...Jon Mandle LIBERALISM, JUSTICE, AND MARKETS: A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL EQUALITY. By Colin M. Macleod. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp.viii, 232. Cornell University 2000 Cohen, G. A. 1989 . “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” Ethics 99 : 906 -944...

...Jon Garthoff Sterba James P. From Rationality to Equality . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2013 . 240 pp. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 James P. Sterba's From Rationality to Equality summarizes and extends the author's recent work in ethical theory and political...

...Nicholas Vrousalis Thomas Alan , Republic of Equals . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . xxiv + 445 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 Alan Thomas's groundbreaking new book sets itself three main tasks. First, to effect a marriage of sorts between liberal...

... important about what the pursuit of probabilistic knowledge demands from us. It does not demand that we give hypotheses equal treatment , by affording them equal credence. Rather, it demands that we give them equal consideration , by affording them an equal chance of being discovered. © 2016 by Cornell...

...Tim Henning Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good...

... carries moral freight concerning abortion. This article surveys familiar “pro-life” principles and argues that if any of them raises moral qualms about the permissibility of aborting zygotic pregnancies, then these qualms apply equally (or at least almost equally) to the permissibility of contraception...

...Richard Bradley Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification...

...) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. Insofar as we cannot deny (i), we are either forced...

... and Jonathan Bennett in effect interprets the result to mean that PSR entails that there are no contingent truths. But reflection on parallels in philosophy of mathematics shows it can equally be interpreted either as a proof that there are “too many” contingent truths to combine in a single conjunction...

...Anders J. Schoubye M ILLIANISM and DESCRIPTIVISM are without question the two most prominent views with respect to the semantics of proper names. However, debates between MILLIANS and DESCRIPTIVISTS have tended to focus on a fairly narrow set of linguistic data and an equally narrow set of problems...

... opportunity and accuracy in the long run. Further, it is sometimes rationally permissible to choose the latter. The article breaks down the features of action which give rise to the trade-off, and then argues that each feature applies equally well to belief. This conclusion is an instance of a systematic...

... of to careers, would serve equally well. It is further argued that the circularity objection to psychological accounts can be answered without appeal to the notion of quasi-memory. Because of the internal relations between the causal profiles of mental states and the persistence conditions of their possessors...

... it in the first place. Either way, the decision should be made in light of the context of the discussion and of their relationship as a whole, rather than by comparing their respective individual moral report cards. © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 hypocrisy criticism blame equality standing...

.... Antony, 194 –214. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fitelson, Branden, and David Jehle. 2009 . “What Is the `Equal Weight View'?” Episteme 6 , no. 3 : 280 –93. Hájek, Alan. 2008 . “Arguments for—or against—Probabilism?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 : 793 –819...

... as the claim that, under present conditions, amour-propre—a concern for how one compares to others—becomes “inflamed”—very roughly, becomes a concern for superiority over others—whereas in other conditions, amour- propre would be “healthy”—would be a concern for equality with others. In section 2, I...

... in how she has responded dox- astically to the ample evidence we both have. In both cases, there seems to be little or no reason for me to revise my belief after learning of hers. Other cases resolve themselves, equally obviously, in the opposite direc- tion. If I have reason to believe that my...

... Empire . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Dworkin Ronald 1996 . Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Dworkin Ronald 2000 . Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality . Cambridge, MA...

... problem, what Beauty learns when she first awakens should have no effect on her credence in any of the hypotheses in S. Hence, since, prior to her first awakening, her credence in any given hypothesis in S should be equal to its objective chance, it should remain so when she first awakens. Let us call...

... where equally distant from each other, they cannot both be straight. If parallels are defined in terms of equidis- tance, there are still no parallel straight lines on the sphere. Consider, for example, the equator and any other line of latitude. They are every- where equidistant, but the line...

... of free and equal individuals. He also embraces the assumption that any legitimate rights exercised by states have to be derivable from rights held by individuals in a prepolitical condition. Unlike Locke, Otsuka holds that each of us may only acquire resources in the external world provided...