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The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones. The...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
... Epistemic States.” In Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. 2 , ed. W. Harper and B. Skyrms, 105 -34. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. BOOK REVlEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2000) PROBABILITY AhD CONDITIONALS: BELIEF...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 371–375.
Published: 01 July 2019
... Probability . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . xiv + 365 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 There is an ongoing debate about how to connect categorical beliefs to graded beliefs. That there must be such a connection has seemed a plausible premise, given that categorical and graded...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 73–114.
Published: 01 January 2018
...Conor Mayo-Wilson Epistemic closure ( ec ) is the thesis that knowledge is closed under known entailment. Although several theories of knowledge violate ec , failures of ec seem rare in science. I argue that, surprisingly, there are genuine violations of ec according to theories of knowledge widely...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
... guessing or conjecturing is something less than knowl- edge. The requirement for swearing or guaranteeing is something greater 86 Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism than knowledge.15 Assuming that knowledge requires a probability of one...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
...- lapsing the distinction between epistemic and practical rationality. Examples such as Pascal’s wager convince many that the two di- verge. But if the pragmatic goal of avoiding the costs of belief 4See I. Levi, “Probability and Evidence,” in Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief; ed. M...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 656–660.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Garber Pasnau Robert , After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . viii + 384 pp. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 This book has its origin in the Isaiah Berlin lectures that Robert Pasnau gave at Oxford...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... . “ The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory .” Mind 128 , no. 509 : 69 – 107 . Lewis, David. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2, edited by Richard C. Jeffrey. Berkeley: University of California Press . Moss, Sarah...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 269–273.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Kelly Trogdon Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. ix + 249 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
...Kurt L. Sylvan Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This article articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism , which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth . Section 1 tackles some...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Malte Willer A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
...Dilip Ninan This essay presents a puzzle concerning the interaction of epistemic modals, singular terms, and quantifiers. The puzzle poses a number of problems for both static and dynamic theories of epistemic modals. The trouble arises because neither approach takes into account the fact that...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
...Zoe Jenkin According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
... 2010 . “ What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It .” Synthese 177 , no. 1 : 67 – 89 . Foley Richard 1987 . The Theory of Epistemic Rationality . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Friedman Jane 2018 . “ Junk Beliefs and Interest-Driven Epistemology...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Richard Bradley Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology of...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... is, Perfect and Imperfect are independent of Match and Close ). In the case described, one's prior probabilities in the three pertinent regions of epistemic space are as follows: P( Imperfect & Close & Seems match ) = 0.0005 = x P( Imperfect & Match & Seems match...