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equality of opportunity
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (4): 367–413.
Published: 01 October 2024
...Daniel Wodak Political egalitarians hold that there is a distinct ideal of political equality, which defines and justifies democracy. So what is political equality? The orthodox view says it is equality of opportunity for political influence , not equality of political influence . The first goal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
... opportunity and accuracy in the long run. Further, it is sometimes rationally permissible to choose the latter. The article breaks down the features of action which give rise to the trade-off, and then argues that each feature applies equally well to belief. This conclusion is an instance of a systematic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 142–144.
Published: 01 January 2005
... that others have an opportunity to acquire goods that will enable
them to achieve a level of welfare equal to our own. Such egalitarianism com-
mits Otsuka to profound restrictions on what people may do with the resources
they rightfully control, restrictions at which Locke would presumably balk...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 603–632.
Published: 01 October 2007
..., but in that event
their opportunities are not really equal.55 Furthermore, proponents of
results-based theories may take an ex ante view or incorporate the pos-
sibility of insurance, in which case many other differences would van-
ish. Regardless of these considerations, the present essay is concerned...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... a decent life, not ( just) that everyone should be likely to do so. Thus, many requirements of “equal chances” could be less misleadingly described as requirements of equal opportunity. In consequence, it is tempting to support any so-called requirement of equal chances just because one is generally...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 601–604.
Published: 01 October 2000
... attached by others to them
. . . . Phrased in the language of opportunity costs, the auction ensures that
aggregate opportunity costs are equal” (26).
According to Macleod, the problem with this solution, however, is that
the market provides Dworkin’s only mechanism for placing value on re...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 253–271.
Published: 01 April 2005
... rules out simple-minded counting principles, which
would say that an individual is equally free whenever she has n options,
irrespective of how she values those options (600–602). Menu-depen-
dent preferences also rule out reducing the value of an opportunity set
to the value of the most preferred...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 101–125.
Published: 01 January 2004
... hypothesis. More generally, the indirect character of the
doubt means that it is unable to discriminate between the various prop-
ositions it undermines. The doubt is an equal opportunity defeater. Its
shadow casts over every evident proposition. All clearly and distinctly
perceived matters thus...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 537–540.
Published: 01 October 2019
... importantly, Anderson uncovers part of the history of an idea that has gained considerable traction in recent years—the idea of relational equality. For relational egalitarians, equality is best understood in terms of our relative standing to others in society, not in terms of how certain things...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 115–118.
Published: 01 January 2007
...) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair opportunity to acquire dif-
ferential deserts” (71–72).
Olsaretti does not want her theory to rule out desert by defi nition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2007
...)
must meet a fair opportunity constraint; inequalities in desert cannot refl ect
unequal access to the bases of desert; and (4) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 121–124.
Published: 01 January 2007
...; inequalities in desert cannot refl ect
unequal access to the bases of desert; and (4) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair opportunity to acquire dif-
ferential deserts” (71–72...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 124–128.
Published: 01 January 2007
...) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair opportunity to acquire dif-
ferential deserts” (71–72).
Olsaretti does not want her theory to rule out desert by defi nition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 128–131.
Published: 01 January 2007
...; inequalities in desert cannot refl ect
unequal access to the bases of desert; and (4) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair opportunity to acquire dif-
ferential deserts” (71–72...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 131–135.
Published: 01 January 2007
...; inequalities in desert cannot refl ect
unequal access to the bases of desert; and (4) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair opportunity to acquire dif-
ferential deserts” (71–72...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 136–138.
Published: 01 January 2007
...) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair opportunity to acquire dif-
ferential deserts” (71–72).
Olsaretti does not want her theory to rule out desert by defi nition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 139–141.
Published: 01 January 2007
...)
must meet a fair opportunity constraint; inequalities in desert cannot refl ect
unequal access to the bases of desert; and (4) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 142–144.
Published: 01 January 2007
...)
must meet a fair opportunity constraint; inequalities in desert cannot refl ect
unequal access to the bases of desert; and (4) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 145–147.
Published: 01 January 2007
...) must be congruent with demands
of comparative justice, so everyone is treated equally relative to their deserts
(38). Olsaretti says, “people must have had a fair opportunity to acquire dif-
ferential deserts” (71–72).
Olsaretti does not want her theory to rule out desert by defi nition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 262–270.
Published: 01 April 2002
... philoso- phers will have about aspects of the present book, 2 I take this opportunity to raise some questions about the Rawlsian direction in which Nussbaum s con- ception of political justification seems to be headed; I hope that the great inter- est and appeal of her work in political philosophy...
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