among episodic memory representations to distinguish between them. For example, memories of dreams and experienced events tend to be perceptually vivid in a way that memories of imagined events are not. The correlation is not perfect, but it provides a useful heuristic...