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epistemic probability

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... . 1991 . “ Epistemic Possibilities .” Philosophical Review 100 ( 4 ): 581 – 605 . ———. 2009 . The Case for Contextualism . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Diaconis Persi Zabell Sandy L. . 1982 . “ Updating Subjective Probability .” Journal of the American Statistical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 135–139.
Published: 01 January 2020
... probability, when she acted, that B was not liable to be killed. (77) To support this idea, Lazar appeals to contrasting two-agent cases, in which innocent victims are harmed by rights violators in different epistemic situations. Though these cases provide some intuitive support for Risky Killing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... or imperfect abilities of discrimination is independent of whether the sticks in fact happen to exactly match in length (that is, Perfect and Imperfect are independent of Match and Close ). In the case described, one's prior probabilities in the three pertinent regions of epistemic space are as follows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
.... If one is a subjectivist, then the probability can be subjective probability. My own favored answer would be the “mixed physical/ epistemicprobability of my 1990 or Pollock and Cruz 2000. Roughly, the mixed physi- cal/epistemic probability of P is the objective probability of P conditional on all...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... and Chakrabarti Arindam , 125 – 61 . Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic Publishers . Fumerton Richard 2004 . “ Epistemic Probability .” Philosophical Issues 14 : 149 – 64 . Gettier Edmund 1963 . “ Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? ” Analysis 23 : 121 – 23 . Gilbert...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 241–294.
Published: 01 July 2022
... contain life is 1 ∕ n . But it does not follow in this case that the prior epistemic probability of “ α contains life” is 1 ∕ n . We must be extremely careful when we try to apply chance-credence principles to de re probabilities: chance statements are referentially transparent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... epistemic probability . 12 Hence the conundrum: Amy lacks any full beliefs that might constitute her new knowledge. The way out of such conundrums, Moss suggests, is to countenance probabilistic knowledge: credences can constitute knowledge, just as full beliefs can . Countenancing probabilistic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 139–144.
Published: 01 January 2020
... semantic treatments of logical operators, epistemic modals, and conditionals—is played in Moss's book by probability spaces: triples < Ω, F , m > consisting of a sample space, a sigma-algebra, and a probability measure. Sets of probability spaces are Moss's choice for modeling content...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
... is informative because it provides evi- dence that a certain possibility—the possibility of our having made an epistemic error—has been actualized. It makes what we already know possible more probable.23 Could we get this same sort of evidence simply by asking ourselves whether merely possible peers might...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
...David Christensen Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 3 (July 2000) Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality David Christensen 1. Diachronic Coherence in Epistemology It is obvious that we would not want to demand...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
... 86 Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism than knowledge.15 Assuming that knowledge requires a probability of one on your evidence, you are well enough positioned to assert that Q if and only if Q has a probability of one on your evidence. If knowledge requires...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Richard Pettigrew In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” James M. Joyce attempts to “depragmatize” de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our credences ought to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. This article adapts Joyce’s argument to give nonpragmatic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 143–148.
Published: 01 January 2016
... and uncertainty is through the framework of probability theory. The basic model for this way of thinking, often called “Bayesian,” is that an agent's degrees of belief can be represented by a probability function, which changes by incorporating new information as certain. The title of this book is a reference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 191–226.
Published: 01 April 2021
.... “Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering.” Philosophical Perspectives 24: 85–120 . Buchak, Lara. 2012. “Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?” In Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison, 225–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
... probability to Jones smoking. ‘Jones is more likely to smoke than drink’ may be used to assert the set of probability spaces that assign higher probability to Jones smoking than Jones drinking. This probabilistic theory can be extended to assertions made using epistemic modals and other epistemic expressions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
... that the aesthetic domain of value is detachable from the prudential. And it seems that the epistemic is too. Or it seems that way to me. So who is right—the pragmatist or the evidentialist? I'm not really sure, and that's probably significant. At a minimum, McCormick deserves some credit for shaking...