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epistemic rationality

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (4): 329–365.
Published: 01 October 2024
...Sophia Dandelet Veritism is the idea that what makes a belief epistemically rational is that it is a fitting response to the value of truth. This idea promises to serve as the foundation for an elegant and systematic treatment of epistemic rationality, one that illuminates the importance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Michael Caie Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
..., foreseeable way in which what is rational to believe now depends on what one expects to be doing in the future. That is, epistemic rationality fundamentally concerns time . If we take historical liberties in filling out the psychological details, then this episode illustrates the importance of Pavlov’s...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 159–162.
Published: 01 January 2015
... on recently hot topics in epistemology—for example, rationality, disagreement, trust, and testimony—and also, under the surface, the latest defense of Catholicism in its centuries-long dispute with Protestantism over fundamental epistemic principles. Linda Zagzebski's highly ambitious book on epistemic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
... time is an important component of epistemic rationality. One popular way of relating an agent’s beliefs at different times involves the principle of Conservatism, according to which the fact that I currently believe P gives me some epistemic justification for continuing to believe P...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 586–589.
Published: 01 October 2003
... the notion to discuss what is surely one form of the problem of the rationality of belief. Rationality, in this book as in his earlier works, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality and Working Without a Net, is understood from a strict internalist and first-person perspective. Assessments of the rationality...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94.
Published: 01 January 2002
.... Tomberlin, 57 -89. Cambridge: Blackwell. Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee. 1985 . “Evidentialism.” Philosophical Studies 48 : 15 -34. Foley, Richard. 2000 . “Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief.” In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy , ed. R. Cobb-Stevens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... that ‘…is epistemically justified’ and ‘…is permitted by the norms of epistemic rationality’ are synonymous. 67. As, for example, George Bealer (1996a , 127; 1996b , 11; 1998 , 217) does during his highly sophisticated defense of the reliability of philosophical intuitions. 68. A point made...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
... be done for the property of rationality. While epistemic and practical rationality are often discussed separately, Lord wants to give a unified account of both in terms of normative reasons. Many have questioned whether this is even possible for just practical rationality, so Lord has his work cut out...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... rationality can be explained in terms of features of epistemic value. The standard framework is decision-theoretic: consider an agent who has a menu of doxastic options (credal-states, belief-states, or plans to update them) and a purely epistemic utility function (standardly, a measure of accuracy). What...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
... it imposes on us as inquirers. ZIP strikes me as a distinctively epistemic norm: it's the sort of norm the conforming to which makes for good inquiry; it's a norm that rational subjects in pursuit of knowledge and understanding are going to conform to; it's a norm that we'll follow if we want to successfully...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 119–122.
Published: 01 January 2008
... + 187 pp. David Christensen’s book is concerned with the relationship between logic and epistemic rationality. It is common to suppose that these are tightly interconnected. Most notably, it would seem that deductive cogency is a requirement of epistemic rationality, where “deductive cogency...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 123–126.
Published: 01 January 2008
... + 187 pp. David Christensen’s book is concerned with the relationship between logic and epistemic rationality. It is common to suppose that these are tightly interconnected. Most notably, it would seem that deductive cogency is a requirement of epistemic rationality, where “deductive cogency...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2008
...: Oxford University Press, 2004. x + 187 pp. David Christensen’s book is concerned with the relationship between logic and epistemic rationality. It is common to suppose that these are tightly interconnected. Most notably, it would seem that deductive cogency is a requirement of epistemic rationality...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 130–133.
Published: 01 January 2008
... + 187 pp. David Christensen’s book is concerned with the relationship between logic and epistemic rationality. It is common to suppose that these are tightly interconnected. Most notably, it would seem that deductive cogency is a requirement of epistemic rationality, where “deductive cogency...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 134–138.
Published: 01 January 2008
... + 187 pp. David Christensen’s book is concerned with the relationship between logic and epistemic rationality. It is common to suppose that these are tightly interconnected. Most notably, it would seem that deductive cogency is a requirement of epistemic rationality, where “deductive cogency...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2008
... + 187 pp. David Christensen’s book is concerned with the relationship between logic and epistemic rationality. It is common to suppose that these are tightly interconnected. Most notably, it would seem that deductive cogency is a requirement of epistemic rationality, where “deductive cogency...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 142–147.
Published: 01 January 2008
... and epistemic rationality. It is common to suppose that these are tightly interconnected. Most notably, it would seem that deductive cogency is a requirement of epistemic rationality, where “deductive cogency” is the the- sis that, first, epistemic rationality is incompatible with having inconsistent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 504–507.
Published: 01 July 2023
... to match KNA’s familiar explanatory successes (involving lottery propositions, Moorean statements, etc.). Unlike KNA, alternatives that require only epistemically justified or rational belief or credence can allow that a subject is epistemically proper to assert what they believe when their belief...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 515–519.
Published: 01 July 2023
... First epistemology. On this view, normative standings such as justification/rationality and knowledge bottom out in epistemic reasons. Yet it seems that only justified belief or knowledge can provide a subject S with reasons, so that we cannot take reasons as fundamental. So, apparently, perceptual...