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epistemic value

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 235–240.
Published: 01 April 2022
...J. Adam Carter adam.carter@glasgow.ac.uk Trinkaus Zagzebski Linda , Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2020 . 364 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 Linda Zagzebski has made wide-ranging and influential...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
... the normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (2) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (3) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 237–240.
Published: 01 April 2018
... jibes with his defense of a form of antirealism about epistemic value, on which, whatever it is that makes the epistemic evaluation of belief appropriate, it's not the existence of epistemic value, as something over and above some people valuing things traditionally referred to as epistemic. What...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... rationality can be explained in terms of features of epistemic value. The standard framework is decision-theoretic: consider an agent who has a menu of doxastic options (credal-states, belief-states, or plans to update them) and a purely epistemic utility function (standardly, a measure of accuracy). What...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
.... The book has two well-coordinated parts. In the first, McCormick argues that epistemic value is inseparable from moral or prudential value: the same norms apply to belief and action. In the second, she argues that doxastic agency is basically identical to moral agency: both sorts of control involve taking...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
.... Clearly, Conservatism does not preclude me from rationally believing P at one time and not-P at another. But it does seem to put some intrinsic epistemic value on my main- taining diachronic coherence or stability of belief.’ A related principle, central to Bayesian accounts of justification...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
... features of epistemic value, one component of which is calibration. The other two features are what Murphy calls “resolution,” which for our purposes is a measure of the frequency of very high and very low (close to zero and one) probabilistic judgments a subject makes, and “uncer- tainty,” which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 363–366.
Published: 01 July 2019
.... True Enough has the important and interesting aim of accounting for the epistemic value of felicitous falsehoods, from science to art. But I worry that the resulting account is at best incomplete due to its failure to support some important epistemic distinctions: between truth and felicitous...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
... not reduce to truth. For instance, beliefs may have epistemic value if they amount to knowledge. Since this value is not perfectly luminous to the agent, we can treat it as a ‘result’ in the same way that we considered truth to be a value resulting from the choice over beliefs. Similarly, an internalist...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 191–226.
Published: 01 April 2021
...: 369–91 . Levi, Isaac. 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press . Levi, Isaac. 1991. The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press . Lougheed, Kirk. 2018a. “The Epistemic Value of Deep...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
...Kai von Fintel; Anthony S. Gillies Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... given agent, there is a 266 Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle single measure of inaccuracy that reflects that agent’s epistemic values. On this view, when we lay down conditions on legitimate inaccuracy measures, we lay down basic objective...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 597–601.
Published: 01 October 2016
... to philosophical reflection, Hume “says nothing either way about the ultimate epistemic value of his beliefs” (232). But he thinks Hume nonetheless has in hand something that provides “after all, just when hope had been lost, a satisfactory principle for determining which exercises of reason to accept and which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... or quantity—are not necessary for justified group belief. 33 By way of response, it is undeniable that this Condorcet-inspired approach shows that there can be epistemic value at the level of the group's belief that is not present at the level of any of the individual beliefs. But the question that I...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
... . The Theory of Epistemic Rationality . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Friedman Jane 2018 . “ Junk Beliefs and Interest-Driven Epistemology .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 , no. 3 : 568 – 83 . Grimm Stephen 2008 . “ Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... for a Theory of Universals .” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 : 343 – 77 . Lycan William G. 1985 . “ Epistemic Value .” Synthese 64 : 37 – 64 . ———. 2008 . “ Phenomenal Intentionalities .” American Philosophical Quarterly 45 : 233 – 52 . Maddy Penelope . 2007...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 125–129.
Published: 01 January 2014
...-carving” (28) and allows that there can be substantive disputes in the special sciences (48). Evidently there can also be laws, explanations, confirmation, and induction in the special sciences as well, and presumably there is greater epistemic value in chemistry than in some gruesome counterpart...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
..., be the set of propositions describing possible credal states, given an algebra P , that a particular agent could have. We let S , the set of states, be the set of propositions describing possible distributions of truth-values for the members of P . 32 We let U be a measure of the agent's epistemic...
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