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epistemic probability
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... . 1991 . “ Epistemic Possibilities .” Philosophical Review 100 ( 4 ): 581 – 605 . ———. 2009 . The Case for Contextualism . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Diaconis Persi Zabell Sandy L. . 1982 . “ Updating Subjective Probability .” Journal of the American Statistical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 135–139.
Published: 01 January 2020
... probability, when she acted, that B was not liable to be killed. (77) To support this idea, Lazar appeals to contrasting two-agent cases, in which innocent victims are harmed by rights violators in different epistemic situations. Though these cases provide some intuitive support for Risky Killing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... or imperfect abilities of discrimination is independent of whether the sticks in fact happen to exactly match in length (that is, Perfect and Imperfect are independent of Match and Close ). In the case described, one's prior probabilities in the three pertinent regions of epistemic space are as follows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
.... If one is a subjectivist, then the probability
can be subjective probability. My own favored answer would be the “mixed physical/
epistemic” probability of my 1990 or Pollock and Cruz 2000. Roughly, the mixed physi-
cal/epistemic probability of P is the objective probability of P conditional on all...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... epistemic normative requirements, would not result in further evidence that when added to the bases of G's members’ beliefs that p , yields a total belief set that fails to make sufficiently probable that p . 39 Let us begin with condition (1a), where there are three central features that should...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 241–294.
Published: 01 July 2022
... this. The objective chance that α would contain life is 1 ∕ n . But it does not follow in this case that the prior epistemic probability of “ α contains life” is 1 ∕ n . We must be extremely careful when we try to apply chance-credence principles to de re probabilities: chance statements...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... full beliefs. And sometimes these full beliefs constitute knowledge. But even when inquiry only leads researchers to adjust their degrees of belief or credences, it still plausibly delivers new knowledge, evidenced by the appropriateness of (16)–(18). 12. Epistemic probabilities, very roughly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 96–101.
Published: 01 January 2024
... Callender (2009), and myself (Hoefer 2019), among others. Beyond Chance and Credence (hereafter, BCC ) develops and defends an approach to objective probability that Myrvold first presented in a 2012 article: epistemic chance . It is a notion that blends physical objectivity with epistemic...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
... to different assignments of probabilities to situations, and hence to different normality relations, which then determine different epistemic accessibility relations. This context-sensitivity suggests a natural response to the worry that comparability leads to skepticism. The idea is that usually, when...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 139–144.
Published: 01 January 2020
...: certainly ) with scope over the prejacent, yielding (1′) as the true LF of (1): (1′) It is .9 likely that C (it is raining). Now, a compositional semantics operating on (1′) must assign a numerical probability (.9) to something that is itself epistemic: ‘certainly’-claims are accepted or rejected...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 1–32.
Published: 01 January 2024
... in various propositions upon acquiring new evidence. For a Bayesian view to count as orthodox, it must maintain that (at least) two norms govern an agent’s epistemic state. The first, probabilism , asserts that the function p representing a rational agent’s epistemic state must be a probability...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
... is informative because it provides evi-
dence that a certain possibility—the possibility of our having made an
epistemic error—has been actualized. It makes what we already know
possible more probable.23 Could we get this same sort of evidence simply
by asking ourselves whether merely possible peers might...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371.
Published: 01 July 2000
...David Christensen Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 3 (July 2000)
Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality
David Christensen
1. Diachronic Coherence in Epistemology
It is obvious that we would not want to demand...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
...
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Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
than knowledge.15 Assuming that knowledge requires a probability of one
on your evidence, you are well enough positioned to assert that Q if and
only if Q has a probability of one on your evidence.
If knowledge requires...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Richard Pettigrew In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” James M. Joyce attempts to “depragmatize” de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our credences ought to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. This article adapts Joyce’s argument to give nonpragmatic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 191–226.
Published: 01 April 2021
.... “The Will to Believe.” Excerpt reprinted in Reason and Responsibility, edited by Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau, 101–9. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson . Jehle, David, and Branden Fitelson. 2009. “What Is the ‘Equal Weight View’?” Episteme 6, no. 3: 280–93 . Joyce, James. 2005. “How Probabilities Reflect...
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